Fraud Resistant Electronic Voting
Fraud resistant electronic voting: a problem worth solving[edit]
Introduction[edit]
Currently, electronic voting systems are viewed with scepticism because of the multitude of ways they can be compromised. Although voting machines are in common use, there are reports on methods for compromising these commonly used voting machines [1][2][3] . Scepticism is justified.
There are endless strategies for compromising the vote count during an election or primary. [4] These methods fall into a few general categories (P1 to P4)
- Directly changing the vote count
- Changing the voter roll without vetting.
- Destroying or corrupting backup media to avoid a recount
- Voter Identity fraud.
In a survey of companies producing electronic voting apparatus, it is surprising to find no company that produces a system that directly countermands election fraud. The voting systems commonly used are "knock offs" of more general accounting systems. Nothing that addresses the voting problem directly was found.
Basic considerations for security issues[edit]
The electronic voting system should consist of a network of devices ( "network nodes".): The central node is operated by precinct administrators and the voter nodes are operated by the public voters. Basic security issues to consider include
- Tampering with the devices: This issue is addressed by requiring that the network nodes be designed to be non destructively impenetrable. This is standard approach in the engineering of military or aircraft devices. When such a device fails, it is replaced by a new device that has been factory tested, there is no attempt to service an individual device.
- Tampering with the programming. The operating programs are tested rigorously in the factory as is the common practice. The precincts have NO ACCESS to the programs that run the network. However precincts have the ability to test that the network nodes are operating properly.
- Corruption of the permanent records. Precinct administrators will have the ability make external copies of the voting results and voter records. These copies will NOT be paper copies which can easily be tampered with. Rather, the records will be stored on external devices whose contents are immutable (i.e., impossible to change). Such external storage devices are commercially available [5] and are readable by commonly used machines.
- Vetting the voter roll The voter roll should be stored in the memory of the voting system and available to all precinct administrators through an audit report. The administrators can challenge the voter roll pertaining to the other political parties.
- System backups To protect against system failure, a backup file should be created continuously while the system is in operation. This backup file can be used to restore the system as it was at the time of failure to a replacement device.
References for System Requirements[edit]
As stated above, no commercial systems are known that are designed to handle voting and resist fraud simultaneously. Furthermore no publically available system requirements documents were found.
One useful engineering document ( purchasable on the Internet ) that provides formal specification for a fraud resistant system [6] In that document, related documents were found to be of less value. However the complexity of the article is overwhelming for all but computer experts.
First thing for the reader to realize is that the programming processes that will be required by this article are well established and well known in the world of professional programmers. Dozens upon dozens of computer companies exist that are qualified to implement the system requirements that will be set forth in this document.
The second thing to realize is that, precinct administrator will need to review and confirm the work of administrators from the other political parties. The system will provide an "audit" file that will keep a record of all actions performed by all administrator. All system actions by precinct administrators are fully transparent to all precinct administrators.
References[edit]
- ↑ Shugah Works (2016-04-11), Electronic Voting Machine hacked by Computer Scientists (AccuVote-TS), retrieved 2018-08-27
- ↑ "Hillary Clinton's election fraud finally exposed".
- ↑ "A Hacker Shows Us How Easy it is To Manipulate Voting Machines".
- ↑ "Electoral fraud".
- ↑ SanDisk®. "SanDisk Introduces Write-Once Memory Cards for Applications where Recorded Data must be Unalterable". www.sandisk.com. Retrieved 2018-08-27.
- ↑ "Formal Specification and Analysis of an E-voting System". 2010 International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security.
External links[edit]
This article "Fraud Resistant Electronic Voting" is from Wikipedia. The list of its authors can be seen in its historical and/or the page Edithistory:Fraud Resistant Electronic Voting. Articles copied from Draft Namespace on Wikipedia could be seen on the Draft Namespace of Wikipedia and not main one.
