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Mona Simion

From EverybodyWiki Bios & Wiki

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Mona Simion is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow where she is also Deputy Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre..[1]

Biography[edit]

Simion previously held positions at the University of Oslo's ConceptLab [2] and at Cardiff University. She was promoted to Professor only four years after receiving her PhD in 2017.

Simion is a member of the Executive Committee of the Aristotelian Society, the Management Committee of BSTK – The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge[3], and the Steering Committee of the Social Epistemology Network [4]. She is on the Editorial Board of the Philosophical Quarterly[5] and the Asian Journal of Philosophy.[6]

She is Principal Investigator of a long-term grant funded by the European Research Council entitled ‘KnowledgeLab: Knowledge First Social Epistemology”[7] and Co-Investigator (with Adam Carter, PI and Christoph Kelp) on a Leverhulme Trust funded project entitled ‘A Virtue Epistemology of Trust’ [8].

Fellowships and Awards[edit]

In 2018-19, she held a Fellowship from the Mind Association for a project entitled ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Functions’ [9], and she won the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021 for her paper ‘Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe’ [10].

Work[edit]

Simion’s work focuses on issues in epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of language, and feminist philosophy.

Her book ‘Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. Epistemic Normativity in Context’ develops a novel account of the normativity of constative speech such as assertion, conjecture, and reporting. In particular, it reconciles two views that have widely been held to be incompatible, to wit, a knowledge-based account of the normativity of constative speech, and a classical invariantist view of the meaning of ‘knows’.[11]

‘Sharing Knowledge. A Functionalist Account of Assertion’ (with Christoph Kelp) develops a novel account of the nature and normativity of assertion. It defends the thesis that assertion has the function of generating knowledge in hearers, uses this thesis to provide a rationale for familiar norms of assertion, and explores a range of consequences of this view in epistemology and the philosophy of language. [12]

Publications[edit]

Books

  • Simion, M. 2021. Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context. Oxford University Press.[13][14]
  • Kelp, C. and Simion, M. 2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge University Press.[15]
  • Brown, J. and Simion, M. 2021. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.[16]


Journal Special Issues

  • Kelp, C. and Simion, M. 2021/2022. Synthese Special Issue: Knowledge-First Epistemology.[17]
  • Carter, A., Gordon, E., Kelp, C., Lyons, J. and Simion, M. Forthcoming. Philosophical Topics Special Issue: Epistemology
  • Cowan, R. and Simion, M. 2020. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice BSET Special Issue: Ethics, Knowledge, and Language.[18]


Journal Articles

  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize 2021.[19]
  • Forthcoming. Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (with C. Kelp). Asian Journal of Philosophy, Special Inaugural Issue, ed. N. Pedersen.
  • Kelp, C., Simion, M. and Carter, C. 2022. How to Be an Infallibilist. Philosophical Studies.[20]
  • Simion, M. 2021. Blame as Performance. Synthese. Online First.[21]
  • Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Simion, M. 2021. Disagreement and Epistemic Improvement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal). Synthese.[22]
  • Simion, M. 2021. Testimonial Contractarianism: A Knowledge-First Social Epistemology. Nous. 55/4: 891-916.[23]
  • Simion, M. 2020. A Priori Perceptual Entitlement, Knowledge-First. Philosophical Issues. Eds. M. McGrath and S. Schellenberg, 30/1: 311-323.[24]
  • Simion, M. 2020. The C-Account of Assertion: A Negative Result (with C. Kelp). Synthese 197: 125–137.[25]
  • Simion, M. and Kelp, C. 2020. Conceptual Innovation, Function First (with C. Kelp). Nous, 54/4: 985-1002.[26]
  • Kelp, C., Boult, C., Broncano-Berrocal, F. Dimmock, P., Ghijsen, H., and Simion, M. 2020. Hoops and Barns: a New Dilemma for Sosa. Synthese. 197: 5187–5202.[27]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Knowledge-First Functionalism. Philosophical Issues, 29/1: 254-267.[28]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief-Assertion Parallel. Analysis, 79/2: 260-265.[29]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Saying and Believing: The Norm Commonality Assumption. Philosophical Studies  176/8:  1951–1966.[30]
  • Simion, M. 2019. A Puzzle for Epistemic WAMs. Synthese 196: 4679 – 4689.[31]
  • Simion, M., Schnurr, J. and Gordon, E. 2019. Epistemic Norms, Closure and No-Belief Hinge Epistemology. Synthese. Online First.[32]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms. Inquiry. Online First.[33]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Assertion: The Context Shiftiness Dilemma. Mind & Language 34: 503–517.[34]
  • Simion, M. 2018. The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21/3: 477-488.[35]
  • Simion, M. and Kelp, C.  2018. How to Be an Anti-Reductionist. Synthese. Online First.[36]
  • Simion, M. 2018. No Epistemic Norm for Action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55/3: 231-238.[37]
  • Simion, M. 2018. Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman.’ Logos&Episteme, 9/1: 91-98.[38]
  • Kelp, C. and Simion, M. 2017. Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114/2: 76-93.[39]
  • Simion, M. 2017. The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry, 61/8: 914-928.[40]
  • Kelp, C. and Simion, M. 2017. Commodious Knowledge. Synthese, vol 194/5: 1487-1502[41].
  • Simion, M. 2017. Epistemic Norms and He Said/She Said Reporting. Episteme, 14/4: 413-422.[42]
  • Simion, M. 2016. Assertion: Knowledge is Enough. Synthese, 193/10: 3041-3056.[43]
  • Simion, M., Kelp, C. and Ghijsen, H. 2016. Norms of Belief. Philosophical Issues, 26/1: 375-392.[44]
  • Simion, M. and Kelp, C.  2016. The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 53/4: 397-411.[45]
  • Simion, M. 2016. Perception, History and Benefit. Episteme, 13/1: 61-76.[46]
  • Simion, M. 2016. Non-Probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Rawlsian Veil.  Journal of Value Inquiry, 50/3: 557-572.[47]
  • Simion, M. 2016. Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back. Logos&Episteme, vol. 7/3: 385-391.[48]
  • Simion, M. 2014. Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style. Contemporary Pragmatism, 11/2: 107-121.[49]


Book Chapters

  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Epistemology. Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy (ed. M. Rossberg), Cambridge University Press.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Knowledge Comes First. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa eds.), Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Knowledge Still Comes First. Contemporary  Debates in Epistemology, Volume 3 (M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa eds.), Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Defeat. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, (K. Sylvan ed.), Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Talking to Social Robots. Communication with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, (Cappelen, H. and Sterken, R), Oxford University Press.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Girl-Technology, Social Knowledge, and Defeat. In Feminist Philosophy and Emerging Technologies, Edwards, M. and Palermos, O., Routledge.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Engineering Evidence. New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering (eds. M.G. Isaac and K. Scharp), Springer.
  • Simion, M. and Broncano-Berrocal, F. Forthcoming. Knowledge and Disagreement. Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, (M. Baghramian, J.A. Carder, and R. Rowland eds.), Routledge.
  • Simion, M. and kelp, C. Forthcoming. A Social Epistemology of Assertion. Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, (Lackey J. and McGlynn A. eds.), Oxford University Press.
  • Simion, M., Kelp, C. and Carter, A. Forthcoming. On Behalf of Knowledge-First Collective Epistemology . Doxastic and Propositional Warrant (P. Silva and L. Oliveira eds.), Routledge.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Warrant Transmission and Psychological Defeat. In Epistemic Closure and Transmission (M. Jope and D. Pritchard eds.), Routledge.
  • Simion, M. and Miragoli, M.  2021. Gender, Race, and Group Disagreement. In Group Disagreement (A. Carter and F. Broncano-Berrocal eds.), Routledge.[50]
  • Simion, M. 2021. Classical Invariantism and Assertion Functionalism. In Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered (C. Kyriakou and K. Wallbridge eds.), Routledge.[51]
  • Simion, M. 2021. Scepticism about Epistemic Dilemmas. Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (K. McCain, S. Stapleford & M. Steup eds.), Routledge.[52]
  • Brown, J. and Simion, M. 2021. Introduction. In Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[53]
  • Carter, A. and Simion, M. 2020. The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust. Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (J. Matheson ed.).[54]
  • Simion, M. 2020. Social Epistemology of Education. Encyclopaedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory (M.A. Peters ed.), Springer.[55]
  • Simion, M., Kelp, C, Boult, C., and Schnurr, J. 2020. Epistemic Virtues and Virtues with Epistemic Content. In Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches (J. Greco and C. Kelp eds.), Cambridge University Press.[56]
  • Simion, M. 2019. Hermeneutical Injustice as Basing Failure. In Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation (P. Bondy, and A. Carter eds.), Routledge.[57]
  • Kelp, C. and Simion, M. 2018. The Constitutive Norm View of Assertion. In Oxford Handbook of Assertion (S. Goldberg ed.), Oxford University Press.[58]
  • Simion, M. 2016. Knowledge, Rational Credibility, and Assertion: The Scoreboard. In Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Goals (M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig eds.), DeGruyter.


Book Reviews

  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Review of Jennifer Lackey, The Epistemology of Groups, Oxford University Press 2021. Philosophical Review.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Review of Sven Rosenkranz, Justification as Ignorance, Oxford University Press 2021. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  • Simion, M. Forthcoming. Sosa on Permissible Suspension. Book Symposium on Ernest Sosa’s ‘Epistemic Explanations’, Oxford University Press 2021, Res Philosophica.
  • Simion, M. 2021. Review of Juan Comesana, Being Rational and Being Right, Oxford University Press 2020. Mind. Online First.[59]
  • Simion, M. 2021. Review of Sanford Goldberg, Conversational Pressure, Oxford University Press 2020. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.[60]
  • Simion, M. 2020. Review of Kate Manne, Down Girl, Oxford University Press 2017. Philosophical Quarterly. Online First.[61]

Selected Talks[edit]

Simion presented her research widely, including a range of prestigious keynote talks at award ceremonies and subject specific societies:

  • The Young Epistemologist Prize Address. Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe. Rutgers Epistemology Conference 2022, New York, USA.[62]
  • Keynote Talk: Resistance to Evidence. European Epistemology Network Meeting, Glasgow, UK, 2022.[63]
  • Keynote Talk: Resistance to Evidence. British Society of Theory of Knowledge, 2022.[64]
  • Mind Fellow Address. Epistemic Norms, Function First. The Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association 2019, Durham University, UK, 2019.[65]
  • Epistemic Norms: Action and Practical Reasoning. Meeting of the European Normativity Network, University of Stockholm, Sweden, 2017.[66]

Reception[edit]

Simion's work is widely cited and discussed, including in several encyclopedia entries[67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75][76]. Her work on the normativity of assertion[77][78][79], the nature of justification[67], and conceptual engineering[80][81] has been substantively discussed in the literature. Her h-index is 11 at Google Scholar[82], 6 at Scopus[83], and 7 at Publons[84]. Her book Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context is in stock at 156 libraries worldwide[85], while Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion can be found 64 in libraries[86], and Reasons, Justification, and Defeat in 156 libraries[87].

Media[edit]

Simion has been featured in the Daily Nous[88][89][90][91] and ResearchProfessional News[92]. She was interviewed for several blogs[93], podcasts[94][95], magazines[96], and for New Books Network[14].

External Links[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ↑ "University of Glasgow – Cogito Epistemology Research Centre".
  2. ↑ "ConceptLab – Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas".
  3. ↑ "Daily Nous – New: The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge – About".
  4. ↑ "SEN – The Social Epistemology Network – Members".
  5. ↑ "Validate User". academic.oup.com. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  6. ↑ "The Asian Journal of Philosophy – Editors".
  7. ↑ "Daily Nous – Philosophers Win Large Grants from the ERC".
  8. ↑ "Leverhulme Trust – Grant Listings".
  9. ↑ "Mind Association – Research Fellowships".
  10. ↑ "Daily Nous – Simion Wins 2021 Young Epistemologist Prize".
  11. ↑ "Oxford University Press – Shifty Speech and Independent Thought".
  12. ↑ "Cambridge University Press – Sharing Knowledge".
  13. ↑ Simion, Mona (2021). Shifty speech and independent thought : epistemic normativity in context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-264842-6. OCLC 1251804495. Search this book on
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 "Mona Simion, "Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic…". New Books Network. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  15. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Simion, Mona (2022). Sharing knowledge : a functionalist account of assertion. Cambridge. ISBN 978-1-009-03681-8. OCLC 1273423778. Search this book on
  16. ↑ Reasons, justification, and defeat. Jessica Brown, Mona Simion. Oxford. 2021. ISBN 978-0-19-258649-0. OCLC 1245671247. Search this book on
  17. ↑ "Synthese". Springer. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  18. ↑ "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice | Volume 23, issue 1". SpringerLink. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  19. ↑ Weinberg, Justin (2021-02-23). "Simion Wins 2021 Young Epistemologist Prize". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  20. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Carter, Adam; Simion, Mona (2022-01-30). "How to be an infallibilist". Philosophical Studies: s11098–022–01785-7. doi:10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7. ISSN 0031-8116. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  21. ↑ Simion, Mona (December 2021). "Blame as performance". Synthese. 199 (3–4): 7595–7614. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03130-7. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  22. ↑ Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando; Simion, Mona (December 2021). "Disagreement and epistemic improvement". Synthese. 199 (5–6): 14641–14665. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03437-5. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  23. ↑ Simion, Mona (December 2021). "Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledge‐first social epistemology". Noûs. 55 (4): 891–916. doi:10.1111/nous.12337. ISSN 0029-4624. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  24. ↑ Simion, Mona (October 2020). "A priori perceptual entitlement, knowledge‐first". Philosophical Issues. 30 (1): 311–323. doi:10.1111/phis.12187. ISSN 1533-6077. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  25. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Simion, Mona (January 2020). "The C account of assertion: a negative result". Synthese. 197 (1): 125–137. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1760-5. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  26. ↑ Simion, Mona; Kelp, Christoph (December 2020). "Conceptual Innovation, Function First". Noûs. 54 (4): 985–1002. doi:10.1111/nous.12302. ISSN 0029-4624. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  27. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Boult, Cameron; Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando; Dimmock, Paul; Ghijsen, Harmen; Simion, Mona (December 2020). "Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa". Synthese. 197 (12): 5187–5202. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1461-5. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  28. ↑ Simion, Mona (October 2019). "Knowledge‐first functionalism". Philosophical Issues. 29 (1): 254–267. doi:10.1111/phis.12152. ISSN 1533-6077. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  29. ↑ Simion, Mona (2019-04-01). "Epistemic norm correspondence and the belief–assertion parallel". Analysis. 79 (2): 260–265. doi:10.1093/analys/any048. ISSN 0003-2638.
  30. ↑ Simion, Mona (August 2019). "Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption". Philosophical Studies. 176 (8): 1951–1966. doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8. ISSN 0031-8116. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  31. ↑ Simion, Mona (November 2019). "A puzzle for epistemic WAMs". Synthese. 196 (11): 4679–4689. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1681-3. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  32. ↑ Simion, Mona; Schnurr, Johanna; Gordon, Emma (July 2021). "Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology". Synthese. 198 (S15): 3553–3564. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02165-1. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  33. ↑ Simion, Mona (2019-02-27). "Conceptual engineering for epistemic norms". Inquiry: 1–17. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562373. ISSN 0020-174X. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  34. ↑ Simion, Mona (September 2019). "Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma". Mind & Language. 34 (4): 503–517. doi:10.1111/mila.12221. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  35. ↑ Simion, Mona (June 2018). "The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21 (3): 477–488. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6. ISSN 1386-2820. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  36. ↑ Simion, Mona; Kelp, Christoph (July 2020). "How to be an anti-reductionist". Synthese. 197 (7): 2849–2866. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1722-y. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  37. ↑ Simion, Mona (2018-07-01). "No Epistemic Norm for Action". American Philosophical Quarterly. 55 (3): 231–238. doi:10.2307/45128617. ISSN 0003-0481. JSTOR 45128617. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  38. ↑ Simion, Mona; Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch (2018). "Epistemic Trouble for Engineering 'Woman'". Logos & Episteme. 9 (1): 91–98. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme2018916. ISSN 2069-0533.
  39. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Simion, Mona; Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2017). "Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion". Journal of Philosophy. 114 (2): 76–93. doi:10.5840/jphil201711426. ISSN 0022-362X.
  40. ↑ Simion, Mona (2018-11-17). "The 'should' in conceptual engineering". Inquiry. 61 (8): 914–928. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894. ISSN 0020-174X. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  41. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Simion, Mona (May 2017). "Commodious knowledge". Synthese. 194 (5): 1487–1502. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0938-3. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  42. ↑ Simion, Mona (December 2017). "EPISTEMIC NORMS AND 'HE SAID/SHE SAID' REPORTING". Episteme. 14 (4): 413–422. doi:10.1017/epi.2016.11. ISSN 1742-3600. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  43. ↑ Simion, Mona (October 2016). "Assertion: knowledge is enough". Synthese. 193 (10): 3041–3056. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0914-y. ISSN 0039-7857. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  44. ↑ Simion, Mona; Kelp, Christoph; Ghijsen, Harmen (October 2016). "Norms of Belief: Norms of Belief". Philosophical Issues. 26 (1): 374–392. doi:10.1111/phis.12077.
  45. ↑ Simion, Mona (2016). "The Tertiary Value Problem and the Superiority of Knowledge". American Philosophical Quarterly. 53 (4): 397–411. JSTOR 44982114 – via Jstor.
  46. ↑ Simion, Mona (March 2016). "Perception, History and Benefit". Episteme. 13 (1): 61–76. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.56. ISSN 1742-3600. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  47. ↑ Simion, Mona (September 2016). "Non-probabilistic Decision Strategies Behind the Veil". The Journal of Value Inquiry. 50 (3): 557–572. doi:10.1007/s10790-015-9536-3. ISSN 0022-5363. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  48. ↑ Simion, Mona; Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch (2016). "Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back". Logos & Episteme. 7 (3): 385–391. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20167336. ISSN 2069-0533.
  49. ↑ Simion, Mona (2014-04-21). "Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce's Style". Contemporary Pragmatism. 11 (2): 107–121. doi:10.1163/18758185-90000293. ISSN 1572-3429.
  50. ↑ Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando; Carter, J. Adam (2020-11-23). Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando; Carter, J. Adam, eds. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (1 ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780429022500-7. ISBN 978-0-429-02250-0. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help) Search this book on
  51. ↑ Skeptical invariantism reconsidered. Christos Kyriacou, Kevin Wallbridge. New York, NY. 2021. ISBN 978-0-429-35346-8. OCLC 1250435547. Search this book on
  52. ↑ Epistemic dilemmas : new arguments, new angles. Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, Matthias Steup. New York, NY. 2022. ISBN 978-1-003-13456-5. OCLC 1261776207. Search this book on
  53. ↑ Reasons, justification, and defeat. Jessica Brown, Mona Simion (First ed.). Oxford. 2021. ISBN 978-0-19-258649-0. OCLC 1245671247. Search this book on
  54. ↑ "The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  55. ↑ Simion, Mona (2020), "Social Epistemology of Education", in Peters, Michael A., Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, Singapore: Springer Singapore, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1, ISBN 978-981-287-532-7, retrieved 2022-03-01 Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  56. ↑ Virtue-theoretic epistemology : new methods and approaches. Christoph Kelp, John Greco. Cambridge, United Kingdom. 2020. ISBN 978-1-108-66640-4. OCLC 1154135413. Search this book on
  57. ↑ Well-founded belief : new essays on the epistemic basing relation. J. Adam Carter, Patrick Bondy. New York, NY. 2019. ISBN 978-1-315-14551-8. OCLC 1123188292. Search this book on
  58. ↑ The Oxford handbook of assertion. Sanford Goldberg. New York. 2018-. ISBN 978-0-19-067524-0. OCLC 1076357739. Check date values in: |date= (help) Search this book on
  59. ↑ Simion, Mona (2021-04-20). "Being Rational and Being Right , by Juan Comesaña". Mind: fzab010. doi:10.1093/mind/fzab010. ISSN 0026-4423.
  60. ↑ Simion, Mona (2021-09-01). "Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges". The Philosophical Quarterly. 71 (4): pqaa075. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa075. ISSN 0031-8094.
  61. ↑ Simion, Mona. "Down Girl". The Philosophical Quarterly. 71: 681–84. doi:10.1093/pq/pqaa048 – via Academic OUP.
  62. ↑ "Rutgers Epistemology Conference 2022 – Susanna Schellenberg". susannaschellenberg.org. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  63. ↑ "European Epistemology Network Conference 2022". philevents.org. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  64. ↑ "ANNUAL CONFERENCE". BSTK. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  65. ↑ Association, Mind. "Research Fellows 2018-19". The Mind Association. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  66. ↑ "Stockholm 2017". European Normativity Network. 2017-10-17. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  67. ↑ 67.0 67.1 "Knowledge-First Theories of Justification | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  68. ↑ "The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  69. ↑ Goldman, Alvin; Beddor, Bob (2021), "Reliabilist Epistemology", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-03-01
  70. ↑ Chignell, Andrew (2018), "The Ethics of Belief", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-03-01
  71. ↑ Pagin, Peter; Marsili, Neri (2021), "Assertion", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-03-01
  72. ↑ Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020), "Epistemology", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-03-01
  73. ↑ Pavese, Carlotta (2021), "Knowledge How", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2022-03-01
  74. ↑ "Assertion > Which Kind of Norm? (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  75. ↑ "Assertion > Notes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  76. ↑ Simion, Mona (2019), "Social Epistemology of Education", in Peters, Michael A., Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, Singapore: Springer, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_696-1, ISBN 978-981-287-532-7, retrieved 2022-03-01 Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  77. ↑ Kvanvig, Jonathan L.; Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch (2017). "Reply to Simion". Logos & Episteme. 8 (1): 113–116. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme2017816. ISSN 2069-0533.
  78. ↑ Kelp, Christoph (August 2020). "Moral Assertion". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 23 (3–4): 639–649. doi:10.1007/s10677-020-10107-x. ISSN 1386-2820. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  79. ↑ Lewis, Max (August 2019). "The Norm of Moral Assertion: A Reply to Simion". Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 22 (4): 1043–1049. doi:10.1007/s10677-019-10033-7. ISSN 1386-2820. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  80. ↑ Podosky, Paul-Mikhail Catapang (2018-12-29). "Ideology and normativity: constraints on conceptual engineering". Inquiry: 1–15. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562374. ISSN 0020-174X. Unknown parameter |s2cid= ignored (help)
  81. ↑ McKenna, Robin; Romanian Academy - Iasi Branch (2018). "No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering 'Woman': Response to Simion". Logos & Episteme. 9 (3): 335–342. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20189325. ISSN 2069-0533.
  82. ↑ "Google Scholar". scholar.google.com. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  83. ↑ "Scopus preview - Simion, Mona - Author details - Scopus". www.scopus.com. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  84. ↑ "Mona Simion's Publons profile". publons.com. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  85. ↑ Simion, Mona (2021). Shifty speech and independent thought epistemic normativity in context. doi:10.1093/oso/9780192895288.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-191608-3. OCLC 1253284276. Search this book on
  86. ↑ Kelp, Christoph; Simion, Mona (2022). Sharing knowledge: a functionalist account of assertion. ISBN 978-1-316-51713-0. OCLC 1273424520. Search this book on
  87. ↑ Brown, Jessica, Simion, Mona (2021). Reasons, justification, and defeat. ISBN 978-0-19-884720-5. OCLC 1277019564. Search this book on
  88. ↑ Weinberg, Justin (2021-02-23). "Simion Wins 2021 Young Epistemologist Prize". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  89. ↑ Weinberg, Justin (2020-09-28). "Online Philosophy Resources Weekly Update". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  90. ↑ Weinberg, Justin (2021-03-16). "New: The British Society for the Theory of Knowledge". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  91. ↑ Weinberg, Justin (2020-09-04). "Philosophers Win Large Grants from the ERC (updated)". Daily Nous. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  92. ↑ "My winning proposal: Permission to prioritise the big ideas". Research Professional News. 2020-01-09. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  93. ↑ Simion, Mona (2020-06-29). "#YouShouldBelieveHer". Cardiff University. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  94. ↑ The Cologne Knowledge Router #6: Mona Simion on the Normativity of Inquiry, retrieved 2022-03-01
  95. ↑ Episode #14. Victim Testimony ft. Dr Mona Simion, retrieved 2022-03-01
  96. ↑ "The truth is out there waiting for us to find it". www.basf.com. Retrieved 2022-03-01.


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