Mercenaries in Sierra Leonean Civil War

Lt. Col. Robert C. MacKenzie (standing, wings on hat) with some of the Sierra Leone Commando Unit he was training with the Gurkha Security Guards. Lt Andy Myers is 2nd from left, kneeling. Photo courtesy of Sibyl MacKenzie.

Mercenaries in Sierra Leone were foreigners who participated in the Sierra Leone Civil War on the side of the Government or rebels. They were represented both by employees of PMCs and by those who were hired directly to the parties to the conflict.

Mackenzie Group

The country's leader, Valentine Strasser had begun to organize a force to counterattacks by the RUF rebels and his right-hand man, Major Tarawali had contracted sixty Gurkhas of the GSG (Gurkha Security Guards Limited) to train approximately 160 green troopers that would form the nucleus of the SLCU. Headed the instructors Robert MacKenzie. He arrived in the country at the end of January 1995. MacKenzie's first order of business was to locate an appropriate camp on which to base the troops. On a scouting patrol to assess possible locations for the training camp, MacKenzie, Tarawali and an escort of would-be SLCU came upon a village that had been burned by the rebels. McKenzie and the co-director of GSG, Borlace, wanted to pursue the rebels; however, the inexperienced troops were reluctant to do so. MacKenzie, Borlace and Tarawali went ahead on their own, and their soldiers later followed. Surprised by such determined action, the RUF forces broke and ran. This incident infused the SLCU with new confidence.

On 17 February, MacKenzie led a convoy of vehicles from their base camp 91 miles from Freetown, the capital, to Mile 47, a town which had a government garrison. This stretch of road had to be secured if they had to hold onto their training camp (Camp Charlie) deep within bandit country. On this particular mission, they were ambushed by an RUF contingent. Marshaling the Gurkhas and the SLCU troops, MacKenzie drove through the kill zone and began flanking maneuvers, surprising the enemy at the aggressiveness of their response. The rebels turned and broke contact. Thick undergrowth prevented effective tracking, but three blood spoors were found, indicating that the RUF forces had taken some casualties.

These successes in the field, however, deluded the government hierarchy into believing that the RUF would crumble in the face of any organized resistance. They ordered MacKenzie to attack the RUF base camp in the Malal Hills. MacKenzie countered that the SLCU had not been trained yet and that it would not be ready for such a major engagement. Back came the word that MacKenzie should take the Gurkhas on the mission, and leave the green SLCU troopers to be trained later. MacKenzie again countered that legally this would not be possible, since the GSG were contracted for training alone and not for combat. Finally, the army chief of staff personally wrote MacKenzie, ordering the attack for 22 or 23 February. Determined to do his duty, MacKenzie agreed to investigate the possibility of attacking the Malal Hills.

MacKenzie gathered what little intelligence he could in the face of the government's impatience. In preparation for the assault on the hills, jets borrowed from the Nigerians were to drop cluster bombs on the rebel positions in order to soften them up. However, the Russian pilot flying a Mi-24 helicopter tasked with bringing in the Nigerian commander who would communicate with the jets, without any explanation simply hovered over the camp on the 23rd and left. Calls to HQ fell on deaf ears, and when the Nigerian jets arrived the next day, they bombed the wrong hill. Alerted by ordnance falling on unoccupied terrain, the rebels were ready for MacKenzie's group when they approached their objective.

MacKenzie, leading from up front with Tarawali and Lieutenant Andy Myers, came under fire from a bandit ambush. Tarawali was killed in the first volley, and an attempt to carry his body back was made. Fire was heavy, coming from the enemy hidden deep in the undergrowth. The SLCU dropped Tarawali's body and ran, actually trampling the Gurkha medics who were a little behind the command group. MacKenzie ordered that everyone should retreat and the senior Gurkha medic saw MacKenzie take two rounds through his legs and one through his back. MacKenzie dropped his rifle as Lieutenant Myers bent over him to give him assistance. This was the last anyone saw of either. Intercepts of bandit radio revealed that they had taken Tarawali's and MacKenzie's bodies, but there was no word on Myers. He would be later presumed dead at 9:00 on 24 February.

Executive Outcomes

In March 1995, the company Executive Outcomes contained an insurrection of guerrillas known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, regained control of the diamond fields, and forced a negotiated peace.

In both the above mentioned cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, E.O. is credited with salvaging it's contracting governments from respectively UNITA and RUF.

In the case of Angola this led to a cease fire and the Lusaka Protocol, which ended the Angolan Civil War – albeit only for a few years. In Sierra Leone, however, the government capitulated to international pressure to have EO withdraw in favour of an ineffective peacekeeping force, allowing the RUF to rebuild and sack the capital in "Operation No Living Thing".

As is characteristic of one of the first PMCs, Executive Outcomes was directly involved militarily in Angola and Sierra Leone. The company was notable in its ability to provide all aspects of a highly trained modern army to the less professional government forces of Sierra Leone and Angola. For instance, in Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes fielded not only professional fighting men, but armour and support aircraft such as one Mi-24 Hind and two Mi-8 Hip helicopters, the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle and T-72 main battle tank. These were bought from sources in the worldwide arms trade within Africa as well as Eastern Europe.

Former USSR

In 1999, from 200 to about one and a half thousand mercenaries from the post-Soviet space fought in the government forces of Sierra Leone. Several hundred retired officers of the Ukrainian army fought on the side of their opponents from the RUF. However, the former Ukrainian military also worked as military specialists in government combat formations. There was a Russian-Ukrainian-South African helicopter squadron in the camp of the authorities (commander Carl Alberts). At least three Ukrainians from the opposition were killed. In May 1997, during another army performance, four Belarusian helicopter pilots who worked in the interests of the official Freetown were taken hostage.

See also

• Mercenaries in Angolan Civil War
• Mercenaries from former soviet republics in Africa

Publications

• Эл Дж. Вентер. Наёмники против анархистов // Солдат удачи : журнал. — №3 — 1996.
• Владимир Воронов, Павел Мороз. Слуги смерти: Русские наёмники в Африке // Собеседник : газета. — 28 мая 2001.
• Коновалов И.П. Солдаты удачи и воины корпораций. История современного наемничества. — Пушкино: Центр стратегической конъюнктуры, 2015. — 216 с.: с ил. ISBN 978–5–9906069–7–5.

Links

• Павел Лось. Наемники в Африке // Deutsche Welle : телерадиовещательная организация. — 2 августа 2002.
• Александр Гольц. Любой конфликт за ваши деньги // Вокруг света : журнал Русского географического общества. — 30 сентября 2010.

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