Maximal extractable value
Comment: Just rephrasing what the LLM produces isn't enough, you'll have to throw everything out and write this from scratch if you want it to be accepted. msk 20:29, 6 November 2026 (UTC)
What is maximal extractable value?
Maximal extractable value (MEV) is the additional value that can be captured beyond standard block rewards and transaction fees by including, excluding, or reordering blockchain transactions. [1]The concept originated in proof-of-work systems, where it was called "miner extractable value" because miners controlled which transactions entered a block and in what order. MEV arises because transaction execution order can affect asset prices, transaction outcomes, and the state of decentralized applications.
The term MEV first appeared in the 2019 paper Flash Boys 2.0. Its meaning later expanded to cover systems in which validators and other participants, mainly searchers, influence transaction execution.[2]
How MEV arises
Blockchain transactions update a network's shared state. On a decentralized exchange, one trade can change the price available to the next trader. The same set of transactions can therefore produce different economic outcomes depending on their execution order.
On networks with a public mempool, pending transactions are visible before execution. In theory, all MEV belongs to validators because only they can guarantee the execution of a profitable MEV opportunity. In practice, searchers extract a large share of it. They analyze pending transactions and run complex algorithms on blockchain data to identify profitable opportunities, then use bots to submit the relevant transactions automatically. For a closer look at how searchers operate, BSC MEV 101, a report published by a research organization, explains how transaction visibility and competition over execution order create MEV opportunities on BNB Smart Chain.[3]
MEV ecosystems differ across blockchains. In Ethereum's MEV-Boost ecosystem, for example, searchers can submit transaction bundles to builders, who assemble candidate blocks. The validator acting as proposer then selects a block through a relay system. This process assigns the work of finding trading opportunities, building blocks, and proposing blocks to separate roles.[4]
Common types of MEV activity
- DEX arbitrage: Arbitrage is the simplest and most common MEV opportunity. Participants profit from price differences between markets. If two decentralized exchanges quote different prices for the same token, a trader can buy it on one exchange and sell it on the other. This helps prices converge across markets, an outcome DeFi aims to encourage, and supports token price stability.
- Liquidations: Liquidations in lending protocols are another common source of MEV. Protocols such as Maker and Aave require users to deposit collateral, which is then used to fund loans to other users. If market movements push the value of a borrower's debt above a specified proportion of their collateral's value, the protocol generally allows anyone to liquidate the collateral and promptly repay the lender. Participants therefore compete to liquidate positions that fall below the protocol's collateral requirements. The mechanism is similar to a margin call in traditional finance. Borrowers typically pay a substantial liquidation fee, part of which goes to the liquidator. This reward creates the MEV opportunity.
- Sandwich trading: A sandwich trade places transactions immediately before and after a target transaction and is often malicious. Searchers monitor the mempool for large DEX trades, which can significantly move a token's price in a liquidity pool. A searcher estimates the price impact, places a buy before the user's trade, and sells immediately afterward to profit from the price increase caused by the large order. A research organization's analysis of sandwich attacks on BNB Smart Chain covers both same-block and cross-block variants. It examines how attacks adapt to changes in transaction submission and filtering mechanisms.[5]
How MEV affects users and networks
Many DeFi protocols rely on economically rational participants to remain useful and stable. DEX arbitrage improves price consistency across markets, helping users trade tokens at the best available prices and at prices that more accurately reflect the market. Lending protocols depend on timely liquidations to repay lenders when borrowers' collateral ratios fall below the required level.
Some forms of MEV, including sandwich trading, can substantially worsen users' trading experience. Users caught in sandwich attacks face greater slippage and worse execution prices. At the network level, front-running bots and the gas price auctions they frequently participate in can cause congestion and drive up gas prices for other users.
The researchers behind Flash Boys 2.0 also found that, under certain conditions, revenue from transaction ordering can create incentives that threaten consensus stability. MEV can therefore affect both trading outcomes within applications and the incentives of blockchain infrastructure operators.
Measures to reduce harmful MEV activity
MEV-Boost separates block proposing from block building, allowing validators to obtain blocks from competing builders. [6]This changes how MEV extraction is organized, while opportunities to extract MEV remain.
Users can reduce their exposure to MEV attacks by submitting transactions through private channels, limiting their visibility in the public mempool. Flashbots Protect, for example, routes transactions through private infrastructure and offers configurable privacy protections and refund mechanisms.
Private submission requires users to trust the infrastructure receiving their transactions. The protection it provides depends on how that infrastructure handles transaction information. A discussion of sandwich attack defenses notes that private submission and builder filtering can reduce the risks of transaction exposure, though incentives to profit from transaction ordering and attackers' ability to adapt remain relevant concerns.[7]
References
- ↑ "Ethereum.org: Maximal extractable value". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "Daian et al.: Flash Boys 2.0". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "BlockRazor: BSC MEV 101". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "Flashbots: MEV-Boost overview". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "BlockRazor: A Brief History of BSC Sandwich Attacks and Defense". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "Flashbots Protect documentation". Unknown parameter
|url-status=ignored (help) - ↑ "BlockRazor: Sandwich attacks and defenses". Unknown parameter
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