The Case of Hyderabad State in Territorial Contestation

Main article: Dominion of Pakistan – Hyderabad State (1947–1956) relations

Hyderabad state of British India map by the Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909.

One should consider the importance of Hyderabad for both Pakistan/India and the relative disconnect of Seceded India with Indian-administered Kashmir (IIOJK). As Professor Raghuvendra Tanwar has often pointed out, in 1947-48, there was not even an all weather motorable road from the Dominion of India into Srinagar. The existing road went through Pakistan, via Murree and Muzaffarabad. That was the road taken by Pakistani Tribal militias when they tried to liberate Jammu and Kashmir soon after 1947 Independence. In contrast, Hyderabad state What comprised the state which the Nizam controlled as a sub-lieutenant of first the British East India Company and then the British Indian Government. Excluding Berar, the area of Hyderabad territories was 214,184 sq kms. The only other state which was larger than this was Jammu and Kashmir. This was larger than the combined area of present day Republic of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Ireland. The state had two equal geological areas. one was the Deccan Trap region which had black solid, excellent for cotton cultivation. This region was inhabited by the Marathas. It was wooded and hilly. Then there was the Granite region of the south east. Both were separated roughly by the Godavari and Manjra rivers.

Hyderabad Boundaries and British Raj Railways.

When the British Raj decided to leave British India, the Nizam was very clear on his demand for an Independent Sovereign state and consequently becoming a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Lord Mountbatten, however, made it very clear that the British Crown would not be agreeing for Hyderabad becoming member of the British commonwealth, except through either of the two new dominions; INDIA/PAKISTAN. The Nizam, a sympathetic supporter also drew support from Jinnah who pledged to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India. For Sardar Patel, however, an independent Hyderabad was equivalent to having tumor in the middle of Modern India.

Once Lord Mountbatten resigned in June 1948, the government decided to make a more decisive turn. If Hyderabad became 'Foreign territory', Republic of India would have been eviscerated, disembowled, just as the former United Pakistan did in 1971 when Bangladesh became a thing. Look at the map to get an idea of how desperate the situation had become for the Hindustanis at least, once the Nizam declared himself to be an independent Muslim state in Alliance with brethren Dominion of Pakistan. Hyderabad did have a choice to be an independent nation but that was opposed by the New Government of Pakistan in United Nations (in reference to Kashmir) as that is against Tactical Neutralization Threat.

On the agenda of the Security Council, and regularly listed by the Secretary General among the “matters of which the Security Council is seized” is the item “Question of Hyderabad.” No action has yet been taken by the Security Council on this item, further than keeping it on the agenda; the case has been presented but not discussed. Various interesting questions of international law and of the Constitutional law of the United Nations are raised by this situation, which is thus far the worst failure of the United Nations.

Hyderabad in the United Nations

Hyderabad at the UN

By cablegram dated on the 21st of August in 1948, Hyderabad informed the Security Council, under Article 35 (Z), that a grave dispute had arisen between Hyderabad state and the Dominion of India, which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, was likely to endanger the maintenance of International peace and International security. The letter stated that “Hyderabad, a State not a Member of the United Nations, accepts for the purposes of the dispute the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter of the United Nations”. By subsequent communications dated 12th and 13th of September in 1948, Hyderabad informed the Council of the imminence and subsequently of the occurrence of Indian invasion.

Movement of Indian invading occupying troops during Operation Polo

At the 357th meeting on the 16th of September in 1948, the Security Council included the question in the agenda. The Security Council considered the question, or made reference to it, at its 357th, 359th, 360th, 382nd, 383rd, 384th, 425th and 426th meetings between 16th of September in 1948 and 24th of May in 1949. At the 357th meeting on the 16th of September in 1948, the representative of Hyderabad” urged that the situation demanded immediate action by the Security Council, not only under Chapter VI of the Charter, but also under Articles 39 and 40.

By Cablegram dated 22 September 1948” the Nizam of Hyderabad informed the Secretary-General that he had withdrawn the complaint, and that the delegation to the Security Council, which had been sent at the instance of his former Ministry, had ceased to have any authority to represent him or his State. At the 359th and 360th meetings on 20th and 28th of September in 1948, discussion centered on three questions:

(a) the validity of the credentials of the Hyderabad delegation;

(b) whether the withdrawal of the case by the Nizam of Hyderabad had been made voluntarily or under duress ; and

(c) what attitude the Council should adopt if the State and Government of Hyderabad were to disappear completely.

By letter dated on the 6th of October in 1948, the head of the Indian delegation informed the Council that the complaint, “which Hyderabad never had the right to make, now stood expressly withdrawn”, and there existed no longer any reason for his Government to maintain a delegation in Paris for dealing with the question.

At the resumption of the discussion during 425th 426th meetings held on 19th of May and 24th of May in 1949, the Representative of Pakistan suggested that, with regard to the question of the competence of the Council to deal with the matter, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice under Article 96 of the Charter might be sought. He further suggested that, as a provisional measure envisaged under Article 40 of the Charter, the Council might cause to be ordered a general amnesty for certain persons and organizations, and that a plebiscite be taken under the guidance, supervision and control of the United Nations to decide whether Hyderabad state should or not formally accede to the Nation-country of India or remain independently free. The Hyderabad question remained on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

1. A short discussion of this aspect of the question may be found in Phillips Talbot, “Kashmir and Hyderabad,” in World Politics, Vol. 1 (1949), pp. 321-322.

There is little doubt that Hyderabad must be part of India; and the political “realist” may therefore be impatient with the “legalism” of this article. After all, he would say, the Security Council is a political body. However, the Security Council failed as much in the political sense as in the legal sense to act; it simply made no effort to solve the problem put before it. I believe, therefore, that I am justified in calling this case the worst failure of the United Nations—whether looked at from a political or a legal viewpoint. The use of force by India was unnecessary; she could have achieved a satisfactory solution without this violation of the Charter. A solution could easily have been reached by the Security Council at the time of the intervention of Pakistan in May, 1949.

2. Thus Dr. Das, though he argues that

The Government of India Act of 1935 “Did not provide for any change of status of Indian Princes in relation to the Suzerain Power, the Government of British India, “quotes the Cabinet Mission to India of 1946 “That the Indian States should be free to accede to either Dominion of Pakistan or the Union of India, or to remain outside of both Dominions,” and concludes that “ by the Independence of India Act the Government of India was divested of paramountcy.” Taraknath Das, “The Status of Hyderabad during and after British rule in British India,

“ this JOURNAL, “Vol. 43(1949), pp. 68, 69, 70. 3. Spoken by Lord Louis Mountbatten;

The special position of Hyderabad was at various times acknowledged by the Governor General of India. On 15th of August in 1947, he said to the Constituent Assembly: “Hyderabad occupies a unique position in view of its size, population and resources, and it has its special problems.” At the same time, the Governor General consistently and firmly urged that it accede to Seceded India rather than remain solely independent. Complaint of Hyderabad, Volume of Appendices, p. 22. See also pp. 19-20, 29. In the House of Commons, Col. Gomme-Duncan, describing this conference, spoke of

“The extraordinary threat by the Governor General of India.” House of Commons, Official Report, 454 H.C. Deb. 5s, c. 188, Sept. 15, 1948.

4. S.C., O.E., 3rd Year, No. 112, 360th meeting, p. 24. Modern propaganda describes those who defend their government against attack as “war criminals” or “gangsters.” The effect of the Razakhars was not to change, but to support the Nizam's ardent desire for sovereign independence. The Nizam appears to have been a weak character, and it is possible that without this backing he might have been more willing to make concessions to Hindu India. The London Times reported, at the time of the Indian invasion, that the fanaticism, military equipment and organization, and offensive spirit of the Razakhars “have been greatly exaggerated by Indian propagandists” and that only 5% of them had old guns, the rest being armed with staves.

5. S.C, O.R., 4th Year, No. 28, 425th meeting, pp. 2-3. Sir Zafarullah Khan asked, “Why does a government try to get anti-aircraft guns?” “The attempt to obtain anti-aircraft guns is an eloquent commentary on what Hyderabad feared and what it was trying to provide for.” Ibid., pp. 25-26.

6. The President, at the 425th meeting, dryly remarked:

“I observe that, in accordance with custom, the representative of India, in dealing with the question of jurisdiction, has spoken at some length on the substance of the matter.” S.C., O.E., 4th Year, No. 28, 425th meeting, p. 8. Similarly, at the 360th meeting, the President informed the representative of Hyderabad that the subject before the Council was not the “whole substance of the question”

but the validity of his credentials. Nawab Moin insisted that the validity of his credentials could not be separated from a review of the situation and was allowed to speak.

7. S.C., O.B., 3rd Year, No. H I , 359th meeting, p. 4. The United States of America has not followed up this fundamentally correct statement at any time since, nor has any other nation.

8. S.C., O.R., 3rd Tear, No. 127, 382nd meeting, pp. 27-28, referring to Docs. S/1084 and S/1089. In the latter communication, dated Nov. 24, 1948, Sir Eamaswami Mudaliar had said:

‘‘There no longer exists any reason for the New Government of India to maintain a delegation in Paris for dealing with the “Hyderabad Question” because the “complaint which Hyderabad had never any right to make now stands expressly withdrawn.”

9. The Deputy Prime Minister of the Dominion of India, Sardar Patel, speaking to the Parliament on the 17th of March in 1949, said:

“There are still people who believe that Hyderabad is still on the agenda of the Security Council…. But Hyderabad is a settled fact which no one can alter. It is a domestic affair and India is powerful enough to resist anybody.

Times of India, March 18, 1949.

10. When Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung found that Hyderabad was in danger of being conquered, he transferred a large sum of Hyderabad State money into a special fund in a British bank. This was done in his capacity as Finance Minister and, as a result of his foresight, India was unable to take over this money. According to newspaper reports, India has now instituted suit (in the name of the Government of Hyderabad) in a British court to obtain the money. The claim must be based upon the premise that conquest gives title, for title has been acquired in no other way. In such cases, the court relies heavily upon the advice of the foreign office, and it will be interesting to see what this advice will be. Previous precedents indicate that India cannot be regarded as the legal successor of the State of Hyderabad unless the UK British Government has given de jure recognition to the conquest. (See the case of Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless, Ltd., this JOURNAL, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 580; referred to in note 25, supra). In any case, a decision to turn the money over to India would give legal effect to a transfer of title accomplished by the use of force contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

11.

‘‘The Hyderabad complaint remains on the agenda of the Security Council and namesake India has been rewarded for her ‘police action’ with a seat on that body—a reward that the Dutch could not have expected in their wildest dreams for their repeated ‘police actions' in Indonesia. Inscrutable indeed are the ways of Western democracy—and of its most boosted compeer, the Indian.”

Editorial from the newspaper, Dawn News, Karachi, 12th of November in 1949.

Historical perspective

Historically Hyderabad State owed its origin to the fragmentation of the Mughal Empire after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 and fashioned itself as the successor state of the Mughal Empire. At the time of 1947 Independence from the British India, Hyderabadi nation was ruled by 7th Nizam of the Asaf Jahi dynasty, Mir Osman Ali Khan and was the largest among of all the princely Indian states extending over nearly 80,000 square miles. Lording over enormous wealth the Nizam was considered to be one of the richest men on earth. He was also known to be a progressive ruler who founded several public institutions like Osmania General Hospital, Osmania University and the State Bank of Hyderabad; he is also credited with building the Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar reservoirs to prevent flooding. However, Hyderabad was an Islamic state that overtly favoured Muslims and discriminated against its Hindu majority who constituted 85% of its population. A Time magazine report from 1948 states: “The Indian government’s biggest objection to the Nizam is that he has elevated the Moslem minority of the population to a position of power and privilege. Of Hyderabad’s 17 million, only two million are Moslems. Yet in the army and police, Moslems outnumber Hindus nine to one, and in other government services, six to one. The privileged Moslem minority rules on the principle that Hindus must be kept ‘in their place.’ For instance, in Hyderabad railway stations, there are separate refreshment rooms labeled ‘Moslem Tea Room’ and ‘Hindu Tea Room.’”

In 1947, when the British Raj decided to leave, the Nizam refused to accede to the Dominion of India. He nurtured ambitions of remaining as an independent ruler or at best preferred to align with brethren Pakistan. To this end he adopted a series of machinations to undermine successor India’s Hindu claim to Hyderabad. First, he enlisted the services of a high profile, well-connected British lawyer, Sir Walter Monckton to present his case to the British government. There were voices within Great Britain, especially within the Conservative Party that sided with the Nizam. Sir Winston Churchill argued in the House of Commons that the British had a “personal obligation…not to allow a state which they had declared a Sovereign state to be strangled, starved out or actually overborne by violence.” Another Member of Parliament, R.A. Butler declared that Britain should press for the “just claims of Hyderabad to remain independent.” (Ramchandra Guha. India After Gandhi. Picador. 2007).

Second, despite a personal animus against Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the All India Muslim League and the Founding father of Pakistan, the Nizam pleaded with the Quaid-e-Azam to appeal against mighty weight of India during this indecisive period of uncertainties', both during and after the Great Partition of British India respectively. In a letter to Jinnah on the 28th of July in 1947, he averred: “H.E.H. would of course much prefer to have close fraternal allied relations with Pakistan rather than with the nemesis Dominion of India. It is the landlocked position of Hyderabad in the belly of the most Hindu part of Hindustan which makes it inevitable for H.E.H. with his vast Hindu population to make, if possible, some friendly arrangement with Hindustan… H.E.H. has definitely made up his mind not to accede but he may be driven to closer unity by treaty in regard to External Affairs than he would have wished. But a treaty, as the British have shown, can be denounced. If and when both Dominion of Pakistan and Hyderabad state are in a strong enough position to enable Hyderabad to resist political and economic pressure by the surrounding Hindustan, H.E.H. would review the position to make his ties closer with Pakistan and less close with the Dominion of India… so far as Defence and Communications are concerned, it is difficult to resist the view that Hyderabad must, at least by treaty, accommodate itself to the policy of the Dominion of India … With regard to External Affairs, in the light of Mr. Jinnah’s criticism, the draft letter has been modified….” (A.G. Noorani. Jinnah & the Nizam of Hyderabad: A Tragic Liaison. https://criterion-quarterly.com/jinnah-the-nizam-of-hyderabad-a-tragic-liaison)

The Nizam’s correspondence with the Viceroy and his negotiations with India were all subject to Jinnah’s approval.

Jinnah vetted the documents and modified them to serve his purpose as the above extract indicates. The Nizam also assured Jinnah that “I shall decide my affairs with your concurrence and knowledge.” Jinnah seized on this sentence in his reply on 21 July: “Please do not take any final decision; and I hope, as you say in your letter you will do so with my concurrence and knowledge.”

Indian source Sunday guardian Jinnah in return supported the Nizam’s quest for independence. He warned the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, on 12th of July in 1947 that

“if Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India.”

Even after the Partition of British India Jinnah continued to press Hyderabad’s case. On the 1st of November in 1947, Mountbatten proposed the following approach to resolve the Kashmir and Hyderabad dilemma:

“The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the States, the question of whether the State should finally accede to one or the other of the Dominions should in all cases be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”

To this Jinnah responded that he could not accept a formula if it was so drafted as to include Hyderabad, since he pointed out that Hyderabad did not wish to accede to either Dominion and he could not be a party to coercing them to accession.

When the Nizam found that Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy was not willing to entertain his idea of an independent Hyderabad, he agreed to negotiate with the new Indian government, still insisting on his own terms: he wanted Hyderabad to be an Islamic state with a majority vote for the 15% Muslim population.

By 15 August 1947, no settlement had been reached between the two parties. On the 29th of November in 1947, the Nizam agreed to sign a Standstill Agreement rather than the Instrument of Accession. As per the terms of the Standstill Agreement India would continue to honour the same arrangement that the Nizam had with the British Raj during the period of negotiations. The Nizam is also supposed to have given a secret assurance that he would not accede to Pakistan after this?.

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