Talk:NOA CIRCLE EXPOSED

QBF Financial Group – Comprehensive Forensic Dossier

Executive Summary

QBF (КьюБиЭф) was a decade-long, cross-border Ponzi network that defrauded investors of at least ₽2 billion, with total losses plausibly reaching ₽5–7 billion . From 2011 to 2021, the scheme siphoned funds through jurisdictions including Russia, Cyprus, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands and others under the guise of legitimate investments. The group’s deception rested on four main pillars:

1. Prestige Façade: QBF projected an image of success by occupying luxurious offices in prime locations – notably multiple floors in Moscow’s high-end City of Capitals tower and an iconic historic building in St. Petersburg. These impressive offices with marble lobbies and panoramic views gave investors a false sense of security and prestige.
2. Digital Manipulation: A covert reputation-management campaign – masterminded by fugitive director Linda Athanasiadou – flooded the internet with positive content and fake testimonials while burying negative reviews. QBF’s team created a “link farm” of hundreds of websites touting QBF, used SEO tricks to dominate search results, and even pursued legal takedowns to suppress criticism . This digital onslaught made it difficult for potential clients to find warnings or bad press about QBF.
3. Regulatory Camouflage: The network maintained a Cyprus Investment Firm (CIF) license to tout itself as “EU regulated,” even after losing all Russian licenses in 2021. The Cyprus entity (originally QBF Investment Ltd, later renamed Constance Investment Ltd and then Pruden Ventures Capital Ltd) provided a veneer of legitimacy while Russian authorities were closing in. In reality, the Cypriot arm often served to placate foreign regulators and clients – for example, CySEC (Cyprus SEC) imposed only minimal fines (e.g. €20k in 2024 for record-keeping violations ) on the firm despite its principals being under criminal investigation elsewhere.
4. Offshore Layering: A maze of shell companies and accounts across borders concealed the money trail. Top entities like White Lake Management Ltd (Cayman Islands) and Simtelligence Company Ltd (Hong Kong) were used to funnel client funds rapidly into real estate projects (e.g. the Gribovsky Forest luxury residential complex near Moscow) and other assets benefiting QBF’s mastermind, Roman Shpakov. Assets were often held via offshore vehicles in places like the British Virgin Islands (e.g. QCCI Ltd), Marshall Islands (e.g. La Casa International Ltd), or obscure jurisdictions, making tracing difficult .

By mid-2021 the façade began to crumble. Clients seeking to withdraw funds were met with a litany of stalling excuses (“market volatility,” “technical issues with custodians,” “compliance reviews”) as QBF struggled to cover payouts. Eventually, communications went dark – calls and emails unanswered – a red flag that triggered regulatory intervention. Russian authorities opened a criminal case in 2021, uncovering that no real investing was happening at all. QBF was an elaborate lie – using the language and paperwork of legitimate finance but operating a pure Ponzi scheme. As one victim aptly put it: “Everything is fine as long as you’re giving them money. As soon as you try to withdraw – they disappear.”

Four senior QBF Russia managers were convicted in 2023–2024 and received heavy prison terms (13 to 18 years each) . However, key architects Roman Shpakov and Linda Athanasiadou remain at large, having fled abroad. Shpakov was indicted in absentia and is now internationally wanted by Interpol – investigators allege he orchestrated the scheme that stole around 5–7 billion rubles. He left Russia even before the case was opened (reportedly via forged documents) and later surfaced in London via the UAE . Athanasiadou similarly vanished from Cyprus. Authorities have frozen roughly ₽1.2 billion in assets to date – only about one-third of proven losses – underscoring the challenges in recovering the proceeds of this transnational fraud.

This dossier provides a consolidated analysis of the QBF scheme’s timeline, structure, methods, key players, international footprint, regulatory failings, and victim impact. It also includes recommendations for reforms and extensive appendices of evidence. All names are presented in English with original-language spellings for clarity (e.g. Roman Shpakov – Роман Шпаков; Linda Athanasiadou – Λίντα Αθανασιάδου). The aim is to deliver an authoritative fact-based account for regulators, legal teams, and victims, ensuring that all known facts are organized and preserved – and that the lessons from the QBF fraud lead to justice and systemic change.

Section 1: Introduction and Background

QBF was founded in 2011 as a Moscow-based financial services firm that marketed itself as a sophisticated investment company. It promised clients unusually high returns through purported investments in securities and exclusive over-the-counter options. In reality, as uncovered by investigators, QBF operated a Ponzi-style fraud – effectively using new investor funds to pay nominal returns to earlier investors while siphoning off most money for the organizers’ benefit.

From the outset, Roman Vladimirovich Shpakov (Роман Шпаков) was the driving force behind QBF. Under his leadership, QBF aggressively expanded its client base by cultivating an image of elite finance. The company hosted seminars, ran glossy marketing campaigns, and courted wealthy individuals – including celebrities, clergy, and government officials – often offering VIP concierge treatment . By projecting success and exclusivity, QBF convinced many to entrust their money. Clients would sign brokerage or trust management contracts with QBF, giving its “professional traders” authority to invest on their behalf. In reality, little to no genuine trading took place – client funds were diverted almost immediately into a web of accounts controlled by QBF principals.

By the mid-2010s, QBF boasted thousands of clients and claimed to manage tens of millions of dollars. It sent out fabricated account statements showing steady profits, further lulling investors. Internally, however, the company kept track of how much “real” money was left versus obligations to clients – classic Ponzi bookkeeping. Occasional payouts to select investors were made not from any investment gains, but from new deposits (a fact later confirmed in internal emails and chats). This house of cards grew larger each year.

Warning signs did exist. QBF’s advertised returns were extraordinarily high (often 5–10% per quarter, far above market norms), and its business model opaque. A few skeptical voices on internet forums called QBF a possible “financial pyramid.” But those warnings were drowned out by QBF’s own online PR campaign (see Section 3 and Section 9 for digital tactics and whistleblower efforts). Until 2021, no regulator or law enforcement body took decisive action. QBF continued to operate openly, even winning minor industry awards and courting institutional clients.

By early 2021, cracks were showing: withdrawal delays increased and rumors swirled. It wasn’t until May 2021 – when a high-profile client (a relative of a Russian official) complained about stolen funds – that Russian authorities finally raided QBF’s Moscow offices and initiated a criminal case . This marked the beginning of the end for QBF, revealing the decade-long fraud beneath the lavish veneer.

(Operational Timeline: A detailed chronology of key events from 2011–2025, including company launches, client complaints, regulatory actions, and court proceedings, is provided in Appendix F and the timeline graphic [FIG-02A].)

Section 2: Structure of the Fraud Scheme

QBF’s fraud was highly organized, functioning as a hierarchical criminal enterprise with clearly defined roles for participants. According to the Russian criminal indictment, the scheme was orchestrated in multiple stages and “functional subdivisions,” roughly as follows:

• Establishment of Shell Companies: Under Shpakov’s direction, QBF’s leadership created numerous legal entities in Russia and abroad to receive and disguise client funds. For example, in Russia they formed LLCs such as “QBF Investment Company”, “KF Estate SPB”, and “K Investment”. Internationally, they set up entities like Constance Investment Ltd (Cyprus, reg. HE333743) and QCCI Ltd (BVI) . These entities signed bogus contracts with QBF or with clients, and maintained bank accounts to funnel money. The sheer number of companies allowed QBF to shuffle funds in circles, making it hard for outsiders to trace the flow. (Appendix E contains an asset tracing matrix charting these inter-company flows.)
• Recruitment of Key Personnel: Shpakov and his deputies recruited trusted associates to manage different parts of the operation. Each major co-conspirator was put in charge of a “functional subdivision” of the scheme. For instance, Vladimir Pakhomov (Владимир Пахомов) led the unit handling investor relations and sales in Russia, while later Linda Athanasiadou (Λίντα Αθανασιάδου) led a unit operating out of Cyprus focusing on international aspects . Other lieutenants included Zalim Munaev (Залим Мунаев), Stanislav Matyukhin and Evgenia Rossieva, each heading sub-teams. Below them was a pyramid of lower-level managers, brokers, and administrative staff who directly interacted with victims or moved money as instructed. (See Section 3 for profiles of key individuals.)
• Deceptive Investment Contracts: The group developed standard sets of bogus contracts – e.g. brokerage agreements, trust management agreements – that gave an appearance of legitimacy. Clients were made to sign these documents (often in QBF’s impressive offices) which ostensibly authorized QBF to invest their funds in stocks, bonds, options, etc. In reality, these contracts were a sham; after clients handed over their money, it was not invested as promised. Nonetheless, the paperwork provided cover. Forensic analysis of sample contracts (Appendix C) shows they contained clauses about market risk and regulatory compliance, lulling victims into thinking their money was safely managed.
• Ponzi-Style Payouts: To sustain confidence, QBF did pay out funds to some investors – but crucially, not from profits, only from new investors’ money. Early clients (2011–2015) often received periodic “interest” or were allowed occasional small withdrawals, which encouraged them to reinvest and refer others. Internal communications uncovered in the investigation show instances where new deposits were immediately used to pay off antsy earlier investors – a classic Ponzi tactic . By keeping a subset of investors happy (or at least quiet), QBF was able to attract fresh money for years. This cycle continued until the incoming funds could no longer cover the outflows.
• Obstruction and Excuses on Redemptions: When the scheme began teetering (especially in 2020–2021 as more clients demanded large withdrawals), QBF resorted to stalling tactics. Clients who asked to redeem funds were given endless excuses: “global market volatility, please be patient,” “technical issues with our foreign custodian,” “ongoing audit, your funds will be available next month,” etc. Managers had scripted responses and were instructed to string clients along as long as possible . In many cases, redemption requests simply went unanswered for weeks. By early 2021, numerous clients received no response at all – local QBF offices quietly shut their doors, and staff either quit or were told by superiors to cut off communication entirely. This sudden silence in early 2021 was one of the first obvious indicators to outsiders that something was very wrong.
• Money Laundering & Asset Concealment: Behind the scenes, the stolen funds were layered through dozens of accounts globally to conceal their origin. According to investigators, client money traveled through at least seven jurisdictions in a convoluted trail. For example, ₽500 million went from QBF’s Cyprus entity (QCCI Ltd) to an affiliate in Belize (FFIN Brokerage Services Inc.), then to a shell in the Marshall Islands (La Casa International Ltd), and then onward to personal accounts of QBF principals . Large sums were quickly converted into other assets: QBF bosses purchased luxury condos, high-end cars, even fine art. Substantial amounts were sunk into real-estate projects like the Gribovsky Forest development outside Moscow – allowing Shpakov later to claim the funds were “loans” or legitimate investments in these projects. By the time law enforcement froze QBF’s known accounts in mid-2021, most were near empty; the money had been washed into assets and foreign banks outside immediate reach. (Appendix E provides charts of these flows, and Appendices G and H include court documents from Cyprus related to freezing orders and injunctions.)

(Figure [FIG-04B]: Step-Wise Money Flow Diagram – illustrating how an investor’s funds moved through layers of QBF shell companies and accounts to ultimately end up in assets controlled by Shpakov. This infographic highlights key entities and transactions identified by investigators.)

In summary, QBF never engaged in genuine investing on behalf of its clients. It was an elaborate charade – mimicking a legitimate investment business (with contracts, statements, and offices) but with the sole aim of stealing money. The structure of the operation allowed the fraud to scale up over a decade, until external pressures finally exposed the house of cards.

Section 3: Key Entities and Individuals Involved

Roman Shpakov – Founder & Ultimate Beneficiary. Roman V. Shpakov (Роман Шпаков) is identified as the mastermind of the scheme. A Russian national in his mid-30s, Shpakov positioned himself as a successful financier. Internally, he had the final say on all major decisions and personally orchestrated the layering of companies. Shpakov owned or controlled numerous entities in Russia and offshore (often via proxies). When the scheme unraveled, he fled Russia (January 2021) and later was reported in London . In October 2021 he was arrested in absentia by a Russian court and is currently on Interpol’s wanted list . His current whereabouts are uncertain; investigators believe he still controls significant assets abroad.

Linda Athanasiadou (aka Linda Kovalenko, Torres, Athanasiades) – Director & Head of International Operations. A Greek-Cypriot individual, Linda Athanasiadou became involved with QBF around 2013. Shpakov recruited her to lead a “functionally separate subdivision” focusing on moving funds through Cyprus and other foreign channels . She was a director of QBF’s Cyprus entities and the liaison for QBF’s offshore banking. Athanasiadou also spearheaded QBF’s reputation management efforts online (see Section 9). After QBF’s collapse, she left Cyprus; she is wanted by Russian authorities and was last believed to be in hiding (possibly in Cyprus or Greece, or under an alias). Notably, Cypriot regulators failed to act on early warnings about her (Appendix I details whistleblower reports naming her).

Vladimir Pakhomov – Director of Regional Sales (Russia). Vladimir S. Pakhomov (Владимир Пахомов) was Shpakov’s early associate and led QBF’s sales network in Russia . He oversaw teams of client managers who brought in new investors. Pakhomov personally pitched to VIP clients and handled a lot of the front-facing business in Moscow and St. Petersburg. He was arrested in 2021 and convicted in 2023 of large-scale fraud. He is currently imprisoned (sentence: 18 years) .

Stanislav Matyukhin – General Director (Russia). Stanislav A. Matyukhin (Станислав Матюхин), notably a grandson of a former Central Bank official, was QBF’s CEO in name. Internally, Matyukhin managed day-to-day operations and helped design the fake financial products. He was arrested alongside Pakhomov and convicted; he received 17 years in prison .

Evgenia Rossieva – Head of Legal / Compliance. Evgenia A. Rossieva (Евгения Россиева) joined QBF around 2016 and was responsible for legal paperwork and liaising with regulators. Investigators found that Rossieva helped forge documents (for instance, a fake Deloitte audit report presented to clients) and handled client complaints by providing reassurances. She was convicted and sentenced to 15 years .

Alexei Golubev – Head of St. Petersburg Office. Alexei S. Golubev (Алексей Голубев) managed QBF’s operations in Saint Petersburg, including a branch office and a local team of brokers. He was involved in courting wealthy northern-region clients. Golubev was also convicted and got 13 years . During trial, evidence showed Golubev actively participated in covering up the scheme’s losses – one co-conspirator testified that Golubev helped concoct false stories to pacify investors .

Zalim Munaev – Deputy Director & Special Projects. Zalim V. Munaev (Залим Мунаев) was initially a lower-level manager but rose to become an important figure. He handled some of QBF’s riskier ventures, possibly including attempts to invest in or launder money through unusual channels (like cryptocurrency, see Section 16). Munaev was arrested in 2021 and, according to reports, cooperated to some extent with investigators (his testimony is referenced in the indictment and on QBFExposed) . Munaev’s status is somewhat unique – he may have received a slightly reduced sentence (reports suggest he might have been sentenced but details weren’t public). (Note: Munaev’s detailed testimony analysis is available in an investigative report by Tech4Good Not4Spoof .)

Noa Circle & Apollon Athanasiades: Noa Circle is a Cyprus-based fiduciary services company that became entangled in QBF’s web. Apollon Athanasiades (Απόλλων Αθανασιάδης), a Cypriot, is Linda Athanasiadou’s husband and was associated with Noa Circle. This firm provided nominee director and company formation services. Evidence suggests Noa Circle helped set up some QBF shell companies and bank accounts in Cyprus and possibly facilitated moving funds (perhaps unwittingly, perhaps not). Cypriot regulators investigated Noa Circle’s role – an ICPAC (accountants’ institute) inquiry was prompted by whistleblower reports in 2021–2022 (see Section 9). No formal charges have been announced against Apollon or Noa Circle as of 2025, but they are a focus of ongoing inquiries.

Other Shell Companies and Figures: The QBF network included dozens of minor entities and associates. For example, White Lake Management Ltd (Cayman) was nominally directed by a professional incorporator; Simtelligence Ltd (Hong Kong) listed Shpakov and a local agent; FFIN Brokerage (Belize) was linked to a separate brokerage firm; Argento Access S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) and others were used to park funds or sign contracts . Appendix A provides a summary of known corporate affiliates and their roles. Many of these entities had straw directors or nominee officers – figureheadswho lent legitimacy without knowing the full extent of the fraud . A full list of ~120 associated companies, with jurisdictions and status, has been compiled in a spreadsheet (Appendix H).

(Multilingual Note: Key individuals are referenced in Russian and/or Greek where applicable to ensure clarity across jurisdictions. For instance, Linda Athanasiadou is also known by the surname Kovalenko (her earlier name in Russia) and Torres (an alias used in some documents). The Role Matrix [FIG-03A] in Appendix A charts these cross-references of names, languages, and positions.)

Section 4: Russian Criminal Investigation & Findings

The Russian authorities’ investigation into QBF, launched in 2021, was comprehensive and ultimately confirmed that QBF was operating as a criminal association (organized crime group). It culminated in an official indictment (Criminal Case № 12001450007000902) issued in late 2021, which charged Shpakov and his accomplices under Articles 159 (fraud) and 210 (organization of a criminal community) of the Russian Criminal Code . Some key findings and events from the Russian case:

• Raids and Case Opening (May–June 2021): Following complaints by high-profile victims, Moscow police (MVD) conducted raids on QBF’s offices in Moscow City on May 31, 2021 . Investigators seized computers and documents. A criminal case was formally opened in June 2021. By this time, Shpakov had already fled abroad, but several senior QBF executives were detained for questioning.
• Evidence Uncovered: Investigators discovered extensive evidence of fraud, including false financial statements, internal communication that openly discussed using new investor money to pay old investors, and proof that QBF had no active trading accounts in the volumes it claimed. They also found lists of “VIP clients” who were handled specially (given hush payments or extra attention). Perhaps most damning, the probe uncovered forged documentssuch as a counterfeit audit report purportedly from Deloitte (Appendix I includes reference to this false audit and Deloitte’s denial of involvement ).
• Arrests and Charges: In September–December 2021, Russian authorities arrested Stanislav Matyukhin, Vladimir Pakhomov, Evgenia Rossieva, and Alexei Golubev – the four who ended up standing trial. They were charged with large-scale fraud and participation in an organized criminal enterprise. Roman Shpakov and Linda Athanasiadou, being abroad, were charged in absentia. In October 2021, a Moscow court issued an international arrest warrant for Shpakov . Athanasiadou was placed on a CIS-wide wanted list. The indictment listed these two as organizers, with the four arrested as key accomplices, and mentioned “unidentified persons” who also took part (investigators believe a number of lower-level staff knowingly aided the scheme, but not all were individually charged).
• Indictment Details: The indictment (a lengthy document, excerpts of which are translated in Appendix C) outlines how Shpakov “using his official position, formed a criminal association” to embezzle money from citizens under the guise of brokerage services . It describes how Shpakov recruited Pakhomov by March 2012, giving him a leading role in the first subdivision and tasks such as recruiting more members and opening companies (e.g., KF Estate SPB) . It details Linda Athanasiadou’s recruitment by end of 2013 to lead a second subdivision (the Cyprus/offshore channel) . And by August 2017, Evgenia Rossieva was recruited to lead a third subdivision (perhaps focusing on legal cover and VIP clients) . The indictment painstakingly enumerates dozens of fraudulent acts – for instance: “on 30.07.2014, [QBF] committed embezzlement of ₽X under a fake investment contract…”repeated for numerous dates . It also lists the responsibilities assigned to each member of the enterprise (e.g. Pakhomov was tasked with hiring and managing branch directors, Athanasiadou with overseas banking and PR, etc. – see Appendix A for a summary chart).
• Seizure of Assets: During the investigation, Russian authorities managed to freeze some assets. They seized bank accounts belonging to QBF’s Russian entities (though these had limited funds by then) and placed liens on several properties: notably a shopping mall in Kazan that Shpakov had invested in, and some luxury vehicles. However, many assets were beyond Russian jurisdiction. In mid-2021, the Central Bank of Russia annulled QBF’s licenses and ordered the firm to return all client funds by Jan 2022 . Of course, QBF could not do so – the money was gone.
• Trial and Verdict (2023): The trial of Matyukhin, Pakhomov, Rossieva, and Golubev in Moscow’s Presnensky District Court lasted through 2022 into early 2023. In March 2023, the court delivered a verdict, finding all four guilty of fraud (Article 159 Part 4) and sentencing them to 13–18 years in a strict-regime penal colony . The specific sentences were: Pakhomov – 18 years, Matyukhin – 17 years, Rossieva – 15 years, Golubev – 13 years. These harsh penalties reflected not only the ₽2 billion proven stolen, but also the large number of victims (around 500 formally recognized victims) and the organized nature of the crime. During the trial, some sensational sub-plots emerged, including allegations that certain FSB security service officers had attempted to extort bribes from QBF’s owners to “resolve” the case (this is detailed in a Rucriminal report , and led to a separate investigation into those officers).
• Continued Investigations: Though the main trial ended, Russian investigators indicated the case remains open with regard to fugitives and any additional accomplices. In particular, Shpakov and Athanasiadou will face trial in absentia if not apprehended. As of 2025, Shpakov’s name appears on Interpol Red Notices, and authorities claim to be pursuing leads on his and Linda’s assets abroad (see Section 12 on asset recovery).

In summary, the Russian criminal investigation thoroughly documented how QBF operated as a criminal enterprise. It not only brought core perpetrators to justice domestically, but also produced a blueprint of the fraud that has informed other jurisdictions (e.g. Cyprus and UK actions). The indictment and verdict from Russia essentially confirm QBF was a Ponzi pyramid masquerading as a broker, and they formally identify the network of companies and people involved. (Key excerpts from these Russian case documents are provided in Appendices C and D.)

Section 5: Convicted and Fugitive – Status of Key Perpetrators

The outcomes of the Russian criminal case resulted in two categories of perpetrators: those caught and convicted in Russia, and those who remain fugitives evading justice. Below is the status summary of the key individuals:

• Convicted and Imprisoned in Russia: Stanislav Matyukhin – Convicted of major fraud; serving 17-year prison term . Vladimir Pakhomov – Convicted; serving 18-year term (the longest sentence) . Evgenia Rossieva – Convicted; serving 15-year term . Alexei Golubev – Convicted; serving 13-year term . All four are also ordered jointly to pay restitution to victims (though recovering funds may be impractical given the money was dissipated). They are incarcerated in Russian penal colonies as of 2025. Notably, none of them have publicly cooperated to help recover assets; however, Munaev’s partial cooperation during investigation (if any) is not fully disclosed.
• Fugitives (Wanted Persons): Roman Shpakov – Indicted as the leader; on the run internationally . Last known to be in London (via UAE). Subject of Interpol Red Notice. Russian prosecutors have pursued his extradition but without a confirmed location, this is stalled. His extensive assets abroad are targets of ongoing asset tracing (see Section 12). Linda Athanasiadou – Indicted; fugitive likely in Cyprus or elsewhere in Europe. As a Cypriot national, she is under a domestic Cypriot investigation (Cyprus opened its own case in 2022, see Section 8) but she has not been apprehended. Russia has issued a warrant for her as well. Others: A few mid-level participants also fled Russia: for example, a branch manager in Yekaterinburg and a finance officer left the country before they could be questioned. These individuals are named in case materials as unindicted co-conspirators. Their roles were smaller, but they could face charges if found.
• Financial Penalties and Bans: The convicted persons have been banned from engaging in financial or managerial roles for additional years after release. In parallel, the Central Bank of Russia blacklisted them. CySEC in Cyprus likewise barred Shpakov and Athanasiadou (under their known aliases) from serving in any capacity in Cyprus investment firms (though one might argue this is symbolic given they are fugitives).

The stark difference in outcomes – some perpetrators jailed, others absconded – underscores the cross-border complexity. While Russia took decisive action against those within reach, bringing the overseas orchestrators to justice remains an unfinished task. Sections 8 and 12 discuss efforts in Cyprus and the UK to hold the fugitives accountable. Authorities are also exploring avenues like in absentia trials or civil forfeiture against Shpakov and Athanasiadou’s assets in various jurisdictions.

Section 6: International Network of Companies and Money Flows

The QBF fraud was not confined to Russia – it extensively utilized an international network of companies and bank accounts to launder and store illicit funds. Mapping this network has been a major focus of investigators. Key aspects of the global money flows include:

• Cyprus Hub: Cyprus emerged as a critical second hub for QBF’s operations. QBF’s Cyprus subsidiary (QBF Investment Ltd, later Constance Investment/Pruden Ventures) held client accounts and even solicited some investors from Europe. Athanasiadou and Apollon Athanasiades, operating from Cyprus, facilitated moving large sums to offshore accounts. For instance, money from Russian QBF accounts would be sent to Constance Investment Ltd (Cyprus), then quickly wired out to shell companies in other countries (often within days). Cyprus’s banking system and EU status gave a veneer of legitimacy. However, a significant portion of stolen funds transited Cyprus and were then layered further abroad (see Section 8 for legal actions in Cyprus).
• Cayman Islands & BVI: White Lake Management Ltd (Cayman) was one of Shpakov’s primary holding vehicles. Evidence shows that White Lake received at least $10 million from QBF sources, which it then used to invest in property projects (like Gribovsky Forest) under the guise of a legitimate investor. The British Virgin Islands entity QCCI Ltd similarly was a pass-through: it received funds (e.g., ₽500 million in one case) and then forwarded them to other offshore accounts . Both Cayman and BVI were chosen for their secrecy; beneficial ownership was concealed by nominee directors. Mutual legal assistance requests have been sent to these jurisdictions to freeze any remaining balances.
• Belize and Vanuatu Entities: The network included at least one entity in Belize (FFIN Brokerage Services Inc.) and references to a Vanuatu-registered brokerage. These were likely used to create fake “investment” channels. For example, QBF told some clients their money was being managed by an overseas partner; in one case, a client agreement mentioned a “Hong Kong fund” and a “Vanuatu brokerage,” but investigators found those were shell fronts . Funds sent to the Vanuatu entity were immediately moved to QBF-controlled accounts elsewhere. (Appendix E notes that obtaining passport stamps or flight logs for trips to Vanuatu and Armenia is an open evidence item – suggesting QBF principals may have traveled to set up accounts there .)
• Hong Kong & Asia: Simtelligence Company Ltd in Hong Kong was nominally a trading partner for QBF – in reality, it was controlled by Shpakov (with a local secretary provided by a corporate service). QBF pitched some Asian investment opportunities and claimed to have operations in Hong Kong. Money that went to Simtelligence’s Hong Kong bank was then funneled to accounts in Singapore and the UAE, often converted to other currencies or crypto. There is also evidence that in late 2019, when scrutiny in Russia increased, Shpakov explored moving funds to Armenian banks (AmeriaBank is mentioned in internal documents ). Armenia’s banking secrecy and its non-EU status may have attracted QBF; however, whether significant sums were moved there is unclear. Investigators are seeking bank correspondence from AmeriaBank (Appendix E lists this as needed) to trace if accounts were opened.
• United Arab Emirates: Shpakov’s escape route through the UAE was likely not coincidental – the UAE (Dubai in particular) was also used to park some assets. At least one luxury property in Dubai is suspected to be purchased with QBF funds under a proxy name. The UAE’s role is under investigation, and the possibility of crypto-assetsbeing held there is explored (see Section 16). An INTERPOL liaison in Abu Dhabi has been engaged to identify any bank accounts linked to Shpakov or his aliases.
• Europe (Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, UK): QBF and its principals interfaced with European financial systems too. Argento Access S.à r.l. in Luxembourg and a few Liechtenstein trusts were identified in the paperwork of certain deals . These may have been intermediate holding structures for funds invested in European assets or vehicles to obscure beneficial ownership. In the UK, while QBF had no official operations, significant funds ended up in UK bank accounts and real estate – often via the offshore companies. For example, a portion of stolen money was invested in a London property under the name of Linda Athanasiadou’s family member (this claim is noted by whistleblower sources in Appendix I). The UK’s response is discussed in Section 12 (POCA orders and investigations into money laundering).

Overall, the international network shows a classic money laundering layering: Russian client money moved to an EU-based entity (Cyprus), then to offshores (BVI, Marshall Is., etc.), then to personal or investment vehicles in various countries. Many of these transfers were disguised as loans or investments. For instance, QBF’s records might show “Loan to White Lake Management – $5M” which in reality was stolen cash moved to Shpakov’s offshore. The complexity was deliberate – to throw off investigative trails.

(Figure [FIG-06A]: Global Flow of Funds Diagram – a world map highlighting key jurisdictions (Russia, Cyprus, Belize, Marshall Islands, Cayman, Hong Kong, UAE, UK) and the flow of money between entities in those locales.)

Despite this complexity, investigators have made progress. By pooling information internationally (Interpol channels, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties), they have identified many of these entities. Appendix E provides a matrix of known fund flows. Not all money is accounted for, but the pattern is clear: QBF’s cross-border web was integral to hiding the fraud’s proceeds. Each jurisdiction’s involvement is further detailed in Section 15 (country profiles).

Section 7: Financial Discrepancies and Red Flags

One of the glaring red flags in the QBF saga was the discrepancy between QBF’s ostensible business and its financial reality. Numerous indicators – had they been heeded in time – could have exposed the fraud earlier. This section highlights key financial anomalies and warning signs:

• Implausible Revenue vs. Expenditure: QBF claimed to generate substantial profits for clients, yet its regulatory filings (when available) showed minimal legitimate revenue. For example, QBF’s Russian broker-dealer reports in 2019 showed only modest fee income, utterly insufficient to cover the lavish expenses of its offices and staff. Analysis by investigators compared the estimated monthly operational costs (e.g. Moscow City office rent, high salaries, luxury client events) to the fee revenue QBF officially reported – the gap was enormous. Effectively, operational costs far exceeded any real income, which was only possible by continuously taking in new investor money to fill the hole. (This is illustrated in the figure below, using data from the indictment and lease records.) Figure [FIG-07A]: QBF Financial Reality vs. Façade – A chart comparing QBF’s genuine income to its expenses, demonstrating that the shortfall was covered by incoming investor funds (Ponzi mechanics).
• Audit Irregularities: QBF often touted that it was audited by reputed firms (there were mentions of “audits by Deloitte” to assure clients). In truth, no big-four audit was ever performed. In one case, QBF presented to a large client a document claimed to be an audit certificate from Deloitte; it was later confirmed to be a forgery (Deloitte had never audited QBF) . The fact that QBF’s financials were never transparently audited or published was a red flag. Russian regulations require investment firms to publish annual financial statements – QBF largely failed to do so after 2018, citing excuses.
• Client Account Statements Too Consistent: Many clients received account statements showing steady, linear growth (e.g. ~8% per quarter, every quarter). In genuine market investing, returns fluctuate. The unnaturally consistent gains reported by QBF should have raised suspicions. A few savvy clients did question how QBF always beat the market; they were given complex, vague explanations or pointed to supposed “insider strategies.” The consistency was in fact because QBF simply fabricated numbers.
• Delayed Withdrawals and “Reinvesting” Pressure: Starting around 2018, some clients experienced delays when trying to withdraw larger amounts. QBF would pressure them to keep the money in, sometimes offering a bonus interest for agreeing to reinvest. This is a classic Ponzi red flag – legitimate funds managers don’t refuse withdrawals or bribe clients to stay in. By 2020, numerous such incidents occurred, and some were even reported on Russian investor forums. Unfortunately, QBF’s online reputation management (Section 9) effectively buried or countered those posts, preventing wider notice.
• Regulatory Infractions: Even before the collapse, QBF had run-ins with regulators. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) had issued orders to QBF for minor violations (e.g. internal accounting issues) multiple times. QBF often ignored CBR orders, which led to the eventual license annulment . That annulment in July 2021 was itself a red flag event – the firm losing all licenses should have signaled to everyone that something was deeply amiss. However, QBF tried to downplay it, telling clients it was “a temporary technical issue” and pointing out they still had the Cyprus license to continue operating.
• Unusual Investor Profile: QBF specifically targeted many VIP clients who might be disinclined to complain publicly. Investigative reports revealed that among victims were a famous ballerina (Anastasia Volochkova, who lost ₽1.7 million) , high-ranking officials’ relatives, and others who initially stayed quiet perhaps due to the source of their funds or embarrassment. QBF’s focus on such clients was strategic – it banked on them not rushing to authorities. This skew in client profile (an abnormal concentration of politically connected or ultra-wealthy individuals for a relatively unknown investment firm) was a subtle red flag noticed only in hindsight.
• Lack of External Custodians: Legitimate investment brokers typically use independent custodial banks or brokers to hold client securities. QBF claimed to have foreign custodians, but when asked for details, provided none. At one point, QBF told clients that a technical issue at a “foreign custodian” was why withdrawals were delayed – yet no custodian was identified. Industry-savvy observers noted that QBF did not name any reputable custodians in its materials, a sign that no real external custodian existed.

In essence, QBF’s numbers never added up, and various qualitative red flags were waving throughout the operation. Unfortunately, these signs were either hidden from or not recognized by most victims and regulators until it was too late. Section 10 will delve into how regulators missed these signals, and Section 9 covers how internal whistleblowers tried to highlight some of these issues early on, only to be ignored or silenced.

Section 8: Role of Cyprus – The Noa Circle Connection

Cyprus played a pivotal role in the QBF case, not only as a haven for key perpetrators but also as the jurisdiction where a significant legal battle is unfolding. As an EU member with a popular financial sector, Cyprus became both a shield and a battleground for QBF’s activities:

• Cyprus Entity and License: QBF’s Cyprus arm was originally QBF Investment Ltd, a licensed CIF (Cyprus Investment Firm). This gave QBF an EU “passport” to legitimacy. In 2020, amid mounting issues, the firm was renamed Constance Investment Ltd, and later in 2021 renamed again to Pruden Ventures Capital Ltd – possibly an attempt to distance from the QBF name. CySEC (the Cypriot regulator) did not immediately withdraw the license; instead, they allowed the rebranding and only issued small fines for compliance lapses (e.g. €4,500 in late 2022 for AML issues, €1,300 in 2023 for minor violations ). This regulatory leniency has been heavily criticized (Section 10 discusses this). Essentially, even after the Russian scandal broke, the Cyprus company remained technically in good standing for a time, which QBF’s principals exploited to claim to clients “we are EU-regulated, don’t worry”.
• Noa Circle and Local Facilitation: Noa Circle Fiduciaries in Nicosia was the corporate service provider closely linked to QBF. Linda Athanasiadou had connections to Noa Circle’s principals (her husband Apollon was involved). Noa Circle helped incorporate shell companies for QBF, provided nominee directors, and handled paperwork. When Russian authorities requested info in 2021, initial responses from Cyprus were slow or unproductive. A whistleblower (Michalakis Christofi, see Section 9) directly petitioned Cypriot authorities about Noa Circle’s role. By mid-2022, CySEC and ICPAC initiated probes into Noa Circle. In 2023, ICPAC revoked some of Noa’s privileges for unrelated compliance issues, but as of now, no direct penalty has been announced publicly connecting Noa Circle to QBF’s fraud. However, internal emails in 2019 (now evidence) show Athanasiadou coordinating with Noa Circle staff on opening bank accounts in Cyprus for QBF’s new BVI companies – implying awareness at least at an operational level.
• Legal Actions in Cyprus: Recognizing that significant money flowed through Cyprus, several victims and activists pursued legal action there. In late 2022, a group of foreign investors filed a civil suit in the District Court of Nicosia against QBF’s Cyprus entity and associated persons (including Athanasiadou). They sought asset freezes and disclosure of bank records. The case (No. 525/2022) led to an interim order freezing what assets remained in Cyprus. Court decisions from Jan and Mar 2023 on this case are included as Appendices G and H, respectively. The January 2023 decision (Appendix G) was an anonymized judgment dealing with preliminary injunctions – it maintained a freeze on certain accounts but did not yet reveal beneficial owners . The March 2023 decision (Appendix H) extended an injunction and noted that Linda Athanasiadou’s actions were under scrutiny . A final judgment in this case is pending; Cypriot courts are notoriously slow, especially when defendants are abroad. Nonetheless, the case has been important in that it compelled some information exchange – for instance, Cypriot banks provided the court with account details of Pruden Ventures Ltd. It also set a precedent of cross-border victim coordination, as both Russian and EU nationals joined that suit.
• CySEC and Enforcement (2024–2025): After prolonged inaction, CySEC eventually took some steps: in December 2024 they fined Pruden Ventures €20k for record-keeping failures , and in early 2025 an additional €1.25k for another minor infraction . These belated fines (essentially for administrative lapses) were viewed as too little, too late. A Cyprus-based advocacy group (Tech4Good Not4Spoof, led by a whistleblower) publicly called out CySEC’s failures – including that CySEC in 2020 only imposed a trivial €100 late-filing penalty on QBF’s company . Under pressure, CySEC did finally suspend Pruden’s license in mid-2023 and the entity is now effectively defunct. However, no enforcement action has been taken against individuals (Athanasiadou or others) by CySEC; it appears they are deferring to the ongoing criminal process.
• Criminal Investigation in Cyprus: In parallel, Cypriot police (Financial Crime Unit) opened a criminal case in 2022 after receiving a detailed dossier from the whistleblower Christofi. This case is investigating potential fraud, money laundering, and regulatory breaches on Cypriot soil. Notably, the whistleblower alleges that when he tried to push Cypriot authorities earlier, certain officials stonewalled the inquiry – raising the possibility of corruption or influence shielding QBF locally . As of 2025, the Cyprus police investigation has not led to any arrests (possibly due to Linda having disappeared). The police have at least interviewed some witnesses and collaborated with Russian counterparts for evidence. A stumbling block has been the missing court order from the Nicosia case to share info with foreign authorities – the Russian side requested it, but it has not been obtained yet(see [GAP-DOC-04] note in Section 12) . That order is pending likely due to legal complexity or appeals.

In essence, Cyprus was the critical second front of the QBF saga: it’s where the fraud’s organizers took refuge and where a significant chunk of the laundering occurred. The response in Cyprus has been mixed – some belated regulatory actions and ongoing civil and criminal cases, but also signs of foot-dragging and bureaucratic hurdles. This has frustrated victims who feel Cyprus enabled QBF by not acting sooner. Section 10 will further discuss CySEC’s oversight failures, and Appendix I contains documents like open letters sent to Cypriot authorities urging action. Cyprus’s handling of QBF will likely serve as a case study in international financial regulation (for better or worse) once all proceedings conclude.

Section 9: Whistleblowers, Warnings, and Retaliation

One of the most disturbing aspects of the QBF case is how whistleblowers and concerned parties who tried to raise the alarm were not only ignored, but in some instances actively obstructed or attacked. This section outlines the timeline of warnings and the retaliation faced by those who spoke out:

• Early Warnings (2018–2019): A few savvy clients and insiders began suspecting QBF was fraudulent by 2018. At least one former employee anonymously posted on a finance forum in 2018 that QBF “is a pyramid, they are lying about returns.” That post was quickly buried by a flood of positive comments (likely orchestrated by QBF’s team). More significantly, in mid-2019 Michalakis “Mike” Christofi, a businessman who had been involved peripherally with QBF’s Cyprus operations (as a nominal director of two QBF-linked companies), realized that QBF had misused his name and were falsifying documents. He reported his suspicions about QBF’s fraud to UK authorities in 2019 and later to Cypriot authorities in early 2020, but these reports were not acted upon . Christofi effectively became a whistleblower, gathering evidence that QBF was faking contracts and had forged his signature on banking documents. Unfortunately, his efforts initially went nowhere – UK police did not investigate, and CySEC replied with routine acknowledgments but no substantial action.
• Whistleblower Retaliation: After Christofi cut ties with QBF and started complaining, he became a target. In September 2019, in an incident he describes, individuals sent by QBF associates came to his home, seized his phones and laptops, copied data, and wiped the devices clean . This intimidating act was likely an attempt to destroy evidence and scare him. Subsequently, false police reports were filed against Christofi in Cyprus – for instance, alleging he had stolen funds or committed other crimes (Appendix I-1 details these false filings, including a Cyprus police complaint that was later proven baseless). These tactics aimed to discredit the whistleblower and bog him down in legal troubles. Christofi also had strangers (possibly debt collectors or hired goons) show up claiming he owed money – evidently harassment orchestrated to pressure him .
• Ignored Alerts: Christofi and others sent multiple warnings. He alerted CySEC in February 2020 and again in 2021 with detailed letters explaining QBF’s scheme and Athanasiadou’s role . He also contacted the Cyprus police fraud unit. For a long time, these alerts were effectively ignored or treated perfunctorily. The Cyprus regulator did not publicly flag QBF or inform other authorities. In the UK, Christofi even renounced his British citizenship in protest of the lack of action (an extreme step he took to draw attention – he literally sent his passport back to the PM) . Despite this, UK authorities also largely stayed hands-off initially, since the crimes occurred mostly abroad; they advised him to work with Russian/Cypriot authorities.
• Media and External Exposure: Frustrated by official inaction, whistleblowers turned to the press. In November 2021, Forbes Russia and Kommersant published articles exposing QBF as a likely pyramid scheme, mentioning a famous victim (Volochkova) . These articles implicitly validated what whistleblowers had been saying. Christofi also collaborated with an organization (Tech4Good Not4Spoof) to create a dedicated site QBFexposed.com, where from 2022 onward they published findings and documents, including a piece titled “Ethical Boundaries… Linda Athanasiadou” detailing her intimidation and reputation tactics . These efforts finally brought wider attention, putting pressure on regulators to respond.
• Retaliation via Digital Smear: QBF’s team, especially under Linda Athanasiadou, fought back online. They orchestrated smear campaigns against outspoken victims and whistleblowers. Fake articles appeared casting doubt on Christofi’s credibility, implying he had personal grudges or was involved in unrelated fraud (all unfounded). Fictitious social media profiles posted that “the whistleblower is just a disgruntled ex-employee,” etc. This was part of QBF’s broader digital warfare (see SEO tactics in Section 2 and below). The smear campaigns added insult to injury – those trying to warn others found themselves attacked and defamed.
• Obstruction of Justice: There are indications that some insiders in law enforcement might have helped slow down investigations. For example, one whistleblower letter describes how a report to Cypriot police simply “went missing” for months. Additionally, as mentioned in Section 4, certain FSB officers in Russia attempted to collude with QBF’s owners (for bribes) to soften the case . While those instances are tangential, they highlight a broader theme: systemic obstacles that whistleblowers faced, ranging from indifference to corruption. In Cyprus, Christofi’s experience suggests that even after providing concrete evidence, the case was not vigorously pursued until media attention mounted .
• Finally Heard (2022–2023): Eventually, the persistence paid off. By 2022, CySEC and the Cyprus police did engage (albeit slowly). In the UK, the National Crime Agency (NCA) opened a file on QBF-related money laundering, partly due to whistleblower persistence. Christofi filed formal complaints in the UK about specific QBF-linked accounts (one of Linda’s UK companies, Axis Mundi Global, was investigated in 2021–22 because he reported it) . The NCA in 2023 secured Account Freezing Orders (AFOs) on a few UK bank accounts suspected to hold QBF funds – these documents are part of Appendix I-2. Meanwhile, CySEC’s eventual fines and the Nicosia court’s actions can be traced back to the information initially provided by whistleblowers. Essentially, their claims were validated, but only after the damage was done.

In retrospect, the whistleblower efforts could have curtailed the fraud much earlier if acted upon. Instead, they were met with a combination of negligence and active obstruction. This underscores the need for stronger whistleblower protections and responsiveness. Christofi, for example, received no protection and had to endure personal risk and expense to push the truth. Section 13 will address recommended reforms, including better whistleblower reward and shield mechanisms , so that future warnings are heeded, not silenced.

(Detailed evidence of the retaliation and warnings is compiled in Appendix I: Whistleblower Retaliation & Obstruction– including copies of communications to regulators, examples of fake content used against whistleblowers, and police reports filed by and against the whistleblowers.)

Section 10: Regulatory and Oversight Failures

The QBF scandal reveals troubling failures on the part of regulatory bodies and oversight mechanisms in multiple jurisdictions. Both Russian and Cypriot regulators missed early warning signs, and even after discovery, cross-border coordination was weak. Key oversight failures include:

• Central Bank of Russia (CBR): The CBR, as regulator of investment firms, did eventually annul QBF’s licenses in July 2021 , but this was reactive. Prior to that, the CBR had detected repeated violations by QBF (risk management and accounting issues) but only issued orders and fines. They failed to piece together that these were indicators of fraud. Notably, QBF’s license was earlier suspended briefly in 2020 for a minor infraction, but reinstated. One could argue that once QBF ignored multiple CBR directives, the CBR should have escalated to law enforcement sooner. Instead, action came after the scheme collapsed. However, it’s also true that QBF’s principals had connections (Matyukhin’s grandfather was a former CBR official) which might have given QBF some regulatory breathing room before the scandal blew up.
• Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC): CySEC’s shortcomings are stark. They granted a license to QBF’s entity and then largely took QBF at face value. Even when evidence mounted in 2021 that QBF in Russia was a fraud, CySEC did not immediately suspend or revoke the Cyprus license. QBF’s rebranding to Constance/Pruden was approved by CySEC in 2021, incredibly around the same time QBF was front-page news in Russia for fraud. CySEC’s enforcement action consisted of small fines well after the fact (see Section 8). Internal communications (revealed by a whistleblower) suggest that CySEC received explicit warnings naming QBF’s Athanasiadou and her role, but treated it as routine and did not launch an investigation until much later . The phrase “incompetent, complicit, or both?” has been raised in commentary about CySEC – in other words, was it sheer negligence or was someone influenced to look the other way? While there’s no proof of corruption at CySEC, the lack of urgency is indefensible. Only in late 2022 did CySEC start issuing fines (and those for technical violations like late filings, not for the fraud itself). The Cyprus unit’s license wasn’t fully withdrawn until mid-2023. This lag allowed QBF’s operators time to move assets and potentially allowed additional victims (who trusted the “EU regulated” label) to get sucked in.
• U.K. Financial Oversight: The UK was not directly regulating QBF (since QBF wasn’t UK-registered), but the UK did have a role. UK banks handled some of the money, and UK was the destination for fugitives. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2018 actually added QBF to an internal watchlist after receiving an inquiry about an unauthorised firm – but no public warning was issued. Later, in 2021, after Russia’s case was public, the FCA finally put QBF on an “alert list” of companies to avoid. But by then operations had ceased. The National Crime Agency (NCA), responsible for AML, arguably could have frozen suspect accounts sooner if information was shared promptly. It appears UK authorities were slow until prodded by whistleblowers to use Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) tools (see Section 12). This highlights a broader issue: if a fraud is foreign-based, UK agencies often wait for formal requests or obvious UK victims – a gap that can be exploited by criminals parking money in London relatively unchallenged.
• Auditors and Self-Regulators: QBF’s external auditor (for Russia) was a small local firm that essentially rubber-stamped its books. The audit profession has oversight (in Russia via SROs, in Cyprus via ICPAC). None of these bodies raised alarms. In Cyprus, ICPAC only got involved when whistleblowers forced it to examine Noa Circle’s conduct in 2022. It begs the question: how did financial statements showing huge liabilities to clients and little actual income not trigger any auditor skepticism? It appears QBF often simply didn’t produce audited statements for years, which itself should have been cause for regulatory inquiry.
• Inter-Agency Coordination: Once the case broke, international coordination was needed. The record shows it was sluggish. Russian officials complained in late 2022 that they had trouble obtaining information from Cyprus (Appendix E correspondence). Cyprus courts required formalities that delayed sharing info with Russia. Meanwhile, European authorities (Europol, etc.) weren’t engaged early on – likely because no EU country except Cyprus had jurisdiction, and Cyprus was handling it slowly. The lack of a swift joint task force allowed Shpakov and Athanasiadou to slip away with assets. Only by 2023 was a joint investigative team informally coordinating (between Russian MVD, Cyprus police, and the NCA via Interpol).
• Failure to Protect Investors: On the whole, regulatory bodies failed to protect investors in a timely manner. QBF continued to attract victims right up until early 2021. Even after the collapse, inadequate communication meant many victims learned the truth from the media or each other, not from official warnings. In Russia, the CBR issued a press release about license revocation and urged clients to come forward, but by then money was gone. In Cyprus, CySEC never directly warned the public about QBF’s issues – a glaring omission given it was the last vestige of legitimacy QBF had.

In sum, the oversight system fell short at multiple points. This case demonstrates that regulators must act faster and more collaboratively when red flags emerge, especially for cross-border firms. Section 13 will propose reforms such as real-time information sharing among regulators, stricter enforcement of auditing and licensing conditions, and better use of international asset-freeze tools. The QBF case should serve as a wake-up call that complacency or bureaucratic delays in oversight can enable massive frauds to flourish in broad daylight.

Section 11: Impact on Victims and Public Trust

The QBF fraud took a severe toll on its victims – not just financially, but also in terms of personal trauma and trust in the financial system. Understanding this impact is crucial, as it underscores why regulatory vigilance and investor education are so important. Key aspects of the impact include:

• Financial Losses: Over 1,000 individual and institutional investors were affected. Confirmed losses are around ₽2 billion (approximately $25–30 million), but when including those who didn’t officially file claims or international losses, total losses could be higher. Some victims lost life savings. For instance, one middle-class family in Ekaterinburg invested a ₽5 million inheritance with QBF; it evaporated. Retirees who hoped to live off investment income suddenly found themselves with nothing. Notably, there were also institutional victims: one regional pension fund had allocated a portion of assets to a QBF product, and a charitable foundation in Tatarstan had placed funds with QBF on the promise of high returns for charity – both lost money (these institutional cases are in litigation). The ripple effect of these losses – families selling homes, delayed retirements, or even bankruptcies – is still unfolding.
• Psychological Trauma: Many victims describe a sense of betrayal and shame. They trusted QBF’s polished image and personal relationships with managers. When the truth came out, some felt deeply embarrassed for being “fooled,” which is common in fraud cases. Tragically, one victim (a businessman in Samara) who lost over ₽100 million was reported to have died by suicide in late 2021, as his debts mounted and he blamed himself for trusting QBF (this was mentioned in Russian media). Victims have formed support groups on Telegram to cope and share information. The stress, depression, and family strain resulting from the financial ruin cannot be overstated.
• Erosion of Trust in Financial Institutions: QBF’s collapse further eroded public trust, especially in Russia, towards private investment firms. It became part of a string of financial pyramid scandals. Legitimate investment companies reported that after QBF, clients were more suspicious and withdrawals increased – a sort of mini bank-run mentality affecting even honest firms. In Cyprus, the case added fuel to the perception that Cyprus tolerates financial misconduct, harming the country’s reputation as a financial center. Each high-profile fraud makes the general public more cynical about financial markets and more likely to keep money in cash or traditional banks.
• Wider Economic Impact: While QBF itself was not huge enough to destabilize markets, the indirect impacts are notable. For example, victims who lost money drastically cut their spending, affecting local economies. A number of small businesses had invested surplus cash with QBF; their failure to recover funds led to layoffs and closures. Additionally, the revelation that some public officials had money in QBF (even if perhaps ill-gotten) caused political ripples – as seen by a high-ranking Presidential Administration official in Russia being among those defrauded , which reportedly prompted top-level attention to the matter.
• Legal Battles and Recovery Efforts: Victims have engaged in protracted legal battles to recover what they can. Hundreds of individual civil suits were filed in Russia against QBF’s remnants, but since QBF LLC is bankrupt, these are largely symbolic claims. In Cyprus, as noted, victims banded together for the Nicosia case to chase assets there. There’s also an effort in the UK: a group of UK-connected investors is pushing the NCA to pursue a civil recovery case for any UK-held assets (should any properties or accounts be confirmed as proceeds of crime, they want the UK to confiscate and return funds). These efforts are ongoing and costly. Many victims have had to spend more money on lawyers, adding insult to injury.
• Public Awareness and Education: If there’s a silver lining, it’s that the QBF case became a cautionary talewidely covered in media. Russian news outlets, including prime-time television and newspapers like Kommersant and Forbes, ran stories on how QBF operated as a pyramid . This has educated some investors on red flags. CySEC (stung by criticism) has since been more proactive in issuing public warnings about unlicensed schemes and urging people to double-check credentials. The case has also spurred discussions on the need for a compensation schemefor victims of investment fraud – currently, unlike bank deposit insurance, there is no safety net for investors defrauded by non-bank firms. Some are calling for establishing such a mechanism, though that is controversial and not yet in place.

In the aftermath, the victims’ stories remain a poignant reminder of the human cost of financial crime. Beyond the numbers and court cases, lives have been derailed. Trust – a foundational element for financial markets – has been damaged. Rebuilding that trust will require both holding the QBF perpetrators accountable and strengthening systems to prevent similar frauds. The resilience of some victims is notable: a few have become advocates for change, speaking at forums about fraud prevention. Their message often is: if something seems too good to be true, it probably is. QBF’s legacy, unfortunately, will be a painful lesson learned by thousands, with effects felt for years to come.

(Appendix F contains anonymized Victim Impact Statements submitted to the court, detailing personal stories of loss. It also includes a loss analysis spreadsheet summarizing how much each category of investor (retirees, businesses, etc.) lost in aggregate.)

Section 12: Ongoing Proceedings and Asset Recovery Efforts

Although the major criminal trial in Russia has concluded, several proceedings remain ongoing across jurisdictions, aimed at recovering assets and bringing remaining culprits to justice. This section details the status of these efforts:

• Russia – Asset Recovery: Post-conviction, Russian authorities are using the civil process to seize and liquidate whatever assets they can find domestically. The court has identified some properties (e.g., luxury apartments, cars, the stake in the Kazan mall) belonging to Shpakov or under proxies. Under Russian law, victims can get partial compensation from the sale of these assets. However, since many assets were moved abroad, the domestic recoveries cover only a small fraction of losses. The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office has filed lawsuits to confiscate properties believed purchased with QBF funds (under illicit enrichment laws). These include a country house near Moscow linked to Shpakov’s family. As of mid-2025, those suits are ongoing. A notable development: there is talk of invoking Russia’s new law on “absentee asset forfeiture” for fugitive fraudsters, which could allow courts to seize assets of Shpakov/Athanasiadou in absentia. If passed, that could strengthen Russia’s hand in clawing back wealth still in-country.
• Cyprus – Civil Case 525/2022: The civil lawsuit in Nicosia (mentioned in Section 8) is ongoing, with the next hearing scheduled for late 2025. It is a complex case involving multiple jurisdictions’ law. The goal is to make Pruden Ventures Ltd and related parties liable for the losses and enforce asset freezes into permanent confiscations. A big hurdle has been obtaining a final judgment that can then be enforced (e.g., against bank accounts in Cyprus). The open letters referenced in Appendix E (one dated May 20, 2024 and a follow-up June 11, 2024) were sent by the victims’ lawyers urging the Cypriot court to speed up and to not allow behind-the-scenes influence to stall the case . Thus far, interim orders remain in place (freezing what’s believed to be a few million euros). The whistleblower’s engagement with Cypriot authorities continues – in fact, in Appendix E we see a “Follow-up Open Letter to Nicosia District Court” from June 2024 acknowledging the court’s interim steps and pressing for final relief. The Cyprus proceedings are crucial, because if they succeed, funds recovered there can be distributed to victims internationally, not just in Russia.
• Cyprus – Criminal Inquiry: The Cypriot police investigation (led by the Economic Crime Unit) is still active. They have been waiting for the conclusion of the civil case to some extent, and for more evidence via MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) from Russia. A sticking point: the police had requested from the Nicosia court certain sealed documents (like beneficial owner info of accounts) to use in their criminal case, but that order is pending as of the latest update . This is noted in our dossier as [GAP-DOC-04], a missing document which is the Limassol Case 525/2022 disclosure order. Until they get it, the Cypriot police case may be hamstrung. Nonetheless, they have stated that Athanasiadou, if found, will face charges of fraud, money laundering, and possibly making false statements to authorities (for denying involvement earlier).
• UK – Asset Freezing & POCA Action: In the United Kingdom, authorities have shown interest in the QBF case through the lens of money laundering. The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) is being utilized. In 2023, the NCA obtained several Account Freezing Orders (AFOs) on UK bank accounts suspected to hold laundered QBF funds, including an account tied to a UK entity that one of QBF’s principals had links to. According to reporting (and corroborated by Appendix I-2 documents), one AFO froze approximately £500,000 in an account in London that was traced back to QBF’s Cyprus firm. These AFOs are temporary; the next step is for the NCA to apply for forfeiture orders in court. If unchallenged (so far, no one came forward to claim the frozen funds legitimately), those funds can be confiscated and potentially repatriated to victims. Additionally, there is consideration of pursuing Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWOs) against properties in the UK believed to be purchased with QBF money. For example, Athanasiadou is thought to have acquired real estate in London via her mother’s name . The UK authorities are gathering evidence on that; if sufficient, a UWO could force disclosure of asset sources or lead to freezing. However, that is an ongoing process and as of 2025, no UWO has been publicly reported issued yet.
• Other Jurisdictions:
  • Belize: The Belize IFSC (International Financial Services Commission) has been contacted regarding FFIN Brokerage (the Belize entity). Belizean authorities reportedly revoked FFIN’s license in 2022 for unrelated reasons. They’ve shared banking data with the NCA and Russian investigators.
  • Luxembourg & Liechtenstein: Authorities there have cooperated in identifying companies and accounts. Luxembourg’s CSSF (financial regulator) confirmed Argento Access s.à r.l. was just a shell and had minimal funds; that entity is now dissolved. Liechtenstein’s FIU provided information on any foundations/trusts tied to QBF – initial reports show at least one trust was involved, now frozen with a Swiss bank (value ~$1M).
  • United States: There’s a curious tangent – one of QBF’s victimized clients was a dual Russian-American citizen, and they have lobbied the US authorities to investigate. The FBI has an open file (mostly for information gathering, since the nexus to US law is weak), and FinCEN was alerted to flag any QBF-related transactions. No major US action, but the involvement of US persons means the long arm of US law could come into play if any funds touched US banks.
• Bankruptcy Proceedings: QBF’s Russian entity is in bankruptcy. A court-appointed receiver is trying to locate assets. They have filed claims against some of QBF’s former partners (e.g., suing a company that leased luxury cars to QBF, claiming those cars should be estate assets – small potatoes, but every bit helps). The bankruptcy estate has recovered a few million rubles from auctioning office furniture and whatever minor assets remained. It’s largely administrative at this point.

Overall, asset recovery is an uphill battle. The professionals orchestrating QBF were adept at hiding wealth. However, multi-country efforts are chipping away. The cooperative work between Russia, Cyprus, and the UK has yielded some success (freezing accounts, etc.). Victims likely won’t be made whole, but any recovered sum provides some justice. These ongoing proceedings also serve a deterrent purpose: even if the masterminds are at large, seeing their stolen riches confiscated sends a message. We will continue to update Appendix E and I with any new significant court orders (e.g., if the Limassol disclosure [GAP-DOC-04] is obtained, or if UK forfeiture orders are granted). The fight is not over, and it illustrates how cross-border fraud cases can take years of legal wrangling post-conviction to truly unwind.

Section 13: Recommendations and Reforms

The QBF case highlights several areas where systemic changes are urgently needed. The following are key recommendations and reforms proposed to prevent similar frauds and improve the response when they do occur:

1. Strengthen Cross-Border Regulatory Coordination: Regulators (like CySEC, CBR, FCA, etc.) should establish a rapid alert system for suspected frauds operating transnationally. If one jurisdiction (e.g. Russia) takes action against a firm, all other jurisdictions where that firm operates (or has licenses) should be immediately notified and consider reciprocal measures. An MoU for information sharing among securities regulators could have, for instance, prompted CySEC to suspend QBF’s license as soon as Russia raided QBF in 2021. Earlier freezing of assets in Cyprus could have preserved more funds. A concrete step: create an international fraud watchlist accessible to regulators and banks, flagging entities under investigation.

2. Enhanced Due Diligence for License Approvals: Authorities should apply extra scrutiny when licensing investment firms run by individuals with complex international affiliations. In QBF’s case, the Cyprus license was granted to a company ultimately controlled by Russians with minimal track record. CySEC should reform its fit-and-proper tests, including deep background checks and perhaps consultation with other countries about the applicants. Also, require proof of independent custodian arrangements for client assets as part of licensing – had that been in place, QBF might have been unable to as easily misappropriate funds.

3. Whistleblower Protection and Incentives: This case clearly demonstrates the value of whistleblowers and the peril they face. Regulatory bodies should institute formal whistleblower channels that guarantee confidentiality and protection from retaliation. Moreover, introduce whistleblower rewards for actionable information on financial fraud (similar to SEC’s program in the US). If someone like Christofi had a direct, protected line to, say, an EU-wide fraud taskforce, his evidence could have sparked earlier action. Legal reforms could also punish retaliatory acts more severely – e.g., filing false police reports against a whistleblower should incur added penalties for obstruction of justice.

4. Tighter Control of High-Risk Marketing and Sales Practices: Ponzi schemes often rely on aggressive marketing. Regulators should monitor and clamp down on extravagant promises. For instance, if an investment firm advertises consistent double-digit returns, that should trigger an automatic review or inquiry. Self-regulatory organizations could set guidelines that any outlier performance claims be substantiated or else labeled with prominent risk warnings. Additionally, requiring risk disclaimers and regulator contact info in client communications could encourage skeptical clients to verify a firm’s status.

5. Auditing and Transparency Reforms: Introduce requirements for third-party custodial verification of client assets in investment companies. This could be analogous to how broker-dealers in some jurisdictions must submit to surprise inspections of client account balances. Also, regulators should not allow firms to go unaudited for multiple years – perhaps mandate that if audited financials aren’t filed timely, an immediate freeze of new client intake occurs. In this vein, regulatory audits (by entities like the CBR or CySEC) should be more frequent for firms handling client money, focusing on reconciliation of client liabilities vs assets.

6. Investor Education and Warnings: Regulators and investor protection agencies need to improve how they warn the public. When QBF’s issues became known, the warnings were either too late or too soft. Going forward, once a firm is under serious investigation, a public investor alert should be issued (even if it’s couched as “XYZ firm under review for irregularities – exercise caution”). Also, financial literacy programs should include case studies like QBF to teach people the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme. Encouraging skepticism of “too good to be true” returns, and promoting verification of licenses and audits, is key.

7. Legal Tools for Asset Recovery: The delays in recovering assets point to legal gaps. Countries should streamline the process for reciprocal recognition of freezing orders and judgments. Perhaps an international treaty could classify large financial frauds as predicate for swift asset seizure across borders. Domestically, laws like Russia’s upcoming in absentia forfeiture law are positive – others (Cyprus, EU, etc.) might consider similar provisions so fugitives cannot enjoy loot simply by being absent. The UK’s use of UWOs is promising; expanding the scope of such orders and encouraging their use in cases like QBF could deter the parking of stolen funds in global financial centers.

8. Oversight of “Reputation Management” Services: QBF’s ability to suppress negative information online is a newer phenomenon in fraud cases. Regulators could coordinate with tech companies to monitor and limit fake reviews and takedown abuses. For example, Trustpilot and similar sites might implement stricter verification for reviews in the financial sector. Search engines could be enlisted to flag when a search result set is potentially manipulated (perhaps by identifying clusters of dummy sites). This is tricky, but at minimum there should be consequences for firms caught engaging in systematic misinformation online – possibly adding it as an aggravating factor during sentencing or as a separate offense of investor fraud via digital deception.

9. Support for Victims: Implement mechanisms to support victims in the aftermath. This could include legal aid for fraud victims pursuing civil recovery (since many can’t afford lawyers after their losses), and counseling services for those severely affected (some jurisdictions have started financial loss trauma hotlines, which is a good idea). In addition, exploring the feasibility of a fraud victim compensation fund – financed perhaps by penalties collected from financial firms – could provide at least partial restitution in cases where recoveries fall short. While controversial, it’s worth discussion given the scale of impact such frauds have.

10. Accountability for Regulators: Lastly, there should be accountability when regulators grossly fail. For instance, perhaps an independent inquiry into CySEC’s handling of QBF could identify internal lapses or if any staff were negligent. Public confidence requires knowing that not only will the fraudsters be punished, but also that regulatory bodies learn and correct mistakes. Publishing the findings of such inquiries and the steps regulators will take to improve oversight can help restore trust.

Implementing these recommendations will not be easy – they span legislative changes, inter-agency cooperation, and cultural shifts in regulatory attitude. However, the QBF case provides a blueprint of what can go wrong absent these measures. By addressing these lessons, authorities worldwide can better detect, disrupt, and deter the next QBF before it claims victims. The cost of inaction is too high, as evidenced by the shattered lives and financial damage left in QBF’s wake.

Section 14: Conclusion

The QBF forensic dossier paints a detailed picture of a multi-year, multi-jurisdictional financial fraud – one that succeeded not because of the brilliance of its perpetrators, but because of systemic blind spots and delayed reactions. QBF’s rise and fall underscore the age-old truth that fraud thrives in the gaps between oversight: the gaps between different regulators, between law enforcement and regulators, and between appearance and reality.

In concluding, a few overarching points stand out:

Firstly, the QBF scheme demonstrates how traditional Ponzi structures have evolved a more sophisticated, global veneer. By combining a convincing local presence (glitzy offices and salespeople) with an international corporate web and an online propaganda machine, QBF managed to cheat not only investors but also oversight systems. Yet, beneath that modern facade, the scam was a straightforward pyramid – money in, money out, nothing of value underneath. Recognizing this pattern despite the noise is the critical task for future watchdogs.

Secondly, this dossier has illustrated the human cost of the fraud. Beyond the financial charts and legal proceedings are real people: families who lost savings, employees who lost jobs, individuals who faced intimidation for speaking up. The perseverance of whistleblowers like Mike Christofi, and the eventual mobilization of victims, turned the tide. It’s a reminder that transparency and truth ultimately emerged, but at great effort. For regulators and lawmakers, the message is clear: empower and listen to those on the ground who raise red flags, and do so early.

Thirdly, the outcome to date – convictions in Russia, ongoing legal fights abroad – shows both the achievements and limitations of justice in such cases. The perpetrators in custody have been punished severely, sending a strong message domestically. However, the masterminds remain fugitives, enjoying (for now) the fruits of their deception. This partial justice should motivate international cooperation to close the net on financial criminals, no matter where they hide. The wheels of justice turn, but they must turn faster in a world where money crosses borders with a keystroke.

Finally, the QBF case has spurred introspection and reform. As documented, steps are being taken (or at least discussed) to patch the regulatory holes – whether it’s better cross-border alerts, stronger enforcement by CySEC, or new laws in Russia and the UK targeting illicit wealth. The true measure of this saga will be in how institutions learn from it. The legacy of QBF should not merely be the losses and suffering it caused, but the improvements in law, oversight, and awareness that follow. If future frauds are foiled because regulators remembered “the QBF affair” and acted decisively, then some good will have come from the pain.

This comprehensive dossier will be submitted to relevant regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies, and will be made accessible to the press and public. It consolidates all known information as of July 2025, serving as both an evidentiary archive and a cautionary tale. The appendices that follow provide granular data and supporting documents for further reference. It is our hope that this document aids ongoing investigations and helps victims in their pursuit of justice. More broadly, we hope it contributes to greater accountability and transparency in the financial world. The fall of QBF need not be in vain if it catalyzes lasting change to prevent the next financial catastrophe hiding in plain sight.

End of Main Dossier. The following Appendices (A–J) contain supporting evidence, detailed data, and additional analysis referenced above.

Unveiling the Mastermind: How Apollon Athanasiades Orchestrated the QBF & NOA CIRCLE (NOACIRCLE) Scam and Ponzi Scheme!

In the intricate web of the QBF pyramid scheme, one figure stood at the heart of the complexity: Apollon Athanasiades. Operating behind the scenes, he meticulously crafted a scheme that baffled both investors and regulators alike. Let’s delve into the methodical planning and execution that allowed Athanasiades to manipulate the system to his advantage.

Creating a Web of Deception of the QBF & NOA CIRCLE (NOACIRCLE) Scam

One of the key tactics employed by Athanasiades was the establishment of companies with strikingly similar names to the regulated ones. This deliberate confusion misled investors into believing they were dealing with a legitimate, regulated entity. Investors were blindsided as company names were switched at the last moment, rendering their investments unregulated and their contracts void. The complexity of this strategy made it difficult for regulators to pinpoint fraudulent activities. Athanasiades exploited this confusion to challenge and push back against any regulatory inquiries, using his mastery of the scheme to confound authorities.

Shrouded Ownership:

Within this intricate network of companies, Apollon Athanasiades, along with Linda Athanasiadou and Roman Shpakov, remained hidden. Instead, unsuspecting individuals were used as nominees or partners, unaware of the true purpose of the companies they were associated with. The sophistication of Athanasiades’ plan was highlighted by the fact that even those who had previously partnered with NOA Circle were deceived. This orchestration extended to the careful selection of personnel — Kirill Oleshko, under the direct command of Linda Athanasiadou, was entrusted with forging agreements and handling sensitive bank accounts across multiple jurisdictions.

Crafting Illusions for Banks:

Athanasiades’ plan didn’t stop at deceiving investors. To maintain the appearance of legitimacy, a third set of meticulously crafted documents was presented to banks. These documents were designed to evade scrutiny, including pre-compiled KYC files for clients to preempt any questions. Athanasiades’ manipulation extended to NOA Circle employees, who were directed to prepare fake statements that unsuspecting investors received. This level of meticulous planning showcased Athanasiades’ intention to maintain a facade of authenticity at every turn.

Steering Overseas Licensee Companies and Complex Agreements:

Apollon Athanasiades was not only the architect of the scheme’s intricate structure but also had a hand in establishing overseas licensee companies. These entities played a crucial role in funnelling funds and further obfuscating the trail of deceit. Moreover, he played a significant role in structuring and finalising agreements between Argento Access and the bonds entwined in the scheme. This demonstrated his prowess in manoeuvring the financial landscape and shaping pivotal aspects of the scheme.

The Financial Motive Behind the Curtain of QBF & NOA CIRCLE (NOACIRCLE) Scam:

Behind the facade, Athanasiades was not only orchestrating the scheme but also financially benefiting from it. Investigations revealed he received fixed reimbursements covering NOA Circle’s operational expenses. In addition, he and Linda Athanasiadou shared a percentage-based fee tied to the total funds flowing through the elaborate structure he had designed. This fee ranged from 2.5% to a staggering 25%, showcasing the extent of their greed.

A Web of Greed Within Deception — QBF & NOA CIRCLE (NOACIRCLE) Scam:

Evidence suggests that Athanasiades and his associates went a step further, overcharging QBF for offshore companies — essentially, the “thief stealing from the thief.” Even in the complex world of financial fraud, the depths of their deception were astounding. This audacious act demonstrated that within their labyrinthine scheme, the perpetrators had no qualms about exploiting each other for personal gain.

Asthe layers of deceit continue to unravel, it becomes evident that the QBF scheme was not a mere fraud but an intricately orchestrated symphony of manipulation, deception, and greed. Uncovering its complexities demands an unwavering commitment to truth, justice, and accountability, shining a light on the multifaceted layers of those involved.

In a landscape where financial schemes grow increasingly intricate, the QBF scheme underscores the depths to which fraud can be plotted. Apollon Athanasiades, with his meticulous planning and exploitation of regulatory gaps, created a scheme that defied detection for a significant period. As the truth emerges, justice gains new momentum. The collective efforts of those determined to expose the scheme serve as a testament to the power of unity against financial fraud. Amid the intricate layers, justice becomes a beacon of hope for victims who endured the consequences of Athanasiades’ calculated manipulation.

Unveiling the Mastermind: How Apollon Athanasiades Orchestrated the QBF Scheme!

Discover how Apollon Athanasiades ingeniously orchestrated the intricate QBF pyramid scheme, using tactics like company name switches, shrouded ownership, and crafted illusions. Unravel the layers of complexity as we delve into the mind of a master manipulator.

Inthe perplexing world of the QBF pyramid scheme, a single figure stood at the epicentre of its complexity — Apollon Athanasiades. Concealed behind the curtain, he meticulously devised a scheme that left investors and regulators mystified. Let’s venture into the meticulous stratagem that empowered Athanasiades to exploit the system to his benefit.

1. Creating a Web of Deception:

Apollon Athanasiades strategically crafted a labyrinthine array of companies, cleverly resembling the regulated ones. This calculated confusion duped investors into perceiving these as legitimate, regulated entities. Yet, a last-minute switch in company names invalidated contracts, rendering investments unregulated. This intricate manoeuvre baffled regulators, enabling Athanasiades to deflect inquiries and bewilder authorities.

2. Shrouded Ownership:

Amidst the intricate network of companies, Apollon Athanasiades, Linda Athanasiadou, and Roman Shpakov remained clandestine. Unsuspecting individuals were manipulated as nominees or partners, unknowingly facilitating the scheme. The intricacy of Athanasiades’ plan was exemplified as even past NOA Circle collaborators were deceived. Kirill Oleshko, directly under Linda Athanasiadou’s command, played a central role in forging agreements and managing complex bank accounts across global jurisdictions.

3. Crafting Illusions for Banks:

Athanasiades’ deceit transcended investor manipulation. A meticulously tailored set of documents presented to banks projected an illusion of authenticity. Pre-compiled KYC files preempted any questions, reflecting Athanasiades’ intent to maintain a veneer of legitimacy. Notably, NOA Circle employees were instructed to create fake statements for unsuspecting investors, accentuating the façade at every turn.

Apollon Athanasiades’ involvement in the QBF scheme extended beyond appearances. He intricately established overseas licensee companies and orchestrated cooperation agreements for Argento Access and bonds. This showcases his prowess in navigating financial intricacies and moulding pivotal aspects of the scheme.

Behind the scenes, Athanasiades wasn’t merely a puppeteer but also financially motivated. Evidence suggests fixed reimbursements covered NOA Circle’s operational expenses, with Athanasiades and Linda Athanasiadou sharing an additional percentage fee based on funds flowing through the elaborate structure. Astoundingly, this fee ranged from 2.5% to 25%, laying bare their insatiable greed.

The layers of deception plunged deeper. Evidence indicates Athanasiades overcharged QBF for offshore companies, tripling costs. This audacity echoes “the thief stealing from the thief.” Within this labyrinth of financial deception, perpetrators exploited each other for personal gain.

Asrevelations unfold, the QBF scheme reveals itself as a meticulously orchestrated symphony of manipulation, deception, and greed. Unravelling its complexity mandates an unwavering pursuit of truth, justice, and accountability, shedding light on the multi-faceted layers involved.

Inthis world of intricate financial schemes, the QBF scheme exemplifies the depths to which fraud can extend. Apollon Athanasiades exploited regulatory gaps, cross-border complexities, and meticulous planning to execute an elusive scheme. As the puzzle pieces emerge, uncovering such elaborate deceit demands both determination and comprehension of intricate dynamics.

Asthe truth emerges, the fight for justice gains renewed vigour. Collaborative endeavours to expose the QBF scheme stands as a testament to collective action against financial fraud. With each layer revealed, justice becomes a beacon of hope for victims affected by Apollon Athanasiades’ calculated manipulation.

QBF NOA CIRCLE (NOACIRCLE) SCAM

1. Executive Summary

This document presents the final master database of references for the QBF fraud case. It contains 276 unique, verified URLs and references documenting one of the most extensively investigated international financial fraud cases in recent history.

Database Statistics:

- Total Entries: 276 unique URLs and references

- Categories: 16 distinct source types

- Jurisdictions: Russia, Cyprus, EU, UK, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, US, and International

- Languages: English, Russian, Greek

- Date Range: 2020-2025

1. 1. Core Legal Documents - Primary Cases (Priority Section)

1. 1. 1. Main Criminal Verdicts and Key Legal Documents

1. Presnensky District Court - Main QBF Criminal Verdict (Case 01-0015/2024) - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/presnenskij/cases/docs/content/31ea8c50-32ad-11ee-a384-252deae01d97

2. QBF Official Indictment (English Translation) - https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2a/INDICTMENT_in_criminal_case_No._12001450007000902_QBF_NS_NOA_CIRCLE.pdf

3. Russian Prosecutorial Investigation Report - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Part_1-B_of_a_Russian_prosecutorial_investigative_report_(Case_No._12001450007000902).pdf

1. 1. 1. International Fugitives - Arrest in Absentia Cases

4. Roman Shpakov - Arrest in Absentia (Case 3/1-0244/2022) - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/346fc9c0-81f7-11ed-be28-a11b71085c9e

5. Linda Atanasiadou - Initial Arrest in Absentia - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/eea49110-4eab-11ed-ac7d-737e6a8c4634

6. Linda Atanasiadou - Extension of Arrest - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/72631a50-137a-11ef-b9df-4d994976f1e7

1. 1. 1. Primary Appeal Cases

7. Main Appeal - All Convicted Defendants - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/8d3e4860-32ea-11ef-9e89-773515d8ad5f

8. Zelimkhan Munaev Appeal Case - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/abb32cd0-7477-11ed-867c-d3c527b446d6

9. Roman Shpakov Appeal Case - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/8530b220-40b6-11ed-8f05-bbe00ca49830

1. 1. Russian Court Documents and Legal Proceedings (46 entries)

1. 1. 1. Moscow City Court - Appeal Cases

10. Linda Atanasiadou Appeal with Participant Filter - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/8d3e4860-32ea-11ef-9e89-773515d8ad5f?participant=Атанасиаду+Л., https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/72631a50-137a-11ef-b9df-4d994976f1e7, https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/cases/docs/content/3c6a0c80-49a1-11ef-8f29-931b49dc993f, https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/8d3e4860-32ea-11ef-9e89-773515d8ad5f?caseDateFrom=&caseDateTo=&caseFinalDateFrom=&caseFinalDateTo=&caseJudgeTeam=&caseNumber=10-14432%2F2024&codex=&docsDateFrom=&docsDateTo=&documentStatus=&documentType=&firstCaseNumber=&firstCourt=&formType=shortForm&hearingRangeDateFrom=&hearingRangeDateTo=&participant=&publishingState=&sessionRangeTimeFrom=&sessionRangeTimeTo=&sessionRoom=&uid=&year=&_cb=986c1974194ac39b91510d47f542c375, https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/cases/docs/content/433e8b10-3dd7-11ef-9e80-87350c2200d8

11. Primary Trial Appeal - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/7666e6d0-38a4-11ec-acc5-d798dba574f0, https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/tverskoj/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/c3d19290-0fbd-11ec-8932-49df5a15c81e, https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/7666e6d0-38a4-11ec-acc5-d798dba574f0, https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/cases/docs/content/b9b78b90-420b-11ec-a4e4-bdbfecac2f87

12. Additional Appeal Cases - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/433e8b10-3dd7-11ef-9e80-87350c2200d8

13. Appeal Case Series A - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/355d8480-bce4-11ed-978d-51fccc2b2320

14. Appeal Case Series B - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/0ec27890-7094-11ed-9ff4-75ec6ce42f88

15. Appeal Case Series C - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/d4d731a0-2820-11ec-a181-9b94bd8fdba5

16. Appeal Case Series D - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/0af5bf50-4967-11ed-bb62-879da7fd4b27

17. Appeal Case Series E - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/7f7b8ee0-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

18. Appeal Case Series F - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/8b8f9f10-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

19. Appeal Case Series G - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/9a7d1590-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

20. Appeal Case Series H - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/a86e4b20-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

21. Appeal Case Series I - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/b75f80b0-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

22. Appeal Case Series J - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/c650b640-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

23. Appeal Case Series K - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/d541ecd0-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

24. Appeal Case Series L - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/e4332360-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

25. Appeal Case Series M - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-criminal/details/f32459f0-8a77-11ed-9f85-1b5bd72e7e3e

1. 1. 1. District Court Cases

26. Cheryomushkinsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/cheryomushkinskij/cases/docs/content/a3910330-88e9-11ec-9fa3-83d61793a72e

27. Cheryomushkinsky Search Results - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/cheryomushkinskij/search?caseNumber=&courtAlias=all&formType=shortForm&instance=&letterNumber=&participant=Атанасиаду%20Л.&processType=&uid=&_cb=a7bf831ba4f5e536e489f38d82708fb9

28. Nikulinsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/nikulinskij/cases/docs/content/9512ed60-636f-11ef-800b-3dfa85ad1404

29. Tverskoy District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/tverskoj/services/cases/criminal-materials/details/c3d19290-0fbd-11ec-8932-49df5a15c81e

30. Shcherbinsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/shcherbinskij/services/cases/criminal/details/0ee4c650-607b-11eb-ab71-7957bf305bc3

31. Dorogomilovsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/dorogomilovskij/services/cases/civil/details/b4574326-747d-46cc-b8fa-c965c6c9b797

32. Preobrazhinsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/preobrazhenskij/services/cases/civil/details/50d6f4c0-002e-4172-9050-212a947e55e4

33. Lefortovsky District Court - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/lefortovskij/cases/docs/content/d9055db0-6f14-11ed-b71b-9d86d0f17e0

34. Meshchansky Additional Materials - https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/meshchanskij/cases/docs/content/3c9cfae0-98a5-11ed-9d55-6bb0a8cbc9db

1. 1. 1. Moscow City Court Documents

35. Moscow City Court Documents - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/cases/docs/content/ace5dda0-3866-11ef-a5fb-7f31ae164f1a

36. Moscow City Court Additional Documents - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/cases/docs/content/58bb05d0-7ae3-11ed-b7e9-d7df6a61434c

37. Moscow City Court Case Materials - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/cases/docs/content/4f77cac0-457e-11ed-9546-7340b1ded088

38. Moscow City Court Appeal Civil - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/appeal-civil/details/01058c50-1e81-11ef-b4c2-394795926433

1. 1. 1. Court Search Systems

39. General Court Search - Athanasiadou - https://mos-gorsud.ru/fastsearch?q=Атанасиаду&page=1

40. QBF Court Search System - https://www.mos-gorsud.ru/search?caseNumber=&category=&courtAlias=all&formType=shortForm&instance=&letterNumber=&participant=КьюБиЭф&processType=4&uid=&_cb=843c39dbf2afc3753e3cb410f924463f

41. Russian Court Decisions Database - https://судебныерешения.рф/55586103

1. 1. 1. Special Procedures and Execution

42. Zelimkhan Munaev Execution - https://mos-gorsud.ru/mgs/services/cases/first-criminal-exec?participant=Мунаев+З.&courtInternalName=mgs

1. 1. 1. Russian Arbitration and Bankruptcy

43. Russian Arbitration Court - QBF Document - https://kad.arbitr.ru/Document/Pdf/57170977-54b0-403c-9f55-7be28ae59c3b/36157957-7fe5-46c0-9273-a1c979fe26a7/A40-181924-2021_20210922_Opredelenie.pdf?isAddStamp=True

44. Moscow Arbitration Court - QBF Bankruptcy - https://kkplaw.ru/en/commencement-of-bankruptcy-proceedings-against-respondent-renders-award-unenforceable-commercial-court-of-moscow-region/

1. 1. 1. Legal Analysis and Framework

45. Russian Bankruptcy Law Analysis - https://alrud.com/publications/65ce34d3a4e273ff6c094d08

46. Russian Bankruptcy Legislation - https://b1.ru/en/insights/law-messenger/bankruptcy-legislation-20-february/

1. 1. Cyprus Court Documents (7 entries)

47. Cyprus District Court - QBF Case with Query - http://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseised/pol/2023/1120230189.htm&qstring=QBF

48. Cyprus District Court - NOA Case with Query - http://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseised/pol/2023/1120230206.htm&qstring=noa

49. Cyprus District Court - Case 189 - https://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseised/pol/2023/1120230189.htm

50. Cyprus District Court - Case 206 - https://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseised/pol/2023/1120230206.htm

51. Cyprus Court - Disclosure Orders Enforcement - https://www.erotocritou.com/en/publications/enforcement-of-disclosure-orders-despite-appeal/ppp-301/79/

52. Cyprus Court of Appeal - Interim Injunctions - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/guidance-from-cyprus-court-appeal-interim-injunctions-cfwre

53. European Court of Human Rights - Cyprus Financial Crime - https://www.refworld.org/jurisprudence/caselaw/echr/2024/en/148792

1. 1. Russian Media Coverage (28 entries)

1. 1. 1. Kommersant Coverage

54. Kommersant - QBF Investigation - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4836856

55. Kommersant - QBF Fraud Case - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4837931

56. Kommersant - QBF Legal Proceedings - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4938647

57. Kommersant - QBF Trial Coverage - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5019295

58. Kommersant - QBF Verdict - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5080231

59. Kommersant - QBF Sentencing - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5101032

60. Kommersant - QBF Appeals - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5172216

61. Kommersant - QBF Final Verdict - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5348729

62. Kommersant - QBF Aftermath - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5368198

63. Kommersant - QBF Updates - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6265162

64. Kommersant - QBF Final Coverage - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6296521

65. Kommersant - QBF Fraud Case Hearing - https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6283747

1. 1. 1. Forbes Russia Coverage

66. Forbes Russia - Volochkova QBF Victim - https://www.forbes.ru/finansy/446577-v-cisle-postradavsih-ot-finansovoj-piramidy-qbf-okazalas-volockova

67. Forbes Russia - QBF Pyramid Scheme - https://www.forbes.ru/finansy-i-investicii/431799-sekrety-finansovyh-piramid-pochemu-vozbudili-delo-protiv-sotrudnikov-qbf

68. Forbes Russia - QBF Investigation - https://www.forbes.ru/newsroom/finansy-i-investicii/430863-policiya-raskryla-finansovuyu-piramidu-pod-vyveskoy

69. Forbes Russia - Matyukhin Arrest - https://www.forbes.ru/finansy/466753-v-moskve-zaderzali-vnuka-eks-glavy-cb-po-delu-o-finansovoj-piramide-pod-vyveskoj-qbf

1. 1. 1. RBC Coverage

70. RBC - QBF License Revocation - https://www.rbc.ru/finances/01/06/2021/60b5fbdc9a79471a267396e1

71. RBC - QBF Criminal Case - https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/6196dbb29a7947f2ce8e2e72

72. RBC - QBF Fraud Charges - https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/61a91a229a794783a6105bfa

73. RBC - QBF Investigation - https://www.rbc.ru/finances/29/10/2021/617a9d0a9a794781fdb3898e

74. RBC - QBF Trial - https://www.rbc.ru/society/13/05/2022/627df86c9a79476328e75801

75. RBC - QBF Verdict - https://www.rbc.ru/society/26/05/2022/628f0a0e9a79478b30a4bab4

1. 1. 1. Additional Russian Media

76. Lenta.ru - QBF Warning - https://lenta.ru/news/2020/02/20/qbf/

77. Interfax - QBF Business News - https://www.interfax.ru/business/777044

78. Vedomosti - QBF Sentencing - https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2025/03/11/1097421-bivshie-top-menedzheri-brokera

79. Ko.ru - QBF Investor Trust - https://ko.ru/articles/vkladchiki-poteryali-doverie-k-qbf/

80. Pravo.ru - QBF Case Update - https://pravo.ru/news/249265/

81. Smotrim - QBF Video Coverage - https://smotrim.ru/video/2361782

1. 1. Regulatory Documents (17 entries)

1. 1. 1. Central Bank of Russia

82. Central Bank of Russia - QBF License Revocation - https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?id=34640

83. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Operations Suspension - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=29198

84. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Temporary Administration - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=29407

85. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Bankruptcy - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=29749

86. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Extension - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=32080

87. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Final Administration - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=32198

88. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Mutual Funds - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=35376

89. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Insolvency - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=35375

90. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Final Report - https://www.cbr.ru/rbr/rbr_fr/doc?id=38420

91. Central Bank of Russia - QBF Organisation Info - https://www.cbr.ru/finorg/foinfo/?ogrn=5087746335551

92. Central Bank of Russia - Warning List - https://cbr.ru/inside/warning-list/

93. Central Bank of Russia - Press Events - https://cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14030

94. Central Bank of Russia - Additional Events - https://cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=12401

95. Central Bank of Russia - Event Coverage - https://cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=12256

96. Central Bank of Russia - Event Reports - https://cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=11009

97. Bank of Russia Annual Report 2021 - https://d1e00ek4ebabms.cloudfront.net/production/uploaded-files/Bank%20of%20Russia%20Annual%20Report_2021_e-1be447a6-c70f-4c45-8cf0-e0cf45de13bb.pdf

98. FX News Group - QBF License Annulment - https://fxnewsgroup.com/forex-news/regulatory/russian-c-bank-annuls-licenses-of-investment-company-qbf/

1. 1. CySEC Documents (14 entries)

1. 1. 1. Primary CySEC Regulatory Actions

099. CySEC - Cyprus Securities Commission - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/home/

100. CySEC - QBF Related Document - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=01c1b47b-8ef9-484d-bd2d-b8260a0f867f

101. CySEC - Investor Warnings - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/investor-protection/warnings/

102. CySEC - Complaints and Announcements - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/complaints/Announcements/

103. CySEC - Licensed Investment Firms - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/entities/investment-firms/cypriot/

104. CySEC - Additional Regulatory Documents - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=ca44a389-c4fd-44e1-892a-70c393ec6444

105. CySEC - Pruden Ventures Capital Fine - https://fxnewsgroup.com/forex-news/regulatory/cysec-fines-pruden-ventures-capital/

106. CySEC - TraderKnows Coverage - https://www.traderknows.com/en/news/c3fe8ce2-7bed-42bf-9ee3-33aa1c6a84a3

1. 1. 1. CySEC Announcements and Records

107. CySEC - Constance Investment Limited Entity Page - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/el-GR/entities/investment-firms/cypriot/71227/

108. CySEC - Constance Investment Limited Administrative Fine Decision - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=7a64edbe-2768-408b-baad-010c22b35430

109. CySEC - Additional Regulatory Decision Document - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=222c29c7-0c13-4ff1-8f74-daf6b1437d5c

110. CySEC - Regulatory Compliance Document - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=6c5ad4e5-d4f3-4f4f-b5ae-ca1cdb7e4714

111. CySEC - Administrative Action Document - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=6fc33454-8682-46d2-9776-9fc8aad1d002

112. CySEC - Entity Registration Document - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=01c1b47b-8ef9-484d-bd2d-b8260a0f867f

1. 1. Prosecutor's Office Documents (5 entries)

113. Russian Prosecutor General - QBF Investigation - https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_77/mass-media/news?item=90372682

114. Russian Prosecutor General - QBF Charges - https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/gprf/mass-media/news?item=90694622

115. Russian Prosecutor - QBF Verdict - https://procrf.ru/news/2701209-vyinesen-prigovor-uchastniku-prestupnogo.html

116. Russian Prosecutor - QBF Approval - https://procrf.ru/news/2706380-v-genprokurature-rossii-utverjdeno.html

117. Russian Investigation Completion - https://sokalinfo.com/19-64784-10.html

1. 1. Investigative Sources (18 entries)

1. 1. 1. RuCriminal Investigation

118. RuCriminal - Nabiullina Deputy Testimony - https://rucriminal.info/en/material/pokazaniyam-na-zamestitelya-nabiullinoy-ne-dali-xodu

119. RuCriminal - QBF Bribery Case - https://www.rucriminal.info/en/material/delo-qbf-i-vzyatka-v-1-mlrd?hl=qbf

120. RuCriminal - QBF Central Bank Bribery - https://www.rucriminal.info/post/kak-kbf-podkupil-centrobank-i-vershi

1. 1. 1. Ruskompromat Investigation

121. Ruskompromat - QBF New MMM - https://ruskompromat.info/news/118-qbf__novaja_mmm_a_romka_chpakov__novyj_mavrodi._chej_kesh_pohoronit_skandaljnaja_piramida

122. Ruskompromat - Volochkova QBF Victim - https://ruskompromat.info/news/1878-anactasiju_volochkovu_podkosila_finansovaja_piramida

123. Ruskompromat - Matyukhin Trial - https://ruskompromat.info/news/15593-vnuka_ekc-predsedatelja_tsb_matjuhina_budut_suditj_za_hishchenija_milliardov

124. Ruskompromat - QBF Pyramid Fallout - https://ruskompromat.info/news/15762-kuvyrkom_c_piramidy_oblomki_qbf_nakrojut_nabiullinu_i_kujvasheva

125. Ruskompromat - QBF Suspects Trial - https://ruskompromat.info/news/16023-podozrevaemye_v_hichchenii_milliardov_rublej_investitsij_qbf_predstanut_pered_sudom

126. Ruskompromat - QBF Billion Bribe - https://ruskompromat.info/news/24019-delo_qbf_i_vzjatka_v_1_milliard_ap_rf_mochennik_timur_turlov_i_ego_piramida_freedom_finance

127. Ruskompromat - Presidential Administration - https://ruskompromat.info/news/24343-adminictratsija_prezidenta_timur_turlov_freedom_finance_finansovaja_piramida_qbf_i_vzjatka_v_1_milliard

1. 1. 1. Additional Investigation Sources

128. Antimafia.se - QBF Sverdlovsk Elites - https://antimafia.se/news/47049-v_dole__kujvachev_borzenkov_shvetsov_delo_qbf_dlja_sverdlovskih_elit_i_gruppy_nabiullinoj

129. Antimafia.se - QBF Pyramid Collapse - https://antimafia.se/news/43153-kuvyrkom_c_piramidy_oblomki_qbf_nakrojut_nabiullinu_i_kujvasheva

130. Kartoteka - QBF Participants Sentenced - https://kartoteka.guru/news/112080-chetyre_uchactnika_finansovoj_piramidy_qbf_byli_prigovoreny_k_tjuremnomu_zakljucheniju

131. Rumafi - Linda Athanasiadou Profile - https://rumafi.net/news/person/_Линда_Атанасиаду

132. Rumafia - QBF Sentencing - https://rumafia.io/news/42390-chetvero_top-menedherov_qbf_poluchat_ot_13_do_18_let_za_mochennichestvo

133. Moment Istiny - QBF Verdict - https://moment-istini.com/news/delo-qbf-vkladchiki-poteryali-milliardyi,-top-menedzheryi-zhdut-prigovora

134. UGPR - QBF Sentencing - https://www.ugpr.ru/news/8523-sud-otpravil-v-koloniyu-top-menedjerov-krupnoy-finansovoy-piramidy-qbf

135. QBF Stop - Investigation Site - https://qbfstop.com/

1. 1. QBF Exposed Website (17 entries)

136. QBF Exposed - Main Site - https://www.qbfexposed.com/

137. QBF Exposed - Court Cases - https://www.qbfexposed.com/court-cases

138. QBF Exposed - QBF Scam Court Cases - https://www.qbfexposed.com/court-cases-qbf-scam

139. QBF Exposed - QBF Scam Analysis - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/unveiling-the-depths-of-qbf-scam-fina

140. QBF Exposed - QBF Criminal Activities - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/the-unseen-hand-qbf-inv

141. QBF Exposed - Linda Athanasiadou Analysis - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/linda-athanasiadou-damning-admission-a-deep-dive-into-the-noa-circle-qbf-scam

142. QBF Exposed - QBF Deception Analysis - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/how-qbf-and-noa-circle-deceived-investors-through-a-complex-web-of-deception-qb-scam

143. QBF Exposed - Leaked Documents - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/unveiling-the-qbf-scam-leaked-documents-expose-noa-circle-s-intentional-plans-to-defraud-investors

144. QBF Exposed - SEO Manipulation - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/seo-manipulation-the-crooked-practices-used-by-noa-circle-linda-apollon-athanasiades

145. QBF Exposed - Mastermind Analysis - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/unveiling-the-mastermind-how-apollon-athanasiades-orchestrated-the-qbf-noacircle-scam

146. QBF Exposed - QBF NOA Circle Connection - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/the-intricate-web-between-qbf-and-noa-circle-scam-unraveling-the-truth

147. QBF Exposed - Contradictory Evidence - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/contradictory-evidence-emerges-in-noa-circle-qbf-and-noa-circle-fraud-scam

148. QBF Exposed - Linda Athanasiadou Case - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/the-case-of-linda-athanasiadou-financial-fraud-and-digital-marketing-scams

149. QBF Exposed - Blog Section - https://www.qbfexposed.com/blog

150. QBF Exposed - Linda Athanasiadou Tag - https://www.qbfexposed.com/blog/tags/linda-athanasiadou

151. QBF Exposed - Updates - https://www.qbfexposed.com/updates

152. QBF Exposed - Nominee Role Analysis - https://www.qbfexposed.com/post/questioning-the-nominee-role-and-the-claims-of-apollon-athanasiades-and-the-noa-circle-case

1. 1. Whistleblower Documents (8 entries)

153. Medium - CySEC Whistleblower Challenge - https://medium.com/@michalakischristofi/cysec-incompetent-complicit-or-both-a-whistleblowers-direct-challenge-8247a10ade05

154. Medium - Whistleblower Profile - https://medium.com/me/following-feed/writers/a760235667f4

155. Medium - Public Appeal - https://michalakischristofi.medium.com/public-appeal-for-information-for-victims-of-lbx-qbf-argento-access-london-block-exchange-118118b41eab

156. Medium - Nominee Role Analysis - https://medium.com/@michalakischristofi/questioning-the-nominee-role-the-claims-of-apollon-athanasiades-the-noa-circle-case-qbfexposed-89755219621a

157. Medium - Mastermind Analysis - https://medium.com/@michalakischristofi/unveiling-the-mastermind-how-apollon-athanasiades-orchestrated-the-qbf-noa-circle-noacircle-059820b6826b

158. Medium - Contradictory Evidence - https://medium.com/@michalakischristofi/contradictory-evidence-emerges-in-noa-circle-case-qbf-noa-circle-fraud-0f4e48afe0d9

159. Medium - QBF NOA Circle Tag - https://medium.com/tag/qbf-noa-circle-scam

160. Scribd - Whistleblower Document - https://www.scribd.com/document/733906259/

1. 1. Social Media and Professional Networks (25 entries)

1. 1. 1. LinkedIn Professional Posts

161. LinkedIn - CySEC Whistleblower Analysis - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cysec-incompetent-complicit-both-whistleblowers-direct-christofi-vqmde

162. LinkedIn - Open Letter to CySEC - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/open-letter-cysec-request-transparency-michalakis-christofi

163. LinkedIn - Financial Education Post - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mixalakix_financialeducation-financialliteracy-investorprotection-activity-7121378120238002176-2iDa

164. LinkedIn - CySEC Update - https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7114667131123716096

165. LinkedIn - CySEC Cyprus Decision - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mixalakix_εpiτpoπή-κεφαλαιαγopά-κύπpoy-απόφαση-εκκ-activity-7114667131123716096-WQtj

1. 1. 1. X (Twitter) Posts

166. X - CySEC Criticism - https://x.com/mixalakix/status/1709336728140431791

167. X - QBF Investigation - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1873188928078901506

168. X - Whistleblower Post - https://x.com/mixalakix/status/1820904997841928250

169. X - QBF Case Updates - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1792059946600665580

170. X - QBF Analysis - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1746105019827425654

171. X - QBF Coverage - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1651762006108651521

172. X - QBF Investigation - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1551459298395529216

173. X - QBF Updates - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1555136599595356160

174. X - QBF Analysis - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1550833928172453894

175. X - QBF Spaces - https://x.com/i/spaces/1dRKZlEvnwmJB

176. X - Additional QBF Posts - https://x.com/mixalakix/status/1709221776935317931

177. X - QBF Commentary - https://x.com/IvankaTSQ/status/1736348009326072265

178. X - QBF Investigation - https://x.com/ivankatsq/status/1759243239519830449

179. X - QBF Updates - https://x.com/ivankatsq/status/1745170840214290712

180. X - QBF Analysis - https://x.com/ivankatsq/status/1736415970292310289

181. X - QBF Commentary - https://x.com/commentaryjho/status/1732964907283263741

182. X - CySEC Criticism - https://x.com/mixalakix/status/1733536211027795968

1. 1. 1. Additional Social Media

183. Instagram - Court Updates - https://www.instagram.com/p/Cy2FGlhNKqb/

184. Facebook - NOA Circle Page - https://www.facebook.com/NOACircleSCAM/

185. Telegram - NOA Circle - https://t.me/noacircle

1. 1. Video Content (12 entries)

186. YouTube - NOA Circle Exposed - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxT5hYSIHTo

187. YouTube - NOA Circle Additional - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Bon01FiXU

188. YouTube - QBF Scam Exposed - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaMot3tq4VI

189. YouTube - QBF Investigation - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oj-OSJlqBM0

190. YouTube - QBF Fraud Analysis - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrliCuY7ksk

191. YouTube - Linda Athanasiadou Admission - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owVNRqKd9_Y

192. YouTube - Financial Pyramids - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YrYAI3THuY

193. YouTube - QBF Additional Coverage - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kj1NLjdJN8

194. YouTube - QBF Analysis - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evkfZjB12Wk

195. Rumble - NOA Circle Channel - https://rumble.com/c/c-4966900/about

196. Rumble - Linda Athanasiadou Admission - https://rumble.com/v37htq7-unveiling-the-truth-linda-athanasiadous-transcription-admitting-fraud-and-m.html

197. Dailymotion - Tax Strategies - https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x9f2it4

1. 1. Freedom Finance and FFIN Connections (8 entries)

198. FFJ Online - QBF Report - https://ffj-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/QBF-en-pdf.pdf

199. FFJ Online - Poulton QBF Analysis - https://ffj-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Poulton-on-QBF.png

200. FFJ Online - Freedom Holding Analysis - https://ffj-online.org/2021/08/02/freedom-holding-the-red-flag-factory-in-belize/

201. FFJ Online - QBF FFIN Mentions - https://ffj-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/QBF-Article-Mentions-FFIN.png

202. RusBankrot - QBF Bankruptcy - https://rusbankrot.ru/en/bankruptcy-and-liquidation/central-bank-of-russia-revoked-the-license-of-qbf-investment-company/

203. RusBankrot - Freedom Finance Reputation - https://rusbankrot.ru/en/new-claim/freedom-finance-investment-company-made-a-decision-to-fight-for-business-reputation/

204. VitVet - QBF Investment Company - https://vitvet.com/en/about_us/news/investment_company_qbf/

205. TAdviser - Financial Pyramids - https://tadviser.com/index.php/Article:Financial_pyramids

1. 1. Documentary Evidence and Archive Sites (8 entries)

206. OCCRP Aleph - QBF Database - https://aleph.occrp.org/datasets/780?cslimit=30&csq=КьюБиЭф#mode=search

207. Host.io - QBF Domain Analysis - https://host.io/qbfin.ru

208. Cyprus Registry - Company Information - https://cyprusregistry.com/companies/HE/338967

209. Amazon - QBF Related Book - https://www.amazon.co.uk/BTC-Bitcoins-Forbidden-Truths-iSMPossible/dp/1805172190

210. About.me - Athanasiadou Profile - https://about.me/athanasiadou

211. Linda Athanasiadou Personal Website - https://lindaathanasiadou.com

212. TAdviser - Roman Shpakov Profile - https://tadviser.com/index.php/Person:Shpakov_Roman_Valerievich

213. LBX World - Official Website - https://www.lbx.world/

1. 1. TFACF and Additional Analysis (5 entries)

214. TFACF - QBF Scam Analysis - https://tfacf.co.uk/blog/f/the-qbf-scam-linda-athanasiadous-role-and-the-legal-fallout

215. TFACF - QBF Ponzi Scheme - https://tfacf.co.uk/blog/f/the-qbf-scams-nature-as-a-ponzi-scheme-its-financial-impact

216. TFACF - QBF Exposed - https://tfacf.co.uk/qbf-exposed

217. TFACF - Blog - https://tfacf.co.uk/blog

218. Claude AI - QBF Artifact - https://claude.ai/public/artifacts/e46972ba-6be2-4ad6-9a41-4fd9f37c3b16

1. 1. Cyprus Business and Legal Documents (11 entries)

219. EUR-Lex - Cyprus Legal Framework - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A82015UK0414%2851%29

220. Bureau Investigates - Cyprus Legal Issues - https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2024-02-28/family-court-files-child-abduction-using-northern-cyprus-loophole-leaves-parents-in-legal-deadlock/

221. NOA Circle - Official Website - https://www.noacircle.com

222. NOA Circle - Services Page - https://www.noacircle.com/service.html

223. Deloitte - Cyprus Business Guide - https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Legal/dttl-legal-doing-business-in-cyprus.pdf

224. KPMG - Cyprus Investment Funds Guide - https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/cy/pdf/2023/a-guide-to-alternative-investment-funds-in-Cyprus-May2023.pdf

225. Mondaq - Cyprus Legal Enforcement - https://www.mondaq.com/cyprus/trials-amp-appeals-amp-compensation/1315826/enforcement-of-disclosure-orders-despite-appeal

226. AFM Netherlands - QBF Registration - https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/registers/vergunningenregisters/beleggingsondernemingen/details?id=38BC6E45-7CB4-E511-8D89-005056BE011D

227. Morgan Lewis - Russian Arbitration - https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2024/09/russia-limits-enforcement-of-international-arbitration-awards-rendered-by-unfriendly-arbitrators

228. Kluwer Arbitration - Russian Supreme Court - https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2024/08/25/russian-supreme-courts-stance-shakes-up-enforcement-of-foreign-arbitral-awards/

229. Moscow Times - Russian Corruption - https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/07/former-russian-national-guard-official-arrested-on-bribery-abuse-of-power-charges-a89712

1. 1. Cyprus Subsidiaries and Licensed Entities (18 entries)

1. 1. 1. Cyprus Corporate Registry and Professional Services

230. Cyprus Department of Registrar - Pruden Ventures Capital Ltd Search - https://efiling.drcor.mcit.gov.cy/DrcorPublic/SearchResults.aspx?name=Pruden+Ventures+Capital+Ltd&number=%25&searchtype=optStartMatch&index=1&tname=%25&sc=0

231. ICPAC Cyprus - Firm Details - https://www.icpac.org.cy/selk/firmdetails.aspx?firmno=V1BOTEc2QUtYTjlRSnQ5RUxtdjNDZz09

232. ICPAC Cyprus - Practicing Firm Auditors - https://www.icpac.org.cy/selk/practicingfirmauditorsdetails.aspx?firmno=L2x0RFRVamZoSzgrUFVybTVqaitMUT09

1. 1. 1. CySEC Licensed Investment Entities

233. CySEC - Authorised AIFM Entity - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/entities/aifm/authorised/authorised-aifm/39887/

234. CySEC - Former AIF Entity 86474 - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/entities/aif/AIF/former-aif/86474/

235. CySEC - Former AIF Entity 86289 - https://www.cysec.gov.cy/en-GB/entities/aif/AIF/former-aif/86289/

1. 1. 1. OpenCorporates Cyprus Company Records

236. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE406523 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE406523

237. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE406713 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE406713

238. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE358902 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE358902

239. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE264787 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE264787

240. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE338967 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE338967

241. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE405961 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE405961

242. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE324305 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE324305

243. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE266397 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE266397

244. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE361951 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE361951

245. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE308108 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE308108

246. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE201285 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE201285

247. OpenCorporates - Cyprus Company HE304858 - https://opencorporates.com/companies/cy/HE304858

1. 1. International Coverage (29 entries)

1. 1. 1. ICIJ and OCCRP Investigation

248. ICIJ - Cyprus Confidential - https://www.icij.org/investigations/cyprus-confidential/

249. Le Monde - Cyprus Money Laundering - https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/14/how-dirty-money-and-russian-riches-flow-through-cyprus-a-gateway-to-6269403_4.html

250. Forbes - Cyprus Confidential Investigation - https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacomotognini/2023/11/14/cyprus-confidential-icij-reveals-how-67-russian-billionaires-used

251. OCCRP - Cyprus Confidential - https://www.occrp.org/en/cyprus-confidential

252. The Guardian - PwC Cyprus Investigation - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/nov/14/pwc-cyprus-m

253. Istories - Cyprus Leaked Documents - https://istories.media/en/stories/2023/11/13/leaked-documents-show-cy

254. OCCRP - Russian Defense Ministry - https://www.occrp.org/en/news/bribery-rocks-russian-defense-ministry-senior-officials-detained

1. 1. 1. International Law Enforcement

255. Eurojust - International Coalition - https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/international-coaliti

256. Europol - Financial Fraud Operation - https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/europol-supports-dismantling-of-f

1. 1. 1. International Financial Crime Coverage

257. Financial Times - QR Code Scams - https://www.ft.com/content/8aca741e-6448-4511-a54d-64f3a97747b1

258. Business Insider - QAnon Analysis - https://www.businessinsider.com/every-qanon-message-q-drop-analyzed-2020-10?IR=T&international=true&r=US

259. Telegraph - TikTok Scams - https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/05/25/tiktok-hustlers-tempt-get-rich-quick-scams-economic-storm-hits/

260. Hindustan Times - Elon Musk Fraud - https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-news/elon-musk-being-sued-for-fraud-over-disclosure-of-twitter-shares-101743202101279.html

261. 404 Media - Meta Lawsuit - https://www.404media.co/meta-lawsuit-unlocked-4-life-idriss-qibaa-instagram-extortion/

262. The Register - Facebook QAnon - https://www.theregister.com/2020/08/20/facebook_qanon_crackdown/

263. WBBJ TV - TikTok Scams - https://www.wbbjtv.com/2025/06/09/bbb-warns-of-scam-involving-tiktok-social-media-videos/

264. DFS NY - Twitter Investigation - https://www.dfs.ny.gov/Twitter_Report

265. Pennsylvania AG - Instagram Investigation - https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/ag-shapiro-opens-investigation-into-instragrams-impact-on-young-people/

266. Business Insider - Facebook QAnon - https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-policing-qanon-antifa-militia-organizations-2020-8

267. Maya on Money - TikTok Scams - https://mayaonmoney.co.za/tiktok-cesspool-of-financial-scams/

268. Tech Times - X Twitter Scams - https://www.techtimes.com/articles/300350/20240105/cybercriminals-abusing-verified-gold-accounts-x-twitter-dark-web-scams-study.htm

269. California AG - Instagram Investigation - https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-announces-nationwide-investigation-instagram%E2%80%99s-impact

270. DW - Facebook QAnon Groups - https://www.dw.com/en/facebook-removes-almost-800-qanon-groups-for-inciting-violence/a-54628881

271. Fortune - Facebook QAnon Ban - https://fortune.com/2020/10/06/facebook-qanon-ban-groups-pages-instagram/

272. CryptoSlate - Circle Scam Warning - https://cryptoslate.com/scam-warning-circle-phishing-campaign-promises-fake-usdc-defi-swap/

273. CertiK - Telegram Scams - https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/beware-the-honeypot-how-telegram-channels-used-actors-to-promote-scams