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Combined Maritime Task Force - Gulf of Guinea

From EverybodyWiki Bios & Wiki


  • Comment: As stated in the intro, "it has remained largely dormant, retaining only nine of its 19 potential coastal and island members despite a 2023 revitalization attempt." Upon further investigation via Google Search there is interest in revitalizing this organization since May 2026, and it may soon be ready to be considered a notable entry in Wikipedia. At present, sources are mostly primary or dated.
    Also, many of the primary sources are not linked URLs and such cleanup is important. Also, page numbers of primary sources are needed. Finally, there is a certain sense of LLM about which I am not certain. I would encourage references to be distributed throughout the text of the article, rather than clumped 5 or 10 at a time as seemingly (but not actually WP:OVERCITE). Fix bare URLs in the draft.
    Please resubmit with recommended changes and including secondary sources such as news reports which seem to becoming more abundant in the past 3 months.-- FeralOink (talk) 21:42, 29 September 2026 (UTC)

The Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea (CMTF-GoG) is a multinational naval task force, established as a cooperative and rapid-response capability in the Gulf of Guinea and West African coastline to combat piracy, transnational organized crime, illegal fishing, terrorism and other threats to African soveriegnty and blue economy interests.[1] The CMTF is a landmark in African maritime security, being the first African created and led combined naval unit.[2]

It was endorsed by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (SPC) in April as a "standing and ready-to-deploy" regional force, while formally launched on 1 june 2026 the CMTF-GoG headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria, by six founding member states: Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone.[3][2] The CMTF-GoG is designed to incorporate naval and coast guard assets from the 25 West and Central African signatory states of the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC).[4][1][2] Intended to compliment the information-sharing in the region's security frameworks know as Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security (YAMS), with a standing operational and survaillance capability, previously lacking in the architecture.[5]

Context and formation

History of maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea

The CMTF-GoG is predated by over two decades of developing regional maritime security cooperation. In 2001 the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was established under treaty as an international body of the oil-producing GoG states, mandated to manage border and resource disputes; it has remained largely dormant, retaining only nine of its 19 potential coastal and island members despite a 2023 revitalization attempt.[5][6]

The YCoC stands as the most significant milestone for cooperation in the region, gathering 25 African states under the joint auspices of the ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GCC[7][5] The YCoC concieved the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security or YAMS, a five-tier system of coordination: political leadership by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS and the GGC; an Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC); two regional centres, the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in West Africa (CRESMAO) and the Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC); Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCC) covering five maritime zones; and national Maritime Operation Centres (MOC).[8] The YAMS has been credited to an improved information-sharing but has also been criticized by academic literature for being non-binding, neglecting maritime threats outside piracy, duplicating efforts and for lacking an operational capacity.[9][8][10][7]

In parallel, Nigeria, the largest GoG economy, has led regional and domestic maritime security efforts, launching the Deep Blue Project in 2021 to strengthen enforcement and protect blue economy interests within its exclusive economic zone and waterways (Duodu 2025: 5).[5] Other contributing initiatives include UNODC capacity-building projects, multiple EU programs against illegal maritime activity, the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences, and the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea

Adjacent governance and security frameworks

The governing principals of the CMTF-GoG draws on multiple international and continental legal and policy frameworks rather than a single standalone treaty. The adopted Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) cites UNCLOS, SOLAS, and the African Union's 2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS).[1][5] the 2050 AIMS, adopted in 2013, consists of five strategic objectives; resource development, maritime governance, environmental protection, inter-agency cooperation and capacity building, on top of proposing to consolidating management of the continents maritime space in a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa.[5] The CMTF-GoG is further anchored as a protective measure, of maritime trade routes and the African blue economy, in AU's economic policy agenda linked to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTFA) and also framed as a step towards the AU's flagship peace and security aims initiative "Silencing the Guns".[3][11]

Political dynamics in the formation of the CMTF-GoG

Mechanisms for regional maritime security, mainly the Yaoundé Code of Conduct from 2013 relies on non-binding participation with no dedicated military or police force, a capacity gap frequently raised as a substantial limitation by scholars to regional maritime security.[8][10]The CMTF-GoG’s commander has identified the task force as specifically filling this gap, though it still depends on voluntary political and resource pledges from signatory states rather than guaranteed capacity.[2]

The AU peace and Security Council (PSC) first advocated for the establishment of a maritime task force by African littoral states on 23 July 2021.[3] Prompted by the AU PSC, regional naval leaderships began treating the concept of the CMTF during the 2022 International Maritime Conference in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Known as the Port Harcourt Declaration, Naval chiefs agreed to form a seven nation technical committee tasked with drafting an operational concept for the CMTF.[1][5] The early progress was complicated by a lack of political will to commit scarce national capacities and resources from the wider Western and Central African countries.[3][11] Initial efforts by regional naval chiefs struggled to secure regional endorsements from the ECOWAS and ECCAS, delaying necessary political commitments from heads of states.[5] This led Nigeria, the initiative's primary proponent, to pursue a central diplomatic effort in the AU and the GGC, concluding with President of Nigeria, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, offering to host the CMTF-GoG headquarters in Lagos at the 2025 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.[5][12] Shortly after the AU SPC formally endorsed the CMTF-GoG as a standing and deployable combined task force on 23 April 2025, proving enough to “flag off” the task force on 1 June 2026 in Lagos  with six operational "pioneering" members out of the 11 states that singed the CONOPS; Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone.[3][11][2]

Organization and objectives

Organization and authority of the CMTF

The principal decision-making body of the CMTF-GoG is the Committee of the Heads of Navies and Coast Guards of member states, also known as the Council of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC).[1] A Force Commander holds operational command of allotted capacities, reporting to the TCC and rotating between members every two years; commanders and all CMTF-GoG operations must follow multinational procedures ratified by the TCC and applicable national, regional and international law.[1] At the task force’s inauguration, Nigeria’s Commodore Mohammed Shettima of the Nigerian Navy was appointed as the first Force Commander.[13][14]

The CMTF-GoG Commanders operational command extends from the headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria, to two sector command centers aligning with the regional economic communities placing an ECOWAS sector command in Dakar, Senegal, and an ECCAS sector command in Pointe-Noire, Republic of Congo.[1] Liaison is maintained between CMTF-GoG and ICC, CRESMAO, CRESMAC, the MMCC's and national MOC's, as well as with the GGC, to enable the integration into the regions wider YAMS framework. All six current operational members are ECOWAS member states and no ECCAS state have yet joined despite ECCAS hosting a sector command center.[3][2]

All signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct are treated as automatic members and membership is open on an opt-in basis extending membership to states beyond the Yaoundé, while members are free to withdraw.[1] Operational burdens of financing and logistics in addition to the necessary diplomatic clearances for pledged forces and capacities to operate in foreign territory is individual responsibility of members, although the CMTF-GoG envisages the possibility of aid from other member states, ECOWAS, ECCAS, the AU, UN and other international partners and maritime industry stakeholders.[1][3]

Member contributions and force capacities

The CONOPS envisaged a 1,500-strong force built on member pledges, but capacity at launch fell significantly short of that target. At the launch of the task force in June 2026, Nigeria provided all capacities.[3][2] Of all six current operational members, Nigeria is supplying all personnel and operational capacities; three ships, one helicopter, three military trucks, two vans and two pickup trucks, in addition to hosting the temporary headquarters staff.[2] This has led the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) has cautioned against Nigeria, as principal champion of the CMTF-GoG, carrying a disproportionate share of the burden, and recommends burden-sharing measures to strengthen the task force’s legitimacy and development.[2]

Strategic objectives

The CMTF-GoG’s strategic vision is a “united, secure, safe, and resilient Gulf of Guinea, free of transnational organized crime, where people live in prosperity, peace, and security, and a region where African continental free trade and development flourish.”.[1] This vision is to be pursued by leveraging the combined maritime capacities of members states and the Yaoundé Architecture along four strategic objectives, structuring the activities of the task force:[1]

1.       PREVENT and DETER Piracy and Criminality at Sea

2.       PROTECT the Blue Economy in the GoG

3.       RESPONSE to Threats to Safety of Maritime Navigation and AfCFTA

4.       SAFEGUARD Sovereignty and resilience of GoG States

The CMTF-GoG’s mandate is to prevent and combat piracy, transnational organized crime, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), terrorism and violent extremism across the airspace, seas and coastal regions of the Gulf of Guinea.[1] Activities include joint maritime patrols and interdictions, search-and-rescue operations, maritime domain awareness (MDA) through vessel tracking and intelligence-sharing, and support for the arrest, investigation and prosecution of maritime offenders.

Contemporary maritime threat landscape in the Gulf of Guinea

Piracy

Historically piracy has been the most visible maritime security threat in the Gulf of Guinea, where the Niger Delta in Nigeria has been a principal source of pirate networks and kidnap for ransom operations going into neighboring EEZ’s, where other countries are legally responsible to under UNCLOS to ensure freedom of navigation and thus protection against piracy activities.[9][15][16] During peak activity of piracy in 2020 the GoG accounted for over 40 percent of recorded piracy incidents worldwide, with studies in 2021 estimating a yearly USD 1.925 billion in direct and indirect costs of piracy on GoG countries.[17] Since 115 incidents in 2022 activity has however fallen drastically to 22 in 2023, 18 in 2024, 21 in 2025, and falling to the lowest recorded levels since 1991 with one reported incident in the first quarter of 2026.[3][18][19] The fall in piracy has been attributed to intensified efforts international and national enforcement like Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project and strengthening coordination under YAMS.[9][20] However, analysts and scholars argue that piracy is a persistent threat to face the CMTF-GoG, pointing to the 2025-2026 resurgence of Somali piracy and the fact that socio-economic root causes of piracy and other blue crime remain effectively unaddressed in GoG countries.[5][21][20][22]

Blue crime beyond piracy; IUU, transnational organized crime and illegal oil bunkering

Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is broadly considered a significant and growing threat to both maritime security and coastal livelihoods in the region, as estimates on activity in the Gulf of Guinea place IUU catches between 40 and 65 percent of the total while putting regional losses at approximately USD 2.3 billion a year.[5][6][19][3]

Transnational organized crime operates multiple illicit markets through the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa, posing growing substance abuse and health concerns while functioning as a trafficking hub for narcotics from South America to Europe, totaling 126 tons of seized narcotics as recorded by UNODC between 2019 and 2024.[23] Transnational organized crime is also closely linked to terrorist and militant organizations in West Africa, a important threat identified by the CMTF-GoG currently heavily affecting Nigeria and other states[1][5][21] Other illicit smuggling markets using the Gulf of Guinea include weapons, wildlife, contraband, migrant smuggling and human trafficking.[5]

Illegal oil bunkering, or “petro-piracy,” is entrenched in the Niger Delta and linked to socio-economic drivers and corruption, estimated at 120,000-200,000 barrels daily and several billion USD in losses while also being a major contributor to oil-spill pollution.[5][24]

Grey zone and emerging geopolitical threats  

Scholars and researchers have begun to highlight the emerging threat is to the vulnerable subsea critical infrastructures and systems, like communication cables, along the Gulf of Guinea coastline, demonstrated by the 2024 outage from cut and disrupted cables off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire that resulted in prolonged internet disruption in 13 countries and halving internet trafficking in the region.[21][7][25][26] Much of the regional maritime critical infrastructure is fragile and response capabilities are weak to both accidental and deliberate. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies has argued that as piracy has declined, the threat landscape has shifted to grey zone activity linked partially to spillover instability and conflict from the Sahel region, moving the primary maritime insecurity problem from blue crime to challenges of state sovereignty.[18]

Challenges against the CMTF

Governance and maritime mechanism overlap and complexity in the GoG maritime security regime

A significant challenge to any initiative on maritime security often highlighted in the literature is the fragmented and overlapping regional, continental and international governance mechanism operating simultaneously alongside each other.[9][16][10][8] In the Gulf of Guinea these include the bodies in YAMS and Yaoundé Architecture, the GGC, national initiatives, and external actors' programs including the European Union's Coordinated Maritime Presences and the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea. Recent reviews conclude that this duplication of governance and technical systems has caused disharmony and diluted effectiveness, with scholars noting that GoG states remain reluctant to delegate authority and cooperate mainly when forced to by transnational threats.[9][20][27][7][5][28][8]

The challenge has been raised directly in relation to the CMTF-GoG. The sector-command structure of the CMTF-GoG is built partly on and into the existing Yaoundé Code of Conduct zonal system, assigning CMTF-GoG fleets to the same five maritime zones used by the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centers. One assessment observed that the CMTF-GoG risks adding to complexity to the inefficiencies of the Yaoundé Architecture with new overlapping structures, authority and insufficient resourcing by being developed independently and not as truly integrated operational part of the Architecture.[5] Attempting to address this increasing governance fragmentation and overlap, the AU SPC has repeatedly call for the AU Commission to from a coordination unit on maritime security between ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC and the Yaoundé Architecture bodies, but the unit has not been established as of mid-2026.[3][11]

Political and capacity commitments

Political commitments by GoG nations to the CMTF-GoG has been hesitant and uneven. The initial efforts reportedly struggled to secure foundational endorsements from ECCAS and ECOWAS, the founding CONOPS was signed by 11 Gulf of Guinea over, only six became operational members at the inauguration where Nigeria is the only operational member to have pledged actual capacities.[5][3][2] Underlying the challenges with the ongoing political commitment for the CMTF-GoG, financing has been identified as unresolved.[3] Responsibility for both financing and logistics of pledged units to the CMTF-GoG is borne by the contributing member state and the option to seek supplementary funding from the AU, UN and other external stakeholders is not established as a predictable financing mechanism.[1][11] The AU SPC has already emphasized the need for predictable financing, equitable burden-sharing and collective ownership as success variable for the project, but has not identified or proposed such concrete funding or cost-sharing arrangements.[11]This uneven political and capacity commitment may undermine perceptions of regional ownership of the task force if burden-sharing is not addressed to move beyond relying only on pledges from Nigeria.[2]

Apparent in these constraints some sources point to persistent tension of sovereignty in pooling the authority that the CMTF-GoG and effective regional maritime security cooperation requires, like shared MDA, joint operations and legal cooperation on prosecutions.[5] Complicating common operational priorities  the challenge is compounded by divergent priorities on threats, where large oil-producing states have tended to prioritize illegal oil bunkering and offshore infrastructure attacks, smaller states focus on IUU fishing and coastal criminality.[3] Similar cases from other multinational naval coalitions suggests some of these challenges may be structural rather than specific to the Gulf of Guinea. A recurring problem across these coalitions has been the so-called "legal finish" gap where vessels operating under differing national mandates and without a unified command was forced to release suspects for lack of a state willing to prosecute within their jurisdiction.[29][16] The scale of a the “legal finish” gap has been documented directly in the Gulf of Guinea where only three piracy cases reached prosecution in the past decade, despite 115 piracy incidents reported in 2020 alone.[19]

Researchers comparing the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea have also cautioned counter-piracy gains in both regions suffer from fragility if naval operations are not matched by efforts to address onshore criminal infrastructure.[30] Related capacity constraints, like lack of patrol vessels, aircraft, trained personnel and funding, have been documented as limiting factors on the broader Yaoundé Architecture that the CMTF-GoG is intended to reinforce, and have been identified as likely to affect the task force's own operational capacity in turn.[5][27]

References

  1. ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 CMTF-GoG (2023). Concept of Operations (CONOPS), The Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea (CMTF-GoG). https://cmtf-gog.org/assets/pdfs/final-conops-may-2023.pdf
  2. ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 Ewi, Martin; Walker, Timothy (24 June 2026). "New maritime task force puts Gulf of Guinea unity to the test". ISS Africa. Retrieved 2026-08-17.
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 Africa, Amani (2026, May 14). "Operationalisation of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) in addressing Piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG)". Amani Africa. Retrieved 2026-08-17. Check date values in: |date= (help)
  4. ↑ "Maritime security in West and Central Africa". www.imo.org. Retrieved 2026-08-20.
  5. ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 Duodu, K. A. (2025). Optimizing maritime security for sustainable blue economy development: A strategic framework for the Gulf of Guinea. UN–Nippon Foundation Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea Fellowship. https://www.un.org/oceancapacity/sites/www.un.org.oceancapacity/files/2025unnf_duodu.pdf
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Okafor-Yarwood, I. (2019). Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Marine Policy, 99, 414–422. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.10.036
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Andersen, M. Ø.; Vreÿ, F. (2025). "Exploring Communities of Practice for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Opportunities and Constraints". Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies. 8 (1): 521–536. doi:10.31374/sjms.396. ISSN 2596-3856.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 Yücel, H. (2021). "Sovereignty and Transnational Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: How a Network Approach can Strengthen the Yaoundé Architecture". Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies. 4 (1): 146–157. doi:10.31374/sjms.90. ISSN 2596-3856.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 Mohammed, A. (2023). "Maritime Security Governance in the Gulf of Guinea: Opportunities and Challenges of States' Responses". The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies. 10 (2): 60–77. doi:10.2307/48750352. ISSN 2288-6834. JSTOR 48750352.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Hassan, D.; Hasan, S. (2017). "Effectiveness of the Current Regimes to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: An Evaluation". African Journal of Legal Studies. 10 (1): 35–65. doi:10.1163/17087384-12340014. ISSN 2210-9730.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 Hailu, T. (2026, June 4). "Beyond the Flag-Off: Building a Sustainable Maritime Security Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea". Amani Africa. Retrieved 2026-08-17. Check date values in: |date= (help)
  12. ↑ Onanuga, B. (2025, February 17). "). Nigeria calls for combined maritime task force for the Gulf of Guinea at AU Summit, Navy to provide sea lift services". The State House, Abuja. Retrieved 2026-08-20. Check date values in: |date= (help)
  13. ↑ THISDAY. (2026, June 15). CMTF-GoG: Setting the stage for a new African approach to maritime security. https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/06/15/cmtf-gog-setting-the-stage-for-a-new-african-approach-to-maritime-security/
  14. ↑ The Daily Circular. (2026, February 23). Explainer: Nigeria-led Gulf of Guinea CMTF to launch in June, coincides with Navy's 70th anniversary. https://thedailycircular.ng/2026/02/23/explainer-nigeria-led-gulf-of-guinea-cmtf-to-launch-in-june-coincides-with-navys-70th-anniversary/
  15. ↑ Ehizuelen, M. M. O. (2023). "Assessing the national and regional effectiveness of countering maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea". GeoJournal. 88 (4): 3549–3574. Bibcode:2023GeoJo..88.3549E. doi:10.1007/s10708-022-10823-0. ISSN 1572-9893.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2024). Understanding maritime security. Oxford University Press.
  17. ↑ Security Council Report. (2022, October 31). Gulf of Guinea piracy. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-11/gulf-of-guinea-piracy.php
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Najimdeen, H., A. (2026, April 22). "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: The Shift from Piracy to Proxy Conflicts | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies". studies.aljazeera.net. Retrieved 2026-08-17. Check date values in: |date= (help)
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 Marangio, R. (2025, January). Deep waters: The maritime security landscape in the Gulf of Guinea (EUISS Brief No. 2024/22). European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-02/Brief_2024-22_Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdf
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Mohammed, Lamir Ado; Dalaklis, Dimitrios (2024-08-30). "The Current Status of Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea". Journal of Maritime Research. 21 (2): 78–86. ISSN 1697-9133.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Bueger, C., Edmunds, T., & Stockbruegger, J. (2024). Securing the seas: A roadmap for enhancing UN maritime security governance. UNIDIR.). https://unidir.org/publication/securing-the-seas-a-comprehensive-assessment-of-global-maritime-security/
  22. ↑ Jacobsen, K. L., Bruwer, C., & Rasmussen, A. M. (2026). Rethinking contemporary (counter)piracy: Lessons from the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 9(1), 47–61. https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.410
  23. ↑ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2024). World drug report 2024: Regional data for West and Central Africa. https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/westandcentralafrica/press/world_drug_report_2024.html
  24. ↑ Transparency International Defence & Security. (2019, May 30). Military involvement in oil theft in the Niger Delta. https://ti-defence.org/publications/military-involvement-in-oil-theft-in-the-niger-delta/
  25. ↑ Munga, J. (2025, March). Beneath the waves: Addressing vulnerabilities in Africa's undersea digital infrastructure. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/beneath-the-waves-addressing-vulnerabilities-in-africas-undersea-digital-infrastructure
  26. ↑ Internet Society. (2024, April 18). 2024 West Africa submarine cable outage report. https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2024/2024-west-africa-submarine-cable-outage-report/
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi; Eastwood, Oliver; Chikowore, Noleen; de Oliveira Paes, Lucas (2024). "Technology and maritime security in Africa: Opportunities and challenges in Gulf of Guinea". Marine Policy. 160 (105976). Bibcode:2024MarPo.16005976O. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2023.105976. ISSN 0308-597X. Unknown parameter |article-number= ignored (help)
  28. ↑ Schandorf, S. (2024). Reimagining counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons from the theory of infrastructure for coordination and information sharing. African Security Review, 33(4), 403–419. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2373110
  29. ↑ Guilfoyle, D. (2010). Counter-piracy law enforcement and human rights. International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 59(1), 141–169. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589309990292
  30. ↑ Şahiner, B. (2026). Multinational responses to Somali piracy: The emergence and contribution of Combined Task Force 151 (2009–2023). Journal of Transportation Security, 19(1), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12198-025-00327-6


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