Science of man
The science of man (or the science of human nature) is a topic in David Hume's 18th century experimental philosophy A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). The science of man expanded the understanding of facets of human nature, including senses, impressions, ideas, imagination, passions, morality, justice, and society.
The science of man first established that impressions from the senses, and memories of impressions, are the foundation of all ideas. Passions are a part of human nature and they rule over our reason in determining our actions. Morality is based on necessary actions, those we make in reaction to a certain set of circumstances, and is therefore natural.[1] However, morality is founded on self-interest, which includes the pleasure we find in sensing the pleasure in others.[2]
Hume identifies sympathy as a passion that causes us to feel for other humans because of their similarity to us. This includes our tendency to feel, to some degree, emotions that we observe in other humans. Man has been naturally inclined to develop the rules of justice over time in order to maximize pleasure. Given the tendency of self-interest to overpower the pleasure felt through sympathy, the eventual accumulation of wealth necessitated the development of some form of government, initially somewhat monarchical, to ensure that the rules of justice were followed. Hume bases his further discussions of humans as individuals and in society in A Treatise of Human Nature on the initial premises set by his science of man.
A Treatise on Human Nature and later works influenced other philosophers, such as Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant—especially in discussions of morality and cause and effect.
Relationship between passion and reason[edit]
The passions are a subgroup of impressions which in themselves are used to categorize the "perception of the mind".[1] Impressions are divided into two groups, Original impressions that represent instinctual senses that all humans are born with. Secondary(reflective) impressions represents passions and arise directly from original impressions.[1] The passions are divided into two categories, "direct passions" which are the raw emotional state human being experience when under intense emotions. "Indirect Passions" are of the same principles of direct passions but have gained additional complexity to them.[1]
Hume makes the distinction that in the relationship between passion and reason, passion shall always supersede the former. He first states that passion is the raw emotion that proceeds in the mind whenever someone is faced with "pleasure and pain".[1] Reason alone cannot provide man the impulse to perform action, but passions that come from emotions that cause us to "avoid or embrace" an object can provide this purpose.[1] Reason than is tool used to understand how the source of the emotion may affect the person themselves and guide them to react to said object.[1]
Reason alone cannot prevent nor stop a passion from proceeding. Reason has no capability of creating the impulse to act, thus if reason alone cannot act, it cannot oppose a passion.[1]
When one feels passion, that is the raw emotional state that all judgments that proceed from that state shall be based off.[1] Thus passion cannot be "reasonable or unreasonable" because all judgments made shall originate from this passion. What can makes a passion unreasonable is not the passion itself but the ideas that form around that emotional state.[1]
Relationship between morality and self interest[edit]
Morality is not based on reason because reason itself does not have the capacity to create action.[1] A system of virtue is favorable to humans because it is created with self interest, if anyone were to join this system, they do so in the pursuit that the system will work for them.[2] Secondarily following this system of morality creates passion of pleasure by allowing humans to present themselves better than others through their virtues.[2] They receive enjoyment through praise and continue to do so in order to receive further praise. Thus humans through envy shall try to receive the same pleasures as well, leading to a more moral society.[2]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 Hume, David (1999). A Treatise of human nature being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. Kitchener, Ont. : Batoche. pp. 192–313. Search this book on
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Hume, David (1983). Schneewind, J.B., ed. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Indianapolis- Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 79–81. ISBN 0915145464. Search this book on
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