Transparency (philosophy)

In epistemology, transparency is a property of epistemic states defined as follows: An epistemic state E is "weakly transparent" to a subject S if and only if when S is in state E, S can know that S is in state E; an epistemic state E is "strongly transparent" to a subject S if and only if when S is in state E, S can know that S is in state E, and when S is not in state E, S can know S is not in state E.

Sources

• Boghossian, Paul A. (1994). "The Transparency of Mental Content". Philosophical Perspectives. 8: 33–50. doi:10.2307/2214162. JSTOR 2214162.
• Smithies, Declan (2012). "Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Informa UK Limited. 90 (4): 723–741. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.627925. ISSN 0004-8402.
• Di Leo, Jeffrey R. (2015). "Transparency in Neoliberal Academe". symplokē. Project MUSE. 23 (1–2): 341–362. doi:10.5250/symploke.23.1-2.0341. ISSN 1069-0697.

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