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Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness

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What is consciousness? We are continuously conscious, except in sleep when we seem to lose consciousness. While everyone experiences it and often takes it for granted, it is much harder for us to define consciousness[1]. Consciousness has been defined in various ways in different disciplines.

Philosophers have often associated consciousness with a mind and higher mental or cognitive functions.  An example of this is awareness of the own self, or self-consciousness which can be traced to the French philosopher Rene Descartes in the 15th and16th centuries. The association of consciousness with a mind raises the question of the mind’s relationship to body and brain, also known as the mind-body problem. This problem is much discussed in current philosophy of mind. Most recently, the mind-body problem has been discarded and replaced by the so-called ‘world-brain problem[2] (see the end of this entry).  

How then is consciousness conceptualized in neuroscience? There have been various neuroscientific theories of consciousness. The Integrated Information theory (IIT)[3] conceives consciousness in terms of information that is integrated. Here, consciousness is defined by the way in which the brain integrates information which allows it  to “go beyond” the information provided by the stimuli themselves. Another major theory, the Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT), posits that information must be maximally distributed, or  globalized, in the various regions of the brain for consciousness to occur[4][5]. Recently, the GNWT has been linked to higher cognitive functions such as meta-memory, meta-cognition, and self-consciousness[5].

The temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC) defines consciousness by the brain’s construction of time and space rather than either integration (as IIT) or distribution of contents (as GNWT) (see below for details). Therefore, the TTC postulates that consciousness is a temporo-spatial feature. How does our brain constructs its own time and space in relation to the continuous ongoing time and space in both body and world[6][7][8]? Focusing on the brain’s construction of time and space, the TTC is primarily a neuroscientific theory of consciousness which carries major philosophical implications (see below). Finally, it should be noted that the TTC is not a fixed theory but is in continuous development, with changes and additions expected in the future[6][7][8][9][10].

Axioms – Fundamental principles[edit]

First axiom: Consciousness is defined by construction of time and space[edit]

The TTC defines consciousness as the construction of time and space that results in a specific temporo-spatial structure. It is seen in the spatiotemporal structure of the brain’s spontaneous activity. This presupposes a certain view of time and space, namely a ‘construction view’ of time and space as distinguished from a ‘container view’[2][8]. The construction view postulates that time and space are continuously constructed by the brain; there are various mechanisms of construction which corresponds to the various temporo-spatial mechanisms of consciousness (See below). Importantly, the construction of time and space is entangled with the construction of objects and events as the contents of consciousness. The construction view aligns well with that of time and space in contemporary physics as in quantum physics. That distinguishes the construction view from the container view that is more aligned to classical physics, that is, mechanics as in the sense of Newton. Here, time and space are considered as ready-made which serve as a container for the contents of consciousness but remain independent of the container, of time and space itself. In the brain, time and space are then characterized by the cognitive mechanisms underlying our perception and cognition of time and space, as distinguished from the construction of time and space). The TTC considers the construction view of time while the other major neuroscientific theories of consciousness, specifically the IIT and GNWT, presuppose the container view of time and space.

Second axiom: Consciousness requires a specific neural code - difference-based coding[edit]

The construction of time and space could take place in different ways. For instance, it could be constructed by summing up varying discrete points or, alternatively, by encoding the stochastic relation between different points in time and space. Presupposing the brain as a stochastic and indeterminate organ, the TTC postulates that the brain’s spontaneous activity constructs its own time and space by encoding the stochastic relation or differences between different discrete points in time and space. This amounts to what is describe as ‘difference-based coding’[6][7]. The TTC postulates that difference-based coding is a necessary condition of possible consciousness. If, in contrast, the brain was encoding each point in time and space by itself, independent of all others as would be seen in stimulus-based coding, consciousness would remain impossible. Hence, the TTC is closely coupled with difference-based coding which, taken together, entails the “coding hypothesis” of consciousness[7].

Third axiom: Consciousness is a biological phenomenon featured by non-linear state transition or transformation  [edit]

Consciousness is a biological feature that can be compared with other biological phenomena. One central biological feature is state transition or transformation: one state transitions to another if the context changes. A typical example of such a transition can be seen with water.The same chemical formula can occur in different states, being either liquid, ice, or steam. The TTC proposes analogous state transition or transformation between neuronal and phenomenal states. If the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure provide the proper neuronal, or temporo-spatial context for the processing of inputs, - stimuli from body and world - the brain’s purely neuronal state transitions or transforms into a phenomenal state, such as consciousness.  Such transformation must be sought of as non-linear rather than linear. Empirically, non-linearity drives the interaction of the brain’s spontaneous activity with external stimuli, non-additive rest-stimulus interaction, in such a way that the resulting stimulus-evoked activity and its respective contents can be associated with consciousness[11][12]. Mathematically, such non-linear state transition can be formalized by what is described as ‘natural transformation’ in category theory.

Fourth axiom: Consciousness is characterized by experience and its phenomenal features[edit]

Consciousness can be defined in different ways including mental (philosophy that associates consciousness with a mind), phenomenal (specific experiential features), informational (the processing of information), and cognitive (specific cognitive functions). The TTC characterizes consciousness by experience and its specific phenomenal features. These phenomenal features include the often cited “what it is like”, the qualia, as well as other characteristics such as unity, intentionality, self-perspectival organisation, ipseity, and inner time and space consciousness[7]. Most importantly, the TTC does not conceive of these phenomenal features as mental, informational, or cognitive. Instead, it claims that phenomenal features are temporo-spatial characteristics which corresponds to how the brain’s spontaneous activity constructs its own time and space and is modulated by the stimuli from body and world. In sum, the TTC claims that phenomenal features, including the famous “what it is like”, are temporo-spatial features. This leads to specific neuro-phenomenal hypotheses as have been explained in detail in "Unlocking the Brain: Volume 2: Consciousness[7]".

Neuronal features of consciousness in TTC - Temporo-spatial mechanisms[edit]

The TTC distinguishes different neuronal mechanisms that are based on the various ways the brain and its spontaneous activity construct time and space. Importantly, the different temporo-spatial mechanisms are related to different features of consciousness.  Currently, the TTC distinguishes five different temporo-spatial, neuronal mechanisms which, however, will be subject to future change[8].

Temporo-spatial Nestedness[edit]

Temporo-spatial nestedness describes how different frequencies and regions in the brain’s neuronal activity are related to each other in a self-similar (or fractal) way. Like the Russian dolls showing similar shapes but different sizes, the brain’s different frequencies and regions show similarities, are fractal and self-similar. This self-similarity is in their overall structure despite exhibiting different frequencies independent of their relations and interactions. Based on various lines of findings, the TTC postulates that the degree of temporo-spatial nestedness of the brain’s spontaneous activity is related to the level or state of consciousness.[13][14][15]. Therefore, temporo-spatial nestedness can be considered a neuronal predisposition of the level of consciousness[8][14]

Temporo-spatial Alignment[edit]

Our brain and its spontaneous activity continuously aligns itself to external stimuli and its stochastically-based temporo-spatial structure. Such temporo-spatial alignment can, for instance, occur on the basis of shifting the phase onsets of the brain’s fluctuations to the onsets of the stimuli, known as entrainment. The TTC postulates that such temporo-spatial alignment is a central neuronal mechanism by which the brain can encode stimuli and contents from both body and world into its own neuronal activity. This, in turn, makes those contents available for becoming contents of consciousness. Therefore, temporo-spatial alignment can be considered a neuronal prerequisite of the contents of consciousness. This is strongly supported by various empirical data[8]. At the same time, temporo-spatial alignment allows for placing the possible contents of consciousness into the larger temporo-spatial context of body and world. Such alignment establishes world-brain relation and body-brain relation. This can be characterized by a specific temporo-spatial structure, namely the form of consciousness[16][7]. Therefore, temporo-spatial alignment can be considered a neuronal correlate of the form of consciousness.

Temporo-spatial Binding and Integration[edit]

The brain receives continuous stimulus input from both body and world which must be processed by the spontaneous activity. Empirical data show that the different stimuli, neuronal (from the brain’s spontaneous activity itself), interoceptive (from the body), and exteroceptive (from the world), are bound together based on their respective temporal and spatial features.This can be described as temporo-spatial, or spatiotemporal binding[6][10]. Such temporo-spatial binding allows for the constitution of content out of single stimuli. Temporo-spatial binding takes place in specific local regions and frequencies of the brain’s spontaneous activity, which are then broadcast to the rest of the brain. This allows for a more global integration of the different stimuli within the overall brain’s spontaneous activity, thereby entailing temporo-spatial integration. Temporo-spatial integration allows for the placing of single contents into a larger temporo-spatial context, including other contents. In sum, the TTC proposes that temporo-spatial binding is a neural correlate of the contents of consciousness. We experience the contents of consciousness at the forefront, while, in contrast, temporo-spatial integration is a neural correlate of the context which resides in the background.

Temporo-spatial Expansion[edit]

The central and most mysterious feature of consciousness is its subjective-experiential, that is, its phenomenal features. The phenomenal features of consciousness go beyond the information provided by the stimulus itself. Where and how does such “going beyond” come from? The TTC claims that such “going beyond” is temporo-spatial: the brain and its spontaneous activity “add” something. What is added is a larger and more extended temporo-spatial  range to the more restricted temporo-spatial range of the stimulus. Such temporo-spatial addition can be described as “temporo-spatial expansion” since it allows the stimulus to expand beyond its own restricted temporo-spatial range. Neuronally, temporo-spatial expansion is intended to be mediated by non-additive rest-stimulus interaction[11][12][17]. The non-additive impact of the resting state on the stimulus allows it to “go beyond” the latter in temporo-spatial terms. Phenomenally, the TTC postulates that the way and degree of temporo-spatial expansion is directly related and corresponds to the phenomenal features -qualia, intentionality, unity, etc.- of consciousness.  In sum, the TTC conceives of temporo-spatial expansion as a neural correlate of the phenomenal features of consciousness.

Temporo-spatial Globalization[edit]

Experience of consciousness (“feeling pain”) can or cannot go along with awareness of that very same experience (“I am aware that I feel pain”) as is seen when one, for instance, reports the experience. Awareness and reporting concern the cognitive features of consciousness which can be distinguished from its phenomenal features. The cognitive features of consciousness have been associated with distributed and globalized information processing in the brain’s temporal and spatial features. They manifest in the involvement of the prefrontal-parietal cortex and late event-related potentials such as the P300 as described in the GNWT[18][19][20]. The TTC therefore speaks of temporo-spatial globalization, which is considered a neural correlate of the cognitive features of consciousness.

Psychiatric implications – Spatiotemporal Psychopathology[edit]

Psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, and others show abnormal changes in their consciousness and, specifically in the experience of their relation to the world. The TTC proposes that these changes can be described as alterations in the form, specifically the  temporo-spatial structure of consciousness, as they can be traced to changes in the brain’s spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure.

Psychiatric symptoms may then be considered as primarily spatiotemporal rather than cognitive, affective, social, or sensorimotor. Therefore, based on various findings (see Martino et al. 2016[21] and Northoff et al. 2017[22]), one may trace the various psychopathological symptoms in psychiatric disorders to the spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure. This entails what I is as ‘Spatiotemporal Psychopathology[23][24][10].  

Philosophical implications – World-brain problem[edit]

The TTC considers consciousness a temporo-spatial phenomenon of the natural world we live in. Taken in such temporo-spatial sense, consciousness allows integrating ourselves including our brain and body, into the wider temporo-spatial context of the world. Consciousness is consequently concerning our brain-based relation to the world. Philosophically (ontologically, as concerning existence and reality), this presupposes the world-brain relation as the ontological predisposition of consciousness (OPC)[2]. Most importantly, the world-brain relation as OPC renders superfluous the assumption of a mind as possible ontological substrate of consciousness. Once the possible existence and reality of mind is discarded on ontological grounds, the mind-body problem itself becomes superfluous and, even more radical, non-sensical. One can then replace the non-sensical mind-body problem by the more sensical and empirically plausible question for the relation between world and brain, the ‘world-brain problem’[2][25].  

Mathematical implications – Category theory[edit]

Every scientific theory is only as good as its mathematics. Therefore, mathematical formalization is necessary for a scientifically valid and robust neuroscientific theory of consciousness. The TTC and its emphasis on temporo-spatial relation and structure of brain and consciousness are well compatible with what is described as Category Theory (CT) in mathematics. In brief, CT focuses its mathematical description on relation and structure between objects rather than on characterizing the objects themselves, independent of their relation to others. One central feature of CT is natural transformation. Natural transformation is how different objects transform and transition into each other on the basis of their interrelations. The TTC is currently being formalized in the mathematical terms of Category theory (CT-TTC).   

References[edit]

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