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Strategic-trap diplomacy

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Strategic-trap diplomacy[1] is a term in international relations which describes a scenario beyond Debt-trap diplomacy where human rights, political and security perspective is added. The term was coined by Sri Lankan academic Asanga Abeyagoonasekera.

In a debt trap situation where ‘the creditor country is said to extend excessive credit to a debtor country with the intention of extracting economic or political concessions when the debtor country becomes unable to meet its repayment obligations’[2][circular reference] argues Indian academic Brahma Chellaney, who coined the term Debt-trap diplomacy.

In the case of Strategic-trap, the creditor country not only focuses its assistance on credit and excessive loans but simultaneously intervenes in the nation's human rights,political and security sphere. China not only offers financial loans to trap nations like Sri Lanka but also offer human rights protection, support to alter the existing democratic political model towards an autocratic model and military assistance to nations like Sri Lanka.

In Sri Lanka, the Strategic-trap diplomacy was carried out as an extension to the Debt-trap diplomacy, where three characteristics are identified apart from the financing model. First, in the Human Rights dimension, where China has supported the Sri Lankan regime on Human Rights concerns,[3] the Sri Lankan government had no other option but to reciprocally support China’s Human Rights concerns in Xinjiang.[4][original research?] Second, in the political dimension, China’s involvement in installing an alternative model[5] away from the democratic model, an authoritarian model,[6] is another attribution in the Strategic-trap. Third, a security dimension[7] is added to the Strategic-trap where China favours a heavily militarized model.

Origin and Background[edit]

The term was coined by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and published initially on 16th September 2021, assessing the Chinese Debt-trap diplomacy in Sri Lanka at an interview with Voice of America.[8] Subsequently, Abeyagoonasekera discussed the Strategic-trap in a commentary published by ORF Think Tank on 23rd September 2021.[9] He dismissed the argument of Deborah Brautigam,[10] assessing there is a ‘Strategic-trap’ in Sri Lanka’. Strategic-trap was discussed at an interview with Dr Pramod Jaiswal on 12th October 2021.[11] While several scholars, such as Dr Ganeshan Wignaraja, argue there is no Debt-trap diplomacy,[12] another Chatham House paper Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’ How Recipient Countries Shape China's Belt and Road Initiative,[13] argues the same.

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera assesses the quantitative economic projection falls short in capturing the strategic depth of these projects. The Chinese projects have a long-term strategic design that could easily bring a ‘hybrid model’ of civil-military activity to the country, a security concern for Sri Lanka and the region. One cannot dismiss the scenario in a future date Sri Lankan government will be told by China to set up a military base on the Sri Lankan shores, China will make the same appeal from Sri Lanka just like they did in Djibouti, highlighting that the Chinese priority in the Indian Ocean is to secure its infrastructure and maintain and contribute to maritime security, argues Abeyagoonasekera.

Limiting to calculate the volume of loans provided by other foreign nations and sovereign bonds/private commercial loans exceeding the percentage of China is a narrow view to dismiss the Strategic-trap in Sri Lanka. Rather than quantitative values, Strategic-trap assesses beyond the volume of loans from a foreign nation, thus also considering the human rights, political and security dimensions and impact in the long-term horizon. China is a rising power in the Indian Ocean that has formulated a Strategic-trap to expand its sphere of influence in its long game.

Abeyagoonasekera, in his 2021 book ‘Conundrum of an Island’ published by World Scientific,[14] refers to the work of ‘Jean Francois Dufour, Economist and Director of DCA China Analysis, comments that the sums invested by China are not donations but loans with consequences. The opponents of China, like India, painted the entire operation as a deliberate plan to acquire strategic positions in the region,’ warning the same could happen to Italy’s Trieste Port as Italy is already a partner of BRI. However, this critical view is not accepted by many nations that receive Chinese funds, such as Sri Lanka. BRI is seen as an ambitious foreign policy strategy to bring the developing world under the Chinese orbit. One of the fears in the developing world is that Belt and Road Initiative would likely institutionalise a Chinese authoritarian model, undermining the existing democratic and economic model in many nations.’[15]

Abeyagoonasekera agrees that Debt-trap diplomacy is a severe concern for developing nations like Sri Lanka, and beyond this, a Strategic-trap is another dimension to consider.

Rajapaksa foreign policy and Strategic Trap[edit]

“The problem of the Rajapaksa’s (referring to Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa) is that you start with a balanced non-aligned foreign policy… but when it comes to practice, there is a serious bandwagoning with the Chinese,” said Abeyagoonasekera.[16] Following the same bandwagoning foreign policy of his brother, the present Gotabaya Rajapaksa regime's foreign policy was discussed in his paper published by Observer Research Foundation India.[17] Abeyagoonasekera warns ‘The danger of port geopolitics is still not understood by the hedging policy circle where they have preferred to bandwagon with Beijing, reminding that a single submarine visit to Colombo port could alter Indo-Lanka bilateral security relations, impacting domestic politics of Colombo in a similar manner as the 2014 Chinese PLAN submarine port call[18] did’. Rajapaksa foreign policy has assisted the Chinese strategic trap in Sri Lanka.

Economic Crisis and Strategic Trap[edit]

On 26 March India ThePrint carried an article on Strategic-trap pointing out to Abeyagoonasekera's comments “the term ‘debt trap’, doesn't capture the non-financial aspects of Chinese investments and loans”.[1] Chinese ‘strategic trap’ responsible for the precarious situation, the island country faces.[1] Sri Lankan economic crisis (2019–present) was the worst economic crisis in its history since independence with deteriorated foreign reserves and its inability to pay for its borrowings. In an interview with Pakistonomy,[19] Abeyagoonasekera explained ‘There are large Chinese borrowings on financially unprofitable projects in Sri Lanka such as the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport built near the wildlife sanctuary not operating for many years was a clear example explained Abeyagoonasekera. Further adding China has built this ancillary infrastructure for long term civil-military use to support their 99 years leased Hambantota International Port[20] closer to the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 "Sri Lanka faces Chinese 'strategic trap': Expert". ThePrint. 2022-03-26. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  2. "Debt-trap diplomacy", Wikipedia, 2022-03-28, retrieved 2022-03-28
  3. "UN Human Rights Council passes resolution mandating war crimes evidence collection on Sri Lanka | Tamil Guardian". www.tamilguardian.com. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  4. "Interview: No evidence of genocide or detention camp in Xinjiang, says Sri Lanka's foreign secretary - Xinhua | English.news.cn". www.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  5. Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga. "The Rajapaksa triumvirate and the CCP backdoor in Sri Lanka". ORF. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  6. "Sri Lanka in 2021: Trouble Ahead For One of Asia's Oldest Democracies". South Asian Voices. 2021-12-22. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  7. "Securitisation and militarisation in Sri Lanka: A continuum | Daily FT". www.ft.lk. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  8. "India Feels the Squeeze in Indian Ocean with Chinese Projects in Neighborhood". VOA. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  9. Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga. "Rajapaksa's dysfunctional regime in Sri Lanka and its impact on South Asia". ORF. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  10. Brautigam, Deborah. "Deborah Brautigam". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  11. ""Nepal should have independent observations on MCC"". Khabarhub. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  12. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ8010-Sri-Lanka-RP-WEB-200324.pdf
  13. "Debunking the Myth of 'Debt-trap Diplomacy'". Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. 2020-08-19. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  14. Abeyagoonasekera, Asanga (2021-02). Conundrum of an Island. WORLD SCIENTIFIC. doi:10.1142/12028. ISBN 978-981-12-2784-4. Check date values in: |date= (help) Search this book on
  15. https://worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/12028
  16. "Sri Lanka faces Chinese 'strategic trap': Expert". ThePrint. 2022-03-26. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  17. "Sri Lanka faces Chinese 'strategic trap': Expert". ThePrint. 2022-03-26. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  18. "Chinese submarine docks in Sri Lanka despite Indian concerns". Reuters. 2014-11-02. Retrieved 2022-03-28.
  19. What's Going On In Sri Lanka?, retrieved 2022-03-28
  20. Abi-Habib, Maria (2018-06-25). "How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2022-03-28.



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