Islamic State in Kurdistan

Islamic State in Kurdistan
Active	2014–present
Ideology	Salafism Salafist Jihadism Takfirism Wahhabism Anti-Shi'ism Anti-Christian sentiment Anti-Yazidi sentiment
Group(s)	Predominantly Kurds
Leaders	Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2014–2019) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2019–2022) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2022–2022) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (2022–2023) † (Leader of ISIL) Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2023–present) (Leader of ISIL)
Area of operations	Kurdistan
Part of	Islamic State
Allies	White Flags (unconfirmed) Ansar al-Islam (sometimes)
Opponent(s)	Kurdistan Region Turkey Iraq Iran Syria SNA SDF PKK Ansar al-Islam (sometimes)
Battles and war(s)	Syrian civil war War in Iraq (2013–2017) Islamic State insurgency in Iraq (2017–present) Rojava–Islamist conflict Turkey–Islamic State conflict

The Islamic State in Kurdistan refers to various organized clandestine cell systems operating in Kurdistan who gave their allegiance to the Islamic State, as well as the activities of the Islamic State organization in Kurdistan.

Background

An Islamic State fighter of Chechen background had confirmed that the Islamic State plans to make Kurdistan into an official wilayah (province) within its caliphate, just like Khorasan Province, or Caucasus Province, (note to editor, Kurdistan would have been a sub-Province of Iraq Province such as Furat Province (Syria), Hawran Province (Syria), Khayr Province (Syria), Kirkuk Province (Iraq), etc. instead of something like Khorasan Province) although it was repeatedly getting delayed due to the Islamic State's failure to control any significant land in Kurdistan. However, there have been many organized cells, dominated by Kurds who operate in Kurdistan, which are connected to each other through their mutual allegiance to the Islamic State.

Activities

Following the Fall of Fallujah, and the Fall of Mosul, the Islamic State declared itself a caliphate on 29 June 2014, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph.

Over 50 commanders and significant members of Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on 29 August 2014. Among them was Abu Khattab al-Kurdi, who later became an Islamic State commander. Some veterans of the Kurdish Hezbollah also joined the Islamic State.

On Newroz 2015, the Islamic State released a 24-minute propaganda video in Kurdish. The main speaker in the video was Abu Khattab al-Kurdi, who promised that the Islamic State was going to "bring the Caliphate to Kurdistan". The video ended with three Peshmerga soldiers each being beheaded by a different Kurdish militant.

The Islamic State in Kurdistan also claimed responsibility for two bombings in Hasakah, targeting Newroz celebrations, which resulted in as many as 45 people dying.

A Syrian Kurdish activist who lived under the Islamic State for a period of time, in an interview, said that many of the high-ranking Kurds in the Islamic State were Iraqi Kurds, with a significant amount of Iranian Kurds and Turkish Kurds, as well as many Syrian Kurds. He claimed that Syrian Kurds had much less communication with the Islamic State, and therefore were more likely to believe rumours about the Islamic State, but many still joined them. Although he opposed the Islamic State, he refuted claims that the Islamic State was anti-Kurdish, and claimed that they do not differentiate between Kurds and Arabs, and that they do not fight Kurds because they are Kurds, but they fight secular-nationalist Kurdish groups because they are against their religious doctrine. In early 2015, the number of Kurds in the Islamic State was estimated to be 3,000. They were dubbed the "Kurds of the Caliphate" due to their rejection of their Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish, or Iranian citizenships, as well as their rejection of loyalty to the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Mullah Shwan Kurdi joined the Islamic State during its early stages and rose to be a senior member. Mullah Shwan appeared in a video in early 2015, in which he interviewed 20 Peshmerga fighters and 1 Iraqi soldier, who were locked in cages.

Another famous preacher named Ismail Susayi, based in Erbil, also pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State and was arrested in 2018 after he was involved in an attack on governmental offices in Erbil. Dastbar Othman, a Kurdish teen from Germany who frequently visited Susayi during his trips to Iraqi Kurdistan, was also arrested after he moved to Iraqi Kurdistan to be an informant for the Islamic State.

The Islamic State's influence increased quickly in Adıyaman and Bingöl, in Turkish Kurdistan, with many either leaving to join the Islamic State, or forming Islamic State cells in their cities. Adıyaman had the deadliest Islamic State cell in all of Turkey, and out of the 21-person cell, 18 were Kurdish natives of Adıyaman, which led to surprise due to how Kurds were associated with the YPG in the media at the time.

The Kurds who were loyal to the Islamic State were crucial during the Siege of Kobanî, in which both the Kurds of Kobanî as well as the Kurds who travelled there, had guided the Islamic State through the terrain and language barriers. While many of the Kurds of Kobanî welcomed the Islamic State out of genuine support, others welcomed them because they hated the PYD to the point they viewed the Islamic State as a better alternative.

In 2018, an Iranian Kurdish man named Saryas Sadeghi, who worked as an Islamic State recruiter, had blown himself up at the Shrine of Ruhollah Khomeini. The majority of Kurds in Iran who sympathised with the Islamic State had crossed to Iraqi Kurdistan or to Syria in order to join its Kurdish faction, although a small minority of them crossed into Afghanistan to join the Islamic State – Khorasan Province.

In 2017, a Kurdish group known as the White Flags emerged. American defence and military officials claimed that the White Flags were a union of Kurdish ISIS and Ansar al-Islam remnants, however it was just allegations, as the Kurds of the Islamic State had continued fighting for the Islamic State under sleeper cells. It was also alleged that the White Flags are allied with the Islamic State, however the allegations are baseless as the two groups never interacted. The White Flags have been inactive since 2018. The common consensus was that the White Flags were an Ansar al-Islam faction which attempted to rebrand and failed.

In July 2021, Iraqi ICTS forces collaborated with Kurdish CTG to crackdown on Islamic State cells across the country. Later in December, Kurdish security forces disrupted dozens of Islamic State sleeper cells across Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC) confirmed that most Islamic State cell members which they arrested have been Kurds. The cell leader was arrested on December 13, in an operation 72 hours after the arrest of 25 Islamic State members from Halabja, Said Sadiq, Khurmal, Sirwan, and Erbil.

Two Kurdish sleeper cells of the Islamic State were disrupted in August 2022, and Kurdistan was referred to as a "fertile ground" for the Islamic State ideology.

In July 2023, an Islamic State commander who was involved in the Camp Speicher massacre was found and arrested in Sulaymaniyah.

References

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