Arctic exceptionalism
The concept of Arctic Exceptionalism derives from the studies of International Relations. It refers to the Arctic region’s distinct features, which allow peaceful cooperation even between states in conflict. After several political initiatives toward more cooperation in the Arctic during the post-Cold War period, the concept received wide acknowledgement in the academic debate. Taking into account the consequences of melting ice caps, several conflicts between Russia and Western states and increased Chinese ambitions as a global player led to the debate whether the concept is outdated and whether the Arctic is experiencing a normalization. In general, critics argue the concept is too narrow and misses explanations from other theoretical approaches besides Liberal Institutionalism. Several alternative explanation models to the dominating concept of Arctic Exceptionalism have been developed to explain the unique cooperation efforts of states in the Arctic region.
Definition
Arctic Exceptionalism is a concept from the International Relations studies describing the success of "maintaining cooperation in the region despite internal competition for resources and territory and compartmentalizing Arctic relations from external geopolitical tensions”.[1] Because of its geographical remoteness, harsh climate conditions, and limited infrastructure, the Arctic is seen as detached from geopolitical dynamics, leading to the region’s description as an “apolitical space of regional governance, functional cooperation and peaceful co-existence”[2]. Compared to other areas of the world being affected by global political dynamics, these features constitute the Arctic as exceptional.
History
During his speech on October 1, 1987, in Murmansk, Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed several foreign policy initiatives, transforming the Arctic into an international zone of peace among the Arctic states. Although western states encountered the initiative with doubt, it allowed the vision of cooperation between Arctic states on political, economic, and environmental issues. Meanwhile, under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), Canada changed its focus in the Arctic from military presence to circumpolar cooperation to introduce a normalization of political engagement on issues of common concern.[3] A further milestone was the Arctic Ocean Conference, held in Ilulissat, Greenland, on May 27-29, 2008. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States signed the Ilulissat Declaration agreeing on cooperation in environmental regulation, maritime security, mineral exploration, polar oil and transportation.[4]
For decades, the idea of exceptionalism promoted cooperation, leading to a normative commitment of the states to peacebuilding in the Arctic. Academic scholars explained this success through different lenses. Oran Young and Gail Osherenko saw overlapping interests of the states in parts of the Arctic, leading to the construction of a common region. The Arctic allowed cooperation initiatives as attractive case studies to solve disputes in a world transitioning from the Cold War to American unipolarity. Cooperation was auxiliary in issues like environmental challenges, which were too large to be addressed by one state alone.[5] While Lassi Heininen attributed an emancipatory spirit in the “exceptional political space”[6] far away but still connected to the world, other strains focus on the apolitical character of the space coming from its distance and decoupling of global political dynamics.[2]
Normalization
Trend towards normalization
Since 2007, the assertion of the Arctic as an exceptional space for peace and cooperation has been increasingly questioned. Progressing climate change with summer ice at a record low led to uncertainty over future maritime boundaries of the region. With high oil prices worldwide, exploration of resources in the Arctic became increasingly attractive for states. In the Ilulissat Declaration 2008, the Arctic littoral states expressed their national sovereignty claims and self-interest while also affirming international norms and legal frameworks.[7]
Several political incidents consolidated the idea of a “normalization” of the Arctic region. Russia performed the Arktika 2007 expedition being the first country ever to descend to the seabed of the North Pole Ocean. After dropping a titanium tube with the Russian Flag, other Arctic states have shown concerns Russia could claim the territory. The Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay warned, "This isn't the 15th Century (…). You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory'".[8] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov answered that the expedition’s aim was “to show that our shelf reaches to the North Pole”.[9] The 2014 Ukraine Crisis with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia was encountered by the West with sanctions on oil and gas and suspension of military cooperation in the Arctic. Further contestation about Arctic territory was shown in the attempt by the U.S. under the Trump administration to buy Greenland and the return of the U.S. Navy Fleet to the Keflavik air base in Iceland in 2018.[4]
Besides these incidents, the trend toward an arms race and Chinese engagement affects the debate about the normalization of the Arctic. Scholars like Rob Huebert[10] and Scott G. Borgerson[11] argue that the Arctic is becoming increasingly militarized. With the region’s opening allowing exploitation of resources and new shipping routes, Borgerson argues that the situation might lead to an Arctic arms race for resources if the U.S. abstain from taking political initiative. Huebert adds that not only are much of the Russian strategic deterrence capabilities located in the Arctic, but spillovers from the Ukraine Crisis are likely to negatively impact cooperation.
A further challenge to the idea of Arctic Exceptionalism is seen in China’s political and economic activities in the region. With the self-declaration as a “polar great power” and “near-Arctic state”, China has increased its visits from high-level political figures, extended its scientific facilities (including dual-use projects), and icebreaker fleets in the region.[12] Chinese military sources predict that they will “increasingly focus on the struggle over and control of global public (…) [and that China] “cannot rule out the possibility of using force”[13] in the Arctic.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, all other seven member states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the U.S.) suspended activities in the Arctic Council.[14] James deHart, the U.S. coordinator for the Arctic, argued, “It’s simply a pause in light of the horrific events and Russia’s egregious, unprovoked, completely unnecessary war of choice against Ukraine”[15], not making any statements about the length of pausing the cooperation. The Russian senior Arctic official, Nikolay Korchunov, stated “The Arctic should remain as a territory of peace (…), and thus, this unique format should not be subject to the spillover effect of any extra-regional events.”[16]
Skepticism of normalization
While there is a trend to describe the Arctic as increasingly normalizing, several aspects indicate future exceptional conditions for peaceful cooperation in the region. Debates about incidents like the Russian flag on the ocean ground in 2007 or the US attempt to buy Greenland are exaggerated by some. Some scholars[17] argue that navigation in the Arctic straits will not be economically profitable soon, and resources are still difficult to exploit. Hence, studies suggest that Russia has the most significant oil and gas potential and intrinsic motivation to cooperate with other Arctic states.[18]
Additionally, previous cooperation formats turned out to be effective during times of crisis. From the Ilulissat declaration 2008 until 2014, states continued to cooperate on political, economic and environmental issues. Disagreements like the Norwegian-Russian conflict in the Barents Sea could be resolved in 2010. In the following years, the Arctic Council members agreed on legally binding treaties (Search and Rescue Agreement in 2011, Combating Oil spills in 2013, and Research Cooperation in 2017).[4]
Michael Byers[19] and Heather Exner-Pirot[20] argue that the crisis and its continuous cooperation show the resilience of Arctic Governance, while some go even further, describing the Arctic as exceptionally peaceful.[6] Borgerson, in 2008 predicting an “Arctic meltdown”, revised his opinion in 2013 when he argued for the potential of peaceful cooperation as an “extraordinary opportunity”.[21]
While there are pessimistic voices about China’s activities and ambitions, others argue that the country’s current role as a constructive contributor to circumpolar research and its observer status in the Arctic Council is barely threatening to a peaceful and cooperative international design in the Arctic.[22]
Critique
Besides the doubts about its topicality under a potential normalization, the idea of the Arctic as an exceptional space has been critiqued and contested since its introduction. Instead of a comprehensive and integrated governance approach that could be expected under these exceptional circumstances, in 2005, only an issue-driven web of policy agreements existed between the states. The low level of peaceful cooperation mechanism at that time left doubts about the effectiveness of the conditions for peace in the Arctic.[23]
Arctic Exceptionalism is critiqued for marginalizing military and security aspects from a conceptual perspective. Arguing for an exceptional (uncontested) Arctic space without defense capabilities creates vulnerability to the peaceful architecture whenever new military equipment enters the region.[3] Additionally, the fact that scholars narrow down the Arctic as an exceptional space with unique attributions based on the theory of Liberal institutionalism lead to a reduction of theoretical explanations from other approaches. For example, characteristics like national behaviors might be better explained through the idea of Realism.[3]
The concept's missing power dimension are criticized,[24] pointing that Arctic Exceptionalism does not illustrate the complexity of its security constellation. Instead, the concept of comprehensive security is suggested to consider all aspects from environmental protection, indigenous groups and regional institutions.
Alternative models of explanation
Since the beginning of the cooperation initiatives in 1987, states and scholars have developed various alternative explanation models, coming from different strains of critique, to explain the uniqueness of the Arctic. All approaches rely on the assumption that the Arctic is exceptional. However, they advocate for different norms and rules that should be applied. Observing these other narratives and understandings reflect why conflicts based on different perceptions occur within the Arctic.[3]
Polar Exceptionalism: The Arctic-Antarctic Analogy
Coming from the comparison of both poles, the idea for a comprehensive polar governance regime became prominent by tackling climate change, resource development and new shipping routes through regional institutions. In the 2008 resolution[25] from the EU parliament, the Antarctic Treaty[26] is mentioned as an inspiration for future Arctic Governance. However, the differences in regional characteristics were too large to ignore. Arctic states hold on to their sovereignty, mostly put aside in the Antarctic Treaty. Further, permanent settlements in the Arctic and an already existing legal framework based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) made distinctions between the regions even more significant.[3] The EU recognized these differences in its joint communication on the Arctic in 2016.[27]
Asserting Exceptionalism: Canada and the Indigenous Homeland
Canada promoted the concept of the Arctic as an indigenous homeland, referring to the high population of Indigenous in the American part of the Arctic. In post-Cold War negotiations, Canada pushed for a civilian component, equaling Indigenous representatives with Arctic governments. The acknowledgement of participation did not include voting rights or the rights to self-determination for Indigenous people, as opposed by the US. Further initiatives, like the idea of an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, promoted by Canadian and Indigenous representatives, were rejected by the U.S. out of concern of losing counter-force options, as Russia was holding most of its nuclear weapons in the Arctic.[3]
Asserting Arctic Exceptionalism: The Russian Case
Russia sees the Arctic as an exceptional zone of peace and territory of dialogue, while also arguing only Russia “has the necessary experience and knowledge to contribute to the economic and social development of the region and to the protection of its ecosystem.”[28]. In the debate about the Russian view on Arctic Exceptionalism, nationalistic discourse can be observed, arguing that the Russian North represents the chance to gain compensation for lost territory during the collapse of the Soviet Union. On another note, high political priorities are increasing shipments through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the exploration of mineral resources, making regional stability efforts from the Russian side highly likely.[29] Therefore, Russia follows several political approaches in the Arctic from various interpretations of self-interest, between cooperative efforts and nationalistic framing.[30]
Atlanticism: The End of Arctic Exceptionalism?
Coming from a collapsed Russian military and Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative, Russian armed forces have been re-consolidated, inherently shown in the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Russia expanded its Northern Fleet for mutual deterrence in the Arctic to restore strategic balance, countering U.S. and NATO forces. Several Russian fleets, commands and guards are active in controlling the Bering Sea and Strait and the Chukchi Sea.[31] Canada blocked Iceland’s and Norway’s initiative to apply NATO troops to the region, denying the likelihood of Russian attacks in the region.[3] When shifting its stance in 2017, Canada agreed to "support the strengthening of situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic, including with NATO”[32].
However, a discrepancy is reflected in state’s rhetoric when referring to NATO engagement in the Arctic. Canada and the U.S. focus on the European Arctic, specifically around the Norwegian-Russian border. Both North American states preferred bilateral solutions concerning continental defense in the American Arctic.[3] The idea of forming transatlantic alliances in the region revived in the debate about a normalization of the Arctic and how new challenges could be tackled.[4]
References
- ↑ Exner-Pirot, Heather; Murray, Robert W. (2017-10-02). "Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism". Politik. 20 (3). doi:10.7146/politik.v20i3.97153. ISSN 2446-0893.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Käpylä, Juha; Mikkola, Harri (2018-06-28), "Contemporary Arctic Meets World Politics: Rethinking Arctic Exceptionalism in the Age of Uncertainty", The GlobalArctic Handbook, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 153–169, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91995-9_10, ISBN 978-3-319-91994-2, retrieved 2022-05-29 Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean (2020) Arctic Exceptionalism. The Arctic and the World Order. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-0007406-8-2
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Olesen, M. (2020). The end of Arctic exceptionalism? A review of the academic debates and what the Arctic prospects mean for the Kingdom of Denmark. In: Danish Foreign Policy Review 2020. Fischer, K. and Mouritzen, H. DIIS.
- ↑ Young, Oran R. (1992). Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North. Dartmouth College, published by University Press of New England. doi:10.1349/ddlp.779. ISBN 0-87451-605-6. Search this book on
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Heininen, Lassi (2018-06-28), "Special Features of Arctic Geopolitics—A Potential Asset for World Politics", The GlobalArctic Handbook, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 215–234, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91995-9_13, ISBN 978-3-319-91994-2, retrieved 2022-05-29 Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Spohr, Kristina; Hamilton, Daniel S.; Moyer, Jason C. (2021-02-02). The Arctic and World Order. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-9997406-8-2. Search this book on
- ↑ "Russia plants flag under N Pole". 2007-08-02. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ "Russia plants flag on Arctic floor - CNN.com". edition.cnn.com. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ Huebert, Rob (2011), "Canada and the Newly Emerging International Arctic Security Regime", Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 193–217, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511994784.013, ISBN 9781107006607, retrieved 2022-05-29
- ↑ Borgerson, Scott G. (2021-11-05). "Arctic Meltdown". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ Zhang, Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi (2021-04-12). "Northern expedition: China's Arctic activities and ambitions". Brookings. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ "China's Science of Military Strategy (2013)". Federation Of American Scientists. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ Friedman, Ingrid Burke. "After Ukraine, Can the Arctic Peace Hold?". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ "Ukraine and the Arctic: Perspectives, Impacts, and Implications | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ Dickie, Gloria (2022-03-04). "Russian officials call Arctic Council boycott 'regrettable'". Reuters. Retrieved 2022-05-29.
- ↑ Young, Oran R. (January 2009). "Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north". Polar Record. 45 (1): 73–82. doi:10.1017/s0032247408007791. ISSN 0032-2474. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Keil, Kathrin (2013-06-06). "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas". Cooperation and Conflict. 49 (2): 162–190. doi:10.1177/0010836713482555. ISSN 0010-8367. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Byers, Michael (2017-10-26). "Crises and international cooperation: an Arctic case study". International Relations. 31 (4): 375–402. doi:10.1177/0047117817735680. ISSN 0047-1178. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Exner-Pirot, Heather (2020). "The Arctic in International Affairs". The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics. Cham: Springer International Publishing: 307–318. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-20557-7_19. ISBN 978-3-030-20556-0. Retrieved 2022-05-29. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Borgerson, S (2013). The Coming Arctic Boom : As the Ice Melts, the Region Heats Up. Council on Foreign Relation. OCLC 1023461561. Search this book on
- ↑ Heurlin, Bertel (December 2019). "China-US Confrontations in The Arctic Region: Strategies and Policies" (PDF). Asian Studies International Journal. 1: 8–15 – via ICRD Publication.
- ↑ Young, Oran R. (2005-08-03). "Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation". Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations. 11 (1): 9–15. doi:10.1163/19426720-01101002. ISSN 1075-2846.
- ↑ Gjørv, Gunhild Hoogensen; Lanteigne, Marc; Sam-Aggrey, Horatio (2020-01-09), "Understanding Arctic security", Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, London ; New York : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.: Routledge, pp. 1–12, doi:10.4324/9781315265797-1, ISBN 978-1-315-26579-7, retrieved 2022-05-29 Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ European Parliament, P6_TA(2008)0474. "Arctic Governance - European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance" (PDF). Retrieved 29 May 2022.
- ↑ "PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY" (PDF). 1992.
- ↑ European Commission (27 April 2016). "JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL - An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic".
- ↑ Khrushcheva, Olga; Poberezhskaya, Marianna (2016-09-20). "The Arctic in the political discourse of Russian leaders: the national pride and economic ambitions". East European Politics. 32 (4): 547–566. doi:10.1080/21599165.2016.1231669. ISSN 2159-9165. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Keil, Kathrin (2013-06-06). "The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas". Cooperation and Conflict. 49 (2): 162–190. doi:10.1177/0010836713482555. ISSN 0010-8367. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Baev, Pavel (2018). "Russia's Ambivalent Status-Quo/Revisionist Policies in the Arctic". Defense & Security Analysis. 30 (4): 323–335. doi:10.1080/14751798.2014.948276. ISSN 1475-1798. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Konyshev, Valery; Sergunin, Alexander (September 2014). "Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?". Defense & Security Analysis. 30 (4): 323–335. doi:10.1080/14751798.2014.948276. ISSN 1475-1798. Unknown parameter
|s2cid=ignored (help) - ↑ Strong Secure Engaged : Canada's Defence Policy. Ottawa, ON, CA. 2017. ISBN 978-0-660-08443-5. OCLC 1000198251. Search this book on
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