Enaction (philosophy)
Enaction in the study of philosophy is related to the study of embodied cognition[citation needed], the notion that mind is not coterminous with the brain or perhaps even an entire organism,[1] but goes farther[citation needed] in its emphasis upon the interactions between a living organism and its surroundings. "A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its effective, embodied action in the world actually constitutes its perception and therefore grounds its cognition."[2][3] There is controversy over how much weight should be given to the information provided by the environment, and the role played by the organism in organizing this information.[4] In one form, this view emphasizes the cultural aspects of mind.[5]
Rowlands in the context of discussing the mind argues that "mental processes are:[6]
- Embodied involving more than the brain, including a more general involvement of bodily structures and processes.
- Embedded functioning only in a related external environment.
- Enacted involving not only neural processes, but also things an organism does.
- Extended into the organism's environment.
Psychology[edit]
As a subject in philosophy, enaction involves epistemology insofar as it concerns how knowledge can be acquired. As a subject in psychology, enaction has been about what is sometimes called "low-level cognition", things like motor learning, design of the human-machine interface, haptic perception, and psycholinguistics, but the developments of enaction in philosophy are finding wider application in psychology, extending to "high-level cognition" like reasoning, problem-solving, and planning.[2][7]
The theory emphasises interaction with the environment in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world.[6] The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity.[8][9]
A recent philosophical account of enaction[edit]
In a recent article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.[10] They present the view that enactive cognition implies embodiment, embeddedness, and the centrality of affect in cognition. Extended cognition is possible through skilful interaction with the environment. Therefore the article intends partially to defend each of these 'es' but also to point out the centrality of enactive cognition: if this is seen as a valid interpretation of our cognition, then the other aspects (the 'Es', and affect) follow also.
The authors propose an 'ecumenical' enactivism combining affordances (James J. Gibson), sensorimotor expectations (Alva Noë) and mutual enactive structuring (Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992)).[1] This enactivism avoids dualism, or what they call the Classical Sandwich, whereby internal cognitive workings intervene between perceptual input and actions output. There is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features.
They agree (p9) with Varela Rosch and Thompson, that rules and regularities come about through our interaction with perceptible environment. The world and our cognition are co-constituted, the world informs us what we can see and do, and our perception demarcates that which is in our world.
The enactivist position they outline 'holds that cognition essentially depends upon the activity, both actual and potential, of the cogniser.' They trace the origins of this view to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. Their claim is that we embody interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through the our bodily limitations and opportunities to enact that world. Further they emphasise the essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall their view is that our enactive cognition implies that we are embedded and embodied in an environment which we enact, and into which we are to a degree extended.
See also[edit]
- Action-specific perception
- Cognitive science
- Computational theory of mind
- Cultural psychology
- Embodied cognition
- Extended mind
- Externalism#Enactivism and embodied cognition
- Mind–body problem
- Situated cognition
- Subject–object problem
References[edit]
- ↑ 1.0 1.1
Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. ISBN 0262261235.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link) Search this book on
- ↑ 2.0 2.1
John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo (2014). "Introduction". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo, eds. Enaction (Paperback ed.). MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-52601-2.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link) Search this book on
- ↑ Hillel J. Chiel, Randall D. Beer (December 1997). "The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system, body and environment" (PDF). Trends in Neuroscience. 20 (12): 553–557. doi:10.1016/S0166-2236(97)01149-1.
- ↑
Anthony Chemero (2011). "§6.1 Gibson on direct perception and information". Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press. pp. 106 ff. ISBN 978-0262516471. Search this book on On-line accessible using Amazon's look inside feature.
- ↑
Carl Ratner (2011). "The act of participating in culture generates psychology". Macro Cultural Psychology: A Political Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. p. 91. ISBN 0199706298. Search this book on
- ↑ 6.0 6.1
Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556. Search this book on
- ↑
McGann, Marek; De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel (June, 2013). "Enaction and psychology". Review of General Psychology. 17 (2): 203–209. doi:10.1037/a0032935. Check date values in:
|date=(help)CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link) - ↑ Basil Smith. "Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ↑ Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed, ed. "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link)
- ↑
Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed. Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525.CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link) Search this book on On-line version here.
Further reading[edit]
- Robert A. Wilson, and Lucia Foglia (July, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed, ed. "Embodied cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). Check date values in:
|date=(help)CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link) - Monica Cowart. "Embodied cognition". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed, ed. "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link)
- Basil Smith. "Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embodied, enacted and extended". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556. Search this book on
External links[edit]
- Pietro Morasso (2005). "Consciousness as the emergent property of the interaction between brain, body, & environment: the crucial role of haptic perception" (PDF). Slides related to a chapter on haptic perception (recognition through touch): Pietro Morasso (2007). "Chapter 14: The crucial role of haptic perception". In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti, eds. Artificial Consciousness. Academic. pp. 234–255. ISBN 978-1845400705.CS1 maint: Extra text: editors list (link) Search this book on
 | This philosophy-related article is a stub. You can help EverybodyWiki by expanding it. |
This article "Enaction (philosophy)" is from Wikipedia. The list of its authors can be seen in its historical. Articles copied from Draft Namespace on Wikipedia could be seen on the Draft Namespace of Wikipedia and not main one.
