Australian Involvement in the East Timor Invasion

Australia, a close neighbour of both Indonesia and East Timor, was the only country to recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, and generally offered support for the annexation from the start of invasion in 1974. The recognition, while given by the government, was generally not supported by the Australian people. Australia assisted the Indonesian military, even while human rights abuses were occurring and the Indonesian military was implicated in massacres, though the independence movement was supported by some within Australia as well. The Australian Government saw the need for stability and to maintain good relations with their neighbour, Indonesia, while it was criticised in some quarters for putting those issues about human rights. In 1998, the Howard Government changed its stance and supported East Timor self determination, prompting a referendum that saw East Timor regain its sovereignty.

Introduction

Despite the unpopularity of the events in East Timor generally with the Australian public, according to author Clinton Fernandes the Malcolm Fraser, Robert Hawke and Paul Keating governments allegedly co-operated with the Indonesian military and President Suharto to obscure details about conditions in East Timor and to preserve Indonesian control of the region. Australian governments saw good relations and stability in Indonesia (Australia's largest neighbour) as providing an important security buffer to Australia's north. Nevertheless, Australia provided important sanctuary to East Timorese independence advocates like José Ramos-Horta (who based himself in Australia during his exile). However, throughout the duration of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, the Australian public were generally uncomfortable, if not actively against the occupation, initially highlighted by the deaths of five Australian journalists who came to be known as the "Balibo 5". Also the actions of the Timorese people in supporting Australian forces during the Battle of Timor in World War II were well-remembered, particularly by veterans. These two issues kept the East Timor occupation in a negative light, throughout the duration of the invasion and occupation. Protests took place in Australia against the occupation, prominent East Timorese lived in Australia and kept the issue alight, and some Australian nationals participated in the resistance movement. Suharto in fact avoided coming to Australia, with the knowledge that there would be public protests.

Whitlam Government Era 1974–75

There are a number of reasons why the Whitlam Government supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Whitlam, speaking to the ABC, said to an extent, his Government was carrying on the view that East Timor was not viable as an independent state, a view that had been established by the preceding Robert Menzies Government. Additionally, there were initial fears of a possible Communist government being installed in East Timor by the Timorese, after the withdrawal of the Portuguese. This saw the Whitlam Government look favourably upon Indonesian annexation, and Whitlam expressed this desire to Suharto in a visit to him in 1974.

Michael Salla, writing in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, said Whitlam perceived and interpreted the issue in an anti-colonial framework. He saw the separation of West and East Timor as a legacy of colonialism, and indicated he was prepared to dismiss East Timorese claims for independence in order to rectify what he saw was a "colonial accident". Whitlam himself said "the division of the island of Timor is no more than an accident of Western colonial history". There were also fears that a long drawn out civil war could result in great loss of life over a long period, as had occurred in Angola, another ex-Portuguese colony To an extent, Whitlam established the logic and support of the annexation, and this was carried on by Australian Prime Ministers and their governments. In addition, the Australian Government saw the desire for peace in the ASEAN region. Nicholas Klar, wrting on Whitlam's response to the Indonesian invasion, said that Whitlam also was concerned that revolution by separation movements could domino across Indonesia, causing a domino effect that could see the balkanisation of Indonesia into small states. Wikileaks documents have indicated that before the invasion, there is some possible evidence that Australia was feeding intelligence to Indonesia about Portugal, in order to minimise misunderstanding about the situation between the two countries.

Comments by the Whitlam Government may have encouraged the Suharto regime to invade East Timor. Despite this, and the favourable view of the annexation, the Australian Government did vote for a UN resolution condemning the invasion, in 1975.

Fraser Government and East Timor 1975–84

A meeting between Fraser and Suharto in October 1976, represented the end of official, albeit ambiguous, Australian opposition to the Indonesian invasion. At the 1976 General Assembly vote for a resolution again calling for an Indonesian withdrawal and for East Timorese self-determination, Australia changed its 1975 position and abstained. The Government of Malcolm Fraser was the first to officially recognise Indonesia's defacto annexation of East Timor, doing so in January 1978. This was followed by de jure recognition, during negotiations with Indonesia regarding the seabed boundary between the two countries. The Prime Minister ordered the seizure of a two-way radio link between East Timor and Australia being operated illegally by Fretilin supporters near Darwin. Following his return from Jakarta, Mr Fraser gave instructions that the Telecom outpost radio service near Darwin cease picking up and passing on Fretilin messages from East Timor. He also denied Australian entry visas to Fretilin spokesmen claiming to represent the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

The opposition party at the time, the Labor Party, in 1979, called on the Fraser Government to withdraw the recognition. Fraser himself saw that he had no choice but to continue the recognition, as it would have caused serious repercussion with Indonesia, and the US at the time would not support Australia, as they saw the East Timorese resistance group, FRETILIN, as communists, and it was seen in Australia's interest to support Indonesia. During this period, there was an increasing focus on human rights issues, and in 1982, concerned that the focus of the Fraser government was ignoring the issue of human rights, the Senate, now controlled by the Labor Party and the Democrats, began an inquiry into allegations of human rights abuses.

Hawke Government 1983–91

The Hawke Government continued and confirmed Australia's de jure recognition of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Portugal expressed its displeasure by recalling its Ambassador, Inacio Rebello de Andrade, back to Lisbon. Indonesian and Australian representatives signed the Timor Gap Treaty in a plane above the Timor Sea. The treaty came into force on 9 February 1991. It established a zone of cooperation in an oil-rich undersea area, with future plans to manage oil resources in the area.

Keating era 1994–98

Initially, after Paul Keating took over the role of Prime Minister, he simply continued the recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. However, the Keating Government escalated its military and other relations with Indonesia, beyond the previous governments. Both Australia and the US were involved in assisting the Indonesian military, and relations during this time included the signing of a security treaty. While other prime ministers like Whitlam had met with Suharto in Indonesia, Paul Keating in particular was seen as having strong relations with the Suharto family and attracted some criticism for it. According to John Pilger and several other journalists, Keating was perceived as not having done enough, while Prime Minister, to prevent human rights abuses in East Timor, though others, such as Whitlam, have defended Keating's policies.

Birmingham, Cotton and Thakur, writing in their respective books on the occupation of East Timor, stated that following the 1991 Dili massacre, which occurred on 12 November 1991, the Keating Government claimed the massacre was an aberration, whereas, this was in fact not the case however, a Government Joint Committee criticised he Government, saying its response to the massacre should have been more condemning.

Documentary maker John Pilger also accused Keating of covering up a second round of massacres, which occurred while he was Prime Minister. In response, Keating threatened to sue Pilger. Keating's foreign minister, Gareth Evans, defended Keating by saying that in fact, there had been a second round of massacres, though they had not been covered up. During the period of East Timor occupation, Keating refused to give political assylum to East Timorese fleeing Timor.

Howard Government and withdrawal of occupation forces 1998–2000

Main article: International Force for East Timor

After winning power in 1996, initially the Howard Government continued on the path of the previous Australian governments, and continued to support Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. However, the fall of Indonesian President Suharto and a shift in Australian policy by the Howard Government in 1998 helped precipitate a proposal for a referendum on the question of independence for East Timor. In late 1998, the Howard Government drafted a letter to Indonesia setting out a change in Australian policy, suggesting that the East Timorese be given a chance to vote on independence within a decade. The letter upset Indonesian President B. J. Habibie, who saw it as implying Indonesia was a "colonial power" and he decided to announce a snap referendum. There was also a view within Indonesia, that until the issues of independence was dealt with IN East Timor, Indonesia may spend 10 years investing money and time in the province, only to have the province break off. A UN-sponsored referendum held in 1999 showed overwhelming approval for independence, but was followed by violent clashes and a security crisis, instigated by anti-independence militia. Australia then led a United Nations backed International Force for East Timor to end the violence and order was restored.

After the withdrawal of the Indonesian military from East Timor, violence flared in Indonesia, mainly relating to pro Indonesian militia. Australia under the then Prime Minister, John Howard (who had replaced Keating in 1996), deployed the International Forces East Timor INTERFET peace keepers to stop violence against the East Timorese by militia. In response, Keating was reported as saying that the violence was in fact Howard's fault. While some media commentators defended Keating's comments, and said he had been misinterpreted, other media and politicians' commentary indicated at the time that in fact Keating's attack on Australia's intervention only highlighted Keating's own past errors in judgement over East Timor. The INTERFET coalition deployed to East Timor on 20 September 1999, as a non-UN force operating in accordance with UN Resolutions. Led by Australia, who contributed 5,500 personnel and the force commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove, it was tasked with restoring peace and security, protecting and supporting UNAMET, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. While the intervention was ultimately successful, Australian-Indonesian relations would take several years to recover.

Public support for East Timor independance

While the Government continued to recognise the annexation of East Timor during this period, there was a contradictory large amount of support for East Timorese self determination by the Australian public. In particular, The Catholic Church, Unions, The Communist Party of Australia and East Timores in Australia worked together to protest the issue. The feelings amongst the Australian public gradually peaked, and when the Militia violence occurred after the referendum ballot, the feelings were that strong the Government moved to be involved to protect the East Timorese

References

• Australia-East Timor Association & Taudevin, Lansell & Lee, Jefferson (2000). East Timor: Making Amends? Analysing Australia's Role in Reconstructing East Timor. Published for the Australia-East Timor Association by Otford Press, Otford, New South Wales.
• Fernandes, Clinton (2004). Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor. Scribe Publications, Carlton North, Victoria.
• Cotton, James (2004). East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its Aftermath in Southeast Asia. RoutledgeCurzon, New York
• Sherlock, Stephen & Australia. Parliament & Australia. Department of the Parliamentary Library. Parliamentary Research Service (1992). East Timor: A Challenge for Indonesia and Australia. Dept. of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory.
• Connery, David (2015-12-10). Crisis Policymaking: Australia and the East Timor Crisis of 1999. ANU ePress.
• Dunn, James (2003). East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence. (3rd ed). Longueville Books, Double Bay, New South Wales.
• Hoyle, Maxwell Bruce (2000-01-01). Australia and East Timor: Elitism, Pragmatism and the National Interest. Deakin University, Faculty of Arts
• Commonwealth Government of Australia, Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor, Senate Report, 7 December 2000 http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries/1999-02/east_timor/report/index

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