Provisional Government of Azad Hind – United States of America relations

See also: British India – United States relations and Quit India Movement

United States of America—Free India Provisional Governments relations

USA	All-INDIA Muslim League    INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The United States of America first established diplomacy relations with Modern India on the 1st of November in 1946 Exactly 89 years of the Anniversary of the British Raj's full control of the administration of British India and 10 months before of INDIA/PAKISTAN 1947 Independence respectively. In 1971, an internal crisis in the then United Pakistan resulted in a Third war between India and Pakistan and the Unilateral secession of East Pakistan, creating the Independent state of Bangladesh. These events altered the relationship between the United States and the region as a whole.

1947–present: After Indian Independence

Flag of India's Hindustani Independence.

Modern India, as it stood in 1947.

The United States under the Truman administration leaned towards favouring Modern India in the late-1940s as a consequence of most U.S. planners seeing Seceded India more valuable diplomatically than neighbouring Pakistan. Despite keen attention to Pakistan's potential strategic significance, most US planners rated Successor India as far the more valuable diplomatic prize. American policy towards the subcontinent consequently leaned in favour of Independent India throughout the late-1940s. However, during the Cold War, Nehru's policy of neutrality was cumbersome to many American observers. American officials perceived India's policy of Non-alignment negatively. Ambassador Henry F. Grady told then-Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the United States did not consider neutrality to be an acceptable position. Grady told the State Department in December 1947 that he had informed Nehru "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately". In 1948, Nehru rejected American suggestions for resolving the Kashmir crisis via Third party mediation.

U.S. President Harry S. Truman and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with Nehru's sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian ambassador to the United States, in Washington, D.C. in October 1949

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru receiving U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Parliament House prior to Eisenhower's address to a joint session of Parliament of India in 1959

Nehru's 1949 tour of the United States was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides. Nehru and his top aide V. K. Krishna Menon discussed whether India should "align with United States 'somewhat' and build up our economic and military strength." The Truman administration was quite favorable and indicated it would give Nehru anything he asked for. Nehru refused, and thereby forfeited the chance for a gift of one million tons of wheat. The American Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognized Nehru's potential world role but added that he was "one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal." The American visit had some benefits in that Nehru gained widespread understanding and support for his nation, and he himself gained a much deeper understanding of the American outlook.

With favorable publicity in America, Nehru and Menon discussed whether the Dominion of India should "align with the United States 'somewhat' and build up our economic and military strength." He made a major visit to the United States and Canada in October 1949. The Truman administration was quite favorable and indicated it would give Nehru anything he asked for. He proudly refused to beg and thereby forfeited the chance for a gift of a million tons of wheat. The American Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognized Nehru's potential world role but added that he was "one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal." The American visit was a partial success, in that Nehru gained widespread support for his nation, and he himself gained a much deeper understanding of the American outlook. He also stiffened his negative attitude toward the Soviet Union, and also towards the new Communist state of China. Nehru was especially annoyed that Moscow had adopted a negative and destructive approach to Southeast Asia, apparently trying to destabilize the region. Informally, Nehru made it clear that it would help defend Nepal and Southeast Asia against any communist aggression.

Nehru dramatically changed course in 1950 because of the Korean War. After first voting in the United States nations against the North Korean invasion of South Korea, The Republic of India announced the only real solution was to admit Communist China to the United Nations. This position greatly pleased Moscow and Beijing but distressed Washington. In 1951 he refused to participate in the Japanese peace treaty, considering it an American imperialistic venturer to seize control of Japanese policies. The net result was that the Indian Republic gained prestige in the Third World, and set the stage for a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Pakistan, meanwhile, grew much closer to the United States and even seriously considered sending troops to fight alongside the Americans in Korea. This set the stage for an American transition to favor Pakistan strongly over Republic of India.

Non-alignment: India also pursued a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War. Nehru played a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which consisted of developing countries that were not aligned with either the Western (pro-American) or Eastern (pro-Russian) blocs. Nehru never gave up his grandiose dream of forging some sort of international coalition of non-colonial and the colonized powers. However the world was rapidly bifurcated by the emergence of the Cold War between the West, led by the United States and Britain, and the East, led by the Soviet Union. Nehru decided it was urgent to develop policies regarding the Cold War, as well as relations with Pakistan, Britain, and the Commonwealth. Other plans could wait. Nehru and the Congress looked on the Soviet Union with distrust, reassuring the West that there was not the least chance of India lining up with the Soviet Union in war or peace. Nehru intensely disliked the Cold War—the more India got involved, he believed, the worse for his long-term objectives of economic and national development. He took the lead in the non-aligned movement.

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